tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20439626677811557592024-02-20T03:00:56.269-08:00FORCE NewsmagazineFORCE is a monthly newsmagazine on national security and defence with focus in nine areas: the defence forces; procurements by imports and indigenisation; nuclear weapons, delivery systems and non-proliferation regimes; revolution in military affairs; terrorism and counter-terrorism; intelligence; paramilitary forces; strategic and geo-political issues in South Asian region; and the impact of outside powers on the regionFORCEhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17033758774826339971noreply@blogger.comBlogger47125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2043962667781155759.post-78989909707210969442016-06-25T04:39:00.002-07:002016-06-25T04:39:58.267-07:00First Carriage Flight of Su-30MKI with BRAHMOS<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"><b>According to the just issued press release by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd:</b></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; text-align: justify;">'The first carriage flight of Su-30 MKI aircraft with BRAHMOS missile was
successfully achieved at HAL Airport, Nashik today. “It is a perfect example of
Make in India and an engineering marvel in aviation history of India. It proves
that when all agencies come together with one mission, there is nothing like
impossible”, said T. Suvarna Raju, CMD, HAL who was present on the
occasion. He pointed out that this unique programme was taken up by HAL as an
indigenous challenge at its Nashik Division and the required data was generated
without the assistance of OEM for the modification. It is not the
techno-economics of the project, but HAL’s commitment to self-reliance which
made HAL to sign the contract with </span><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; text-align: justify;">BrahMos Aerospace Pvt Ltd (BAPL)</span><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; text-align: justify;"> in 2014 for modification of two Su30
MKI aircraft for integration of BRAHMOS missile. The first modified aircraft
was airborne in one year and the second aircraft in the second year. This is
the second project where HAL presumed the role of OEM and modified the airframe
of license build aircraft.</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"><span lang="EN-US">Sudhir Kumar Mishra, CEO & MD, BrahMos Aerospace said it is the first time in the world that such a heavy weight (2,500 kg)
supersonic cruise missile has been integrated on fighter aircraft. “The world
did not believe us that we could do it and thanks to the vision of late
President APJ Abdul Kalam, we could achieve this today and history is
made”, he added.</span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"><span lang="EN-US">The aircraft was in the air for 45 minutes and was flown by Wg. Cdr.
Prashant Nair and Wg Cdr M.S. Raju, both flight test crew of ASTE.</span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"><span lang="EN-US">With successful integration of BRAHMOS, Su-30MKI has become
a lethal weapon delivery platform for IAF. Around 40 Su-30MKI
aircraft are expected to be modified. The maiden flight will be followed by
series of test flights and complete evaluation and certification of BRAHMOS missile on Su-30MKI, added Mr. Raju. </span></span><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">The missile is developed by BAPL. Other agencies involved in the project
include CEMILAC and DGAQA.'</span></div>
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FORCEhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17033758774826339971noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2043962667781155759.post-5467503147136965422015-08-31T21:37:00.000-07:002015-09-01T00:46:52.585-07:00Folklore, Not Fact<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><i><b>Instead of a
great victory, 1965 war should be remembered for lessons not learnt</b></i><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;">
</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><b>By Pravin
Sawhney</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;">The 1965 war between India and Pakistan was
a political and military stalemate. Political because the Tashkent declaration
after the war sought to settle the immediate war issues rather than the reason
behind the war: Kashmir. Military because the ceasefire line formed after the
1947-49 war remained intact without change; proof that neither side had won the
war.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;">According to the western army
commander responsible for the entire war front, Lt Gen. Harbakhsh Singh (in his
book, <i>War Despatches</i>), ‘With the
exception of the Hajipir offensive, none of the remaining thrusts were pushed
to a successful conclusion… Most of our offensive actions fizzled out into a
series of stalemates without achieving decisive results.’<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;">One such offensive that spoke of
India’s senior leadership’s incompetence and junior leadership’s initiative
happened on 7 September 1965 when leading Infantry column (3 Jat) of the Indian
Army reached the outskirts of Lahore and asked for reinforcements to press ahead.
While tasked to occupy the east bank of Ichhogil canal (Pakistan Army’s
obstacle system for defence of Lahore), they managed to cross the canal and
reached the gates of Lahore.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;">Both the Pakistan and the Indian
Army were shell-shocked. The Pakistan Army because it could not conceive this
scenario; heavy strafing by the Pakistan Air Force was ordered to save face.
The Indian Army senior leadership was equally dumbstruck by the initiative of
the junior leadership, as it had not catered for such a run-away success.
Reaching Lahore was unimaginable and outside the script. What followed was
dithering, piecemeal reinforcements, tardy cooperation with the Indian Air
Force and finally orders by the brigade commander for the Indian column to
withdraw.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;">Yet another example of India’s weak
leadership was in the Chhamb sector where the Pakistan Army made a major
irregular forces’ thrust supported by heavy artillery fire on August 14. The
bombardment cost the life of the 191 infantry brigade commander, Brigadier B.F.
Master. While the terrorists’ ingress was contained, the Indian leadership
failed to appreciate the terrain advantages vis-à-vis India in this sector, and
the fact that Pakistan’s armoured formation was close at hand in Sialkot and Kharian.
Despite this, Indian leadership did not assess Chhamb to be a major war arena,
only to be surprised when the Pakistani armour thrust came here during
Operation Grand Slam on 1 September. The newly raised and inducted India’s 10
division lost Chhamb and just about managed to save the Akhnoor bridge, the
sole communication link to Jammu.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;">Thus, India’s overall war effort
showed numerous shortcomings: poor strategic and operational intelligence,
indecisive higher defence organisation, reactive thinking, inability to exploit
operational opportunities, lack of directive style of command (where junior
leadership are allowed to take initiatives), and little agreement between the
army and the air force. All these weaknesses exist even today with each defence
service having its own doctrine and ideas about how to defend territory. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;">On the other hand, Pakistan’s 1965 proactive
war aim was to complete the unfinished agenda of the 1947-49 war: Annex
Kashmir. This was to be done in three phases, one in Gujarat and two in
Kashmir. The Gujarat phase was conceived by the Pakistan supremo, President
General Ayub Khan to both bring territorial disputes between India and Pakistan
into international limelight and to test the new weapon systems acquired from
the US after Pakistan joined the US-led South East Asia Treaty Organisation
(SEATO) and Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;">Taking advantage of its territorial
claims in the Rann of Kutch in Gujarat, the Pakistan army took advantage of
India’s laxity of not guarding the disputed area (a similar mistake by India
led to the 1999 Kargil conflict). While India’s timely reaction minimised the
damage, the Pakistan Army could test its new weapons. Under the aegis of the
British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, the two sides, both members of the
Commonwealth, amidst fanfare and bonhomie signed the Kutch agreement in July
1965 and agreed to restore the status quo ante as on 1 January 1965. This set
the stage for the war in Kashmir. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;">Pakistan’s 1965 Kashmir war-plan
followed the 1947-49 script: irregulars followed by regulars. Originally, the
war was meant to be limited to Jammu and Kashmir. The Pakistan Army raised a
guerrilla force which was led by regular officers under the overall command of
Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik. Numbering about 30,000, and called the
Gibraltar Force, it was divided into columns which were to infiltrate into
Kashmir through various ingress routes. For example, Salauddin column with
Srinagar as its objective was meant to capture the Srinagar airfield and the
radio station. They were then to invite Pakistan publicly to liberate Kashmir.
Heeding the call, the Pakistan Army would attack with tanks and artillery
across the southern end of the LC (called working boundary by Pakistan), which
was semi-mountainous and plain and cut-off Jammu from the mainland. The plan
was based on two simple principles of war: surprise and initiative.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;">The infiltrations started on August
8, the day Kashmir was celebrating the festival of Sufi Pir Dastgir. The same
week, crowds were to assemble in Srinagar to mark the anniversary of the arrest
of Sheikh Abdullah in 1953. Pakistan’s guerrilla force was to mingle with the
crowds and incite them to raise anti-India slogans. Instead, the people,
finding foreigners amongst them handed them to the police. Other infiltrating
columns met with similar fate. Undeterred by the failure of his initial plan,
Ayub Khan went ahead with the second act and launched Operation Grand Slam on 1
September 1965 in Chhamb-Akhnoor sector. India, its intelligence agencies and
the military were caught napping.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;">What saved embarrassment for India
was the support of the people of Kashmir, and Prime Minister Shastri’s go ahead
to the army to broaden the war beyond the J&K theatre to relieve pressure
from Pakistan’s point of choosing. Ayub Khan had not bargained for this. While
losing Chhamb, the Indian Army opened the Punjab front which broadened the
war. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;">The 22-day war between India and
Pakistan in 1965 went wrong for the Pakistani ruler, Ayub Khan, who started it
all, because his critical assumptions did not stay course. Fought over Kashmir,
to grab what Pakistan could not in 1947-49, Ayub Khan presumed that the people
of Kashmir would welcome the Pakistani intruders. They did not. Instead, they
helped Indian security forces nab the outsiders. Then, China did not go the
whole hog in opening the second front against India; it simply made a few
noises. Little known to Pakistan, China had been warned of dire consequences by
the United States if it took advantage of the war. Moreover, in spite of the
1962 war debacle, the Indian Army at tactical levels rose like a phoenix to
meet the Pakistani challenge. And last, but not the least, Ayub Khan calculated
that in the absence of the towering presence of Nehru, his little known
successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri would surrender on Kashmir.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;">The opposite happened; Shastri stood
ground on Kashmir and let the military run the operations. In an exceptional
saga of grit and determination, Haji Pir was captured by 68 Infantry brigade
under Brigadier Zorawar Bakshi. Unfortunately, after the ceasefire, Shastri, in
a goodwill gesture towards Pakistan, returned it at the post-war Tashkent
summit with Ayub Khan.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;">How did the 1965 war fare? The honours
were equally shared by the two sides. Pakistan lost territory in Jammu and
Kashmir, while India lost land in Khem-Karan and Chhamb. Prime Minister
Shastri, by supporting the military effort, helped the army recover some honour
lost in the 1962 war. However, his giving away of Haji Pir to the wily Ayub
Khan showed that India continued to decide its border policy without any say
from the military, which is meant to defend it.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;">Learning the right lessons from the
war, the Pakistan Army has today turned the tables on the Indian military. With
an insurgency raging in Kashmir since 1990, with its usual ups and downs, the
Indian Army is more worried about the safety of its internal lines of
communication (which according to the present Director General Military
Operations, Lt General Subrata Saha is the theatre’s centre of gravity) in case
of a war with Pakistan. The unrelenting proxy war by Pakistan has left the
Indian Army enervated and fatigued with little time, energy, resources, and
even inclination for training for conventional war. This explains Indian Army’s
precariously depleted war wastage reserves since years, lack of systemic
acquisitions and modernisation.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;">Moreover, China as a transformed
nation with credible military power in all domains of war can no longer be
dictated to by the US or any other power. With the signing of the
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which runs along three axis — eastern,
central and western — from the Karakoram Pass to Gwadar and Karachi, Pakistan’s
military power has been enhanced substantially in four ways. One, the Pakistan
military’s operational sustenance is, at present, more than India’s, implying
the Pakistan military would be able to fight a long duration conventional war. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;">Two, growing interoperability
between the Pakistan military and the PLA would help Pakistan share China’s
assets in space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains as well its ballistic and
cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles. Three, the fibre optic
communications link between the PLA and the Pakistan Army would ensure timely
interaction between the two obviating the need for Pakistani generals to travel
to Beijing (as General Pervez Musharraf did during the Kargil conflict) in case
of a crisis with India. And four, the acquisition of tactical nuclear weapons has
put paid to any possibility of the Indian military taking the war inside
Pakistan across the international border like in 1965. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;">Given this, instead of merely celebrating
the heroism and brilliant tactical battles fought by young officers and men, India
should introspect to understand Pakistan’s intentions on Kashmir, especially
when the Pakistan Army still celebrates the 1965 war as Pakistan Defence Day.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
FORCEhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17033758774826339971noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2043962667781155759.post-35273533003616064772015-08-19T21:38:00.000-07:002015-08-19T21:40:09.456-07:00Don't Make a Joke of Talks<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;"><i>India-Pak NSA level talks should not be reduced to scoring points</i></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;"><b>By Pravin Sawhney</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;">Two realities should never be lost sight
off when considering relations between India and Pakistan. First, the power
balance between the civil and military in Pakistan will always be heavily
tilted in favor of General Headquarters, Rawalpindi whatever the dispensation
in Islamabad. And second, the Pakistan Army will never give up its support to
cross border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir as long as the Line of Control
exists in its present form.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;">Irrespective of the political
mandate with a civil government in Pakistan, the Pakistan army will continue to
dominate India policy as it holds two aces it would never give up: nuclear
weapons and ownership of Kashmir resolution. Pakistan’s growing geopolitical
clout build with the support of the United States and China (for different
reasons) is pivoted upon its possession of nuclear weapons. Without the latter,
it would have been impossible for Pakistan to spread its strategic wings on the
basis of religious identify even in the Middle East. Today, Pakistan’s
geopolitical importance is understood by Russia, Central Asian Republics and of
course within the turbulent Middle East torn asunder by power play between
Saudis and Iran.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;">On terrorism, it is unrealistic to
expect the Pakistan Army to give up both its low cost bleeding of India and blunting
of the Indian Army’s fighting capabilities. The Pakistan Army assumed ownership
of the Kashmir agenda after the 1947-49 war with India when Karachi, the
civilian capital of the new born nation, proved incompetent to conceive and
fight the 18-month war. It fell on Rawalpindi to fulfil the dream of the Quaid-e-Azam
to integrate Kashmir with Pakistan. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;">Learning lessons from the first
Kashmir war after Independence, the Pakistan Army used the strategy of a two-prong
assault — irregulars followed by regular army — in the 1965 war. It did not
lose the war, but the two-prong strategy misfired as the people of the Valley showed
more faith in India than Pakistan. Once the insurgency erupted in the Valley in
1990, the Pakistan Army, having perfected the low cost war in Afghanistan,
shifted its sights to J&K. Since then, it has gained aplenty by making the
Indian Army unfit for conventional war. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;">Thus, on the one hand, it has given
the Pakistan Army time, energy and resources to plug the operational gaps and
even get a leg-up along the military line in J&K. On the other hand, it
manages to compel India to come back for bilateral talks. If the Pakistan Army
were to stop cross-border terrorism, India, which desires a status quo in
J&K, would have little reason to talk with Pakistan over Kashmir. Moreover,
the friends of Pakistan, in the present case Russia, would not have nudged
India to start talks with Pakistan.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;">Given these truisms, it is difficult
to understand how talks between the two National Security Advisors slated for
August 23 in New Delhi would lead meaningfully anywhere with divergent core
interests. Pakistan’s NSA, Sartaj Aziz has made it clear that the Kashmir
resolution would be his focus. India, under the BJP government, is fixated on
terrorism with talks on Kashmir resolution being anathema to it. Moreover, the NSA-level
talks are being held when Pakistan scores well, both on strategic clout and
military capabilities.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
FORCEhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17033758774826339971noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2043962667781155759.post-34712031833370924782015-08-10T05:59:00.001-07:002015-08-10T05:59:13.180-07:00Not a Big Deal<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><b><br /></b></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><b>Mutual distrust continues to haunt the 10-year-old Indo-US nuclear deal</b></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
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<i style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">By Pravin Sawhney</i></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">Sanjaya Baru (Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s media
advisor) wondered why on the 10</span><sup style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">th</sup><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;"> anniversary of 18 July 2005 nuclear
deal there was little celebration in Delhi when in the US, the Carnegie
Endowment think-tank brought together bipartisan supporters of the deal
including US vice president Joe Biden to mark the momentous occasion which
resulted in strategic partnership between India and the US. He pointed out that
few in India were clear about the deal (technical aspects), and still fewer
understood a transactional relationship which is what the deal was about.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Meanwhile,
Ashley J. Tellis, an astute US commentator intimately involved in the post-deal
negotiations believes that ‘the nuclear deal transformed India overnight from
being a target of determined US non-proliferation policy to becoming a partner
in America’s larger geo-political endeavours.’ <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Was it really so
considering geo-political partnerships require strategic trust? Ironically,
India had reached out to the US before and after 1998 nuclear tests to be
rebuffed with grand brush-off which, not coincidently, saw the unholy
partnership between China and Pakistan come out of the closet. This generated vast
distrust in the India-US bilateral relationship which the deal, given its unrealisable
agenda and counter-productive pace, brought out into the open.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">The roots of the
nuclear deal go to India’s 1998 nuclear tests. When the Vajpayee government
came to power, US President Bill Clinton sent commerce secretary and friend,
Bill Richardson to India. His agenda was to find out if the BJP-led government
would do the nuclear tests as committed in their election manifesto. Richardson
got assurances at the highest level that decision for nuclear tests would depend
upon the recommendations of the first-ever Strategic Defence Review. Prime
Minister Vajpayee, however, encouraged Richardson to meet Jaswant Singh (his
senior advisor on foreign and defence affairs) ‘in private’ according to Strobe
Talbott’s book, <i>Engaging India</i>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Jaswant Singh
went alone to meet the Richardson team at the residence of the US ambassador to
India. His mission: to tell them that ‘he was under instructions from Vajpayee
to serve as a discreet — and if necessary, secret — channel to Washington, to
be used for anything sensitive that the US leadership wished to convey to the
Prime Minister.’ India was clearly proposing geopolitical partnership to the US.
Jaswant Singh believed that close geopolitical ties with the US would help India
transform its status from a balancing to a leading power.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Jaswant Singh —
a rare politician in India who understood geopolitics — was aware of two strategic
issues where understanding with the US was necessary. The first was India’s
need for high technology, which since 1984 (the two countries signed a
memorandum of understanding on science and technology) had been a recurring
talking point between the two counties. The second issue concerned China. In
his book, <i>Defending India</i> published
soon after the tests, he wrote, ‘from the early fifties, when Indian policy
helped an emerging China, to now when the century ends, a relationship of
equals no longer obtains. Clearly, India’s management of Sino-Indian relations
has been a failure and the nation continues to pay the price.’ <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Immediately after
the tests, unsure of how he would be received by an angry Clinton
administration, Jaswant Singh got in touch with American expert, George
Perkovich to explore possibility of his meetings at the US State Department.
Without waiting to hear from the US administration, Jaswant Singh reached the
US on 6 June 1998 where in a series of media interactions he explained India’s
viewpoint — how the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
and the imminent universal acceptance of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban
Treaty (CTBT) had forced India to safeguard its security interests. This,
Jaswant Singh did after the Clinton administration had made Prime Minister
Vajpayee’s letter to President Clinton where he had cited China as the main
reason for conducting the May 1998 nuclear tests public.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">If the US felt
let down by India’s nuclear tests, the disclosure of Vajpayee’s letter by the
US President was seen as a snub of India’s geopolitical aspirations. With
India’s strategic intent out into the open, China decided to play hard ball: restrict
India’s geopolitical ambitions through its proxy Pakistan while ensuring that
India-US ties did not get too cosy for its comfort.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Jaswant Singh’s
meeting with Richardson had not helped. What is more, within days of the test,
Clinton dispatched secretary of state, Madeleine Albright to a specially
convened US Security Council session where China held the (rotatory) chair. According
to Talbott, the US team ‘spent hours talking the Chinese out of their
preference for more India-bashing and harsher demands in the document.’ The
drafted UN 1172 Security Council resolution of 6 June 1998 made impossible
demand — that India and Pakistan join NPT as non-nuclear weapons states — and
Kashmir as the likely flashpoint found mention in a UN resolution for first
time after the 1972 Simla Agreement. Hereafter, UN 1172 resolution became
China’s stick to beat India with. Most recently, China on 3 June 2015 said that
‘the Nuclear Suppliers Group regarded NPT status as a crucial standard to
accept new member state (referring to India and Pakistan). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">To take the
nuclear deal story forward, once tempers cooled in Washington and sense prevailed
that the nuclear genie could not be put back in the bottle, Jaswant Singh and his US interlocutor
Strobe Talbott ‘met fourteen times at ten locations in seven countries on three
continents’ (as Talbott put it) to come to an understanding. These interactions
helped in formulation of the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP)
announced on 13 January 2004 between Prime Minister Vajpayee and US President
George W. Bush.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">The NSSP covered
three strategic areas, namely, civilian space programme, civilian nuclear
activities and high-technology trade as well as dialogue on missile defence. Trade
in defence hardware was deliberately not included in NSSP, perhaps because it
was felt that trade in weapon platforms should follow trade in technology. This
was meant to ensure that enough strategic trust is build before India purchased
war-fighting platforms which would need uninterrupted supply of spares. India
learned this lesson from US’ close ties with Pakistan where after the Pressler
Amendment, the US refused delivery of F-16 aircraft for which money was already
paid.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">The NSSP
followed the High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG) — meant for commercial
trade in high technology for civilian use — established between the two countries
in November 2002. According to the then US undersecretary of commerce, Kenneth
Juster (FORCE, July 2004), ‘in some respects, the NSSP builds and expands upon
the work being done in the HTCG. The HTCG set up a framework for reviewing and
analysing how technology commerce between the US and India could be expanded
across a broad range of categories, including information technology,
biotechnology, nanotechnology, and defence technology.’<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Thus, the NSSP,
a process capable of fulfilling India’s need of high technology and US’ need of
tightening of Indian laws for better export controls (a non-proliferation
requirement) was meant to, in a subtle progressive manner, help India and the
US come geopolitically closer without ruffling China.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">The slow
movement on NSSP did not diminish its importance. According to the then US
ambassador, David Mulford (FORCE, October 2004), ‘India is the only country
with which the United States has Next Steps in Strategic Partnership initiative,’
adding, ‘a key strategic relationship has to be built into a comprehensive
relationship. Strategic, as you know, applies to a particular type of
relationship. This relationship has been defined as the NSSP initiative.’ Simply
put, the US’ focus was to build a comprehensive bilateral relationship of which
the NSSP and military cooperation were two important components. This approach
was adopted to reduce trust deficit needed for strengthening the bilateral relationship.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Given the high level
of distrust, especially on the India side which felt let down in the aftermath
of the tests, the NSSP was possibly the best approach for the relationship to
grow. This was confirmed by the then NSA, Brajesh Mishra, who was less trusting
of the US than Jaswant Singh. According to Mishra (FORCE, August 2005), ‘there
were three phases in NSSP. In general terms there was a difference of opinion
in what they (the US) were looking and what we were looking. At the end of
NSSP, we were looking at lifting up of all restrictions on India’s civilian
nuclear and space programme. This is not what they had in mind. They were
looking at end-use verification and fissile material. So when phase one was
over, they said that a new phase has begun. What they meant (in that) is a
promise to work with Congress and their allies in Nuclear Suppliers Group.’ <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Given India’s
stated minimum credible deterrence, which Mishra said ‘is a flexible concept’,
‘the NDA (Vajpayee) government had offered to put a few of our existing nuclear
reactors under safeguards. The idea was that from the unsafeguarded reactors
there would be enough fissile material for India’s minimum credible programme.
We have 14 reactors in operation and about nine under (various stages of)
construction (this was in August 2005). I would have said that all future reactors
either built by us or with others’ cooperation will be put under safeguard.
This way we would have had 10 to 11 unsafeguarded reactors. But this was not
acceptable to the US.’<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Just when the
two sides started work on phase two of NSSP, the Vajpayee government was voted
out of power. The incoming Manmohan Singh government with J.N. Dixit as the NSA
while taking ownership of the NSSP, initiated talks with the Bush
administration on phase two of the NSSP in September 2004. However, given the
US Presidential elections, it was left to the second Bush administration to
move the bilateral dialogue forward.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">When the second
Bush administration entered office, two major changes transformed the on-going
dialogue between India and the US: Condoleezza Rice, a Bush family friend was
elevated from the post of NSA to secretary of state, and on the sudden demise
of Dixit, India got a new NSA, M.K. Narayanan, a former intelligence officer
who was unaware of NSSP’s technical nuances. It was in such milieu that Rice,
on her first oversees tour arrived in Delhi on 16 March 2005, and took the
Indian dispensation by storm by her declaration that the US would help India
become a major power.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">There was
excitement in Delhi and alarm in Islamabad and Beijing. While India had harboured
ambitions of becoming a major power, it found it hard to believe that the
foremost power of the time, while acknowledging India’s potential, had promised
to help it achieve glory. Pakistan was worried that by de-hyphenating it from
India the US might lose strategic interest in it. And China saw its containment
in the partnership between India and the US.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">After Rice’s
spectacular announcement in Delhi, the NSSP was ended abruptly and talks on the
nuclear deal — Rice brainchild — began. In her book, <i>No Higher Honour</i>, Rice writes, ‘The key from our point of view was
to get India within the IAEA… better to have India in the tent in some fashion,
even if New Delhi could not formally sign the NPT… at least, new construction
of (Indian) reactors would be under safeguard. India already had more than
enough nuclear material for its military programme. It needed help on the
civilian side and we needed the strategic breakthrough with this emerging,
democratic power.’ <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"> Rice’s trick had worked. The nuclear deal offered
by her was too tempting for Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to let it go easily.
While suggesting nothing more substantive than the NSSP, the nuclear deal by
its over-reach, all-inclusiveness, fast pace and pretence of equality between
India and the US was probably a dishonest proposition. According to the deal,
India was to place certain numbers of its nuclear reactors under International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. In return, the US promised to end
India’s nuclear apartheid by acknowledging it as a nuclear weapons power,
agreed India have access to high and dual-use technologies, and offered to cooperate
on civilian nuclear energy to meet India’s growing energy demands.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">It seemed that
India would get the moon: it would become a nuclear weapons power (with freedom
to maintain its credible minimum deterrence); be free to decide on more indigenous
nuclear reactors for strategic purposes; be part of the global restricted
technology cartels, namely, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR), Australia Group, and Wassenaar Arrangement (all led by
the US); maintain strategic autonomy implying independent foreign policy; not
be clubbed with Pakistan; be free to buy nuclear fuel (Uranium), run the
nuclear closed fuel cycle (including reprocessing and subsequently the
indigenous three-stage Thorium cycle), and purchase state-of-art nuclear
reactors and Enrichment and Reprocessing (ENR) technologies for its energy
needs. It appeared to be a win-win situation for India. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">In reality, from
the US perspective, the deal was about non-proliferation by coercing India to
identify maximum numbers of its rectors for civilian use, getting India to de
facto sign the CTBT even when the US Senate had rejected it, getting India’s
foreign policy closely aligned with that of the US, doing commerce in civil
nuclear reactors and defence (through a 10-year Defence Framework signed
separately but highlighted in the 18 July 2005 framework document), and
eventually having India as a junior strategic partner if not junior ally in the
Asia-Pacific region.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">What Mishra has
foreseen seemed to come true. Going public within days of the 18 July 2005 framework
document (joint statement with the nuclear deal) being signed in Washington,
Mishra said (FORCE, August 2005), ‘My view is that if you offer to identify and
separate the civilian and military nuclear facilities and programmes, it will
have long term national security impacts.’<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Having flown
across half the globe, Prime Minister Manmohan had a similar apprehension
sitting in Washington’s Willard hotel, a block away from the White House on 17
July 2005 night when he was to sign the framework document which was meant to
transform the bilateral relationship next day. He suddenly developed cold feet
and according to Rice refused to meet her since he felt ‘he cannot sell (the
deal) it in New Delhi.’ Reason: the US had shifted the goalpost and wanted
India to ‘keep just two or three reactors outside safeguard’, India’s then NSA,
Narayanan recently disclosed on the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the deal.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">While Rice
managed to coax the Indian Prime Minister to sign the framework document, the
hard work for India as the junior partner had just begun. While the excruciatingly
long process with dramatic highs and lows — on account of US’ constant shifting
of goalposts and meeting its global non-proliferation obligations which were
contrary to the nuclear deal promises — which concluded on 10 October 2008 has
been amply documented, a few instances indicative of the US duplicitousness
deserve highlighting. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Having signed
the framework document, Manmohan Singh returned home to enormous scepticism
strewn across India. The Congress President Sonia Gandhi — the real power
centre — and numerous Congress MPs were unsure about the deal. The Left parties
— coalition partners of the government — were upset about closer ties with the
US and wanted more transparency on the bilateral relationship. The opposition,
led by the BJP, declared the framework document a sell out to the US. And, the diplomats
and scientists were deeply divided on the strategic implications of the deal.
In such a domestically charged atmosphere, US President Bush arrived on 2 March
2006 in Delhi to settle the deal’s separation plan — which reactors to come
under safeguards and which would not. This turned out to be an acrimonious
bilateral exercise as according to the framework document, India was to
unilateraly take this decision. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Sanjaya Baru
says in his book, <i>The Accidental Prime
Minister</i>, ‘The Indian side still (as Manmohan Singh had insisted before
signing the 18 July 2005 framework document) wanted a 14:8 division between
civilian and military reactors, while the American side had not budged from its
position of 18:4. Moreover, the Indian side was keen on keeping the two
research reactors out of the IAEA safeguards.’ While the US ultimately relented
to the Indian position — India would place 14 of its nuclear reactors under
IAEA safeguards by 2014 —, it appeared a pyrrhic victory.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">When Manmohan
Singh was informing the nation that with the separation plan, only 65 per cent
of Indian reactors would be under safeguards, the US’ main interlocutor,
Nicholas Burns told the media that ‘in one generation 90 per cent of Indian
reactors would be under safeguards’. Burns was clearly hinting that India’s
right to decide future indigenous reactors for strategic purposes as agreed to
in the deal would be opposed by the US.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">India was thus being
subjected to restricted fissile material stocks even before the world had
agreed to the terms of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. This is not all. The
India-specific Additional Protocol that India signed with the IAEA was
extremely intrusive and could through technical means monitor progress of the
unsafeguarded reactors. Moreover, the US relented on keeping India’s research
reactors out of safeguards because they have yet not harnessed the indigenous
three-stage Thorium cycle (example of technology over-reach). Things might
change in the future. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Interestingly,
while Bush was pushing India’s case for exemption from the global restrictive
regimes (NSG for waiver to India to do nuclear commercial trade) and the US
Congress, the US, under its global commitment, was also urging the NSG to
review its export control rules to check proliferation. Finally, in July 2011,
the NSG announced its new export norms: only those nations which had signed the
NPT would be eligible for ENR technologies. This came as a bombshell for India.
While allowed to trade with the NSG, India would be denied reprocessing and
enrichment technologies needed for utilisation of closed fuel cycle because it
had not signed the NPT. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">In simple terms,
while India could buy nuclear fuel from the world, it could not use it fully as
without reprocessing technologies it would be unable to use the nuclear waste
for energy production. This was when, as scientists protested, India has its
own limited reprocessing capabilities and is not entirely bereft of them. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Regarding
India’s quest for membership of the NSG — the club which works on consensus
principle — China has (July 2015) made it clear that signing of the NPT would
be essential for new member states. What China has left unsaid is that India
could become NSG member if it signs the NPT under US 1172 article as
non-nuclear weapon state.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Even as the
non-proliferation noose was being tightened on India (through signing of India-specific
Additional Protocol with the IAEA, shifting US goalposts by re-interpretation
of the separation plan and NSG export guidelines placing NPT signing benchmark),
there was bilateral disagreement over how much India was obliged to align with
US’ security concerns. India said that it would abide by the bilateral 123
agreement that it has signed with the US, while the US insisted on giving
precedence to its own domestic law, the Henry J. Hyde Act of 2006 (essential
for the US administration to sign the 123 agreement) which required India to
respect US’ security agenda. This resulted in India’s flip-flop Iran policy as
Delhi was torn asunder between its relationship with the US and the need for
bilateral strategic ties with Tehran. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">If this was not
enough, two other contentious issues propped up: US’s disappointment over
defence ties with India, and India’s 2010 Nuclear Liability Law. While the
bilateral Defence Framework was signed in April 2005, three months before the
July 2005 framework agreement, it got mentioned under the framework agreement.
For this reason, the powerful US defence lobby which had played a major role in
the passage of the nuclear deal through the US Congress expected, in a
transactional fashion, to be rewarded. When none of the two US platforms which
had participated in the over USD 40 billion Indian Air Force’s Medium
Multi-Role Combat Aircraft competition made it into the final in beginning 2012,
numerous US Congressmen and leading analysts accused India of betrayal. A lot
of pressure was put on New Delhi to consider another US platform — the F-35
aircraft — for the IAF. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Similarly, the Indian
2010 Nuclear Liability Law was found unacceptable to the US which argued that
in the event of an accident, the liability, as per global norms, should be of
the operator. Thus, when Manmohan Singh’s term in office ended in May 2014, few
mentioned the nuclear deal as the outgoing government’s achievement. Those who
did obfuscated matters by arguing the nuclear deal as a prime reason for
overall improved ties between India and US. The truth remained that both the
strategic and commercial aspects of the nuclear deal had remained unfulfilled.
Nuclear commerce, which India had touted as the key reason for the deal, had
not started. And, India, despite having accepted non-proliferation measures,
namely, signing the Additional Protocol with the IAEA and undertaking the
separation plan, had not operationalised the deal: the promised NSG waiver fell
short of expectations. While India could do nuclear fuel commerce, there
remains uncertainty about India getting reprocessing technologies to recycle
spent fuel. Moreover, the high and dual-use technologies that were promised to
India under the deal have not come; the HTCG had done more for bilateral trade
in these areas.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Speaking at the
Hindustan Times summit in Delhi on 7 December 2013, the architect of the
nuclear deal, Condoleezza Rice admitted that, ‘the technology cooperation (with
India) was tied to the Indo-US nuclear deal.’ While the US got the deal it
wanted, India is still to get the technology it was promised under the NSSP, well
before the deal happened.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Instead of an
objective analysis of the nuclear deal, the Modi government on assuming power
in May 2014, went along with the popular perception that the deal had
transformed relations between India and the US. Before Prime Minister Narendra
Modi embarked on his US visit in September 2014, India, on 22 June 2014 ratified
the Additional Protocol signed (on 15 March 2009) with the IAEA, signalling its
intention to bring the deal to closure so that nuclear commerce with the US
could commence. Between September 2014 and the visit of US President Barack
Obama as the chief guest on India Republic Day on 26 January 2015, ‘experts,
legal and nuclear, from both countries sat down and worked out an understanding
(on India’s Nuclear Liability Law),’ as the US ambassador in India Richard
Verma put it. It is another matter whether it would be acceptable to the business
community in both countries.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Notwithstanding
epithets like ‘natural allies’ used by Vajpayee for Indo-US ties, ‘strategic
partnership’ cited by Manmohan Singh and the recent ‘strategic plus partnership’
by US ambassador in India, Richard Verma, the spectre of mutual distrust has
not gone away. Instead of a gradual mutual understanding, which is what the NSSP
was about, the Indo-US nuclear deal took the big leap into the unknown.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
FORCEhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17033758774826339971noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2043962667781155759.post-12500483255071107412014-10-07T03:47:00.000-07:002014-10-07T03:47:31.811-07:00Delusionary Generals<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">By Pravin Sawhney</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">When French Prime Minister George Clemenceau wrote that, ‘war is too
important to be left to the generals,’ he had people like Lt Gen. Syed Ata Hasnain
in mind who do not understand military coercion or coercive diplomacy as
distinct from war-fighting, are mixed up between perception management and
reality check, and fail to appreciate that land war is just one of the six
domains of war. The war-fighting domains are land, sea and air, while military
coercion (short of war also called non-contact war) is possible in space,
electromagnetic space and cyber domains.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Military coercion is more demanding than actual war-fighting
because in addition to the kinetic capability it needs credibility to deter and
compel if deterrence fails. A failed military coercion demonstrates a blunted
conventional war-fighting capability. This has adverse political, military,
diplomatic and psychological implications as the enemy gets emboldened. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">An example of failed military coercion is India’s
Operation Parakram in 2001-2002 against Pakistan. The Indian Army lost 979
soldiers in what General V.K. Singh refers to as ‘mine panic’, which ‘exposed
the hollowness of our operational preparedness’ (his book: <i>Courage and Conviction</i>); India, by official account, spent Rs 858
crore; and New Delhi eventually blinked after the 10-month military stand-off seeking
refuge in a vague posture called ‘strategic re-deployment.’ Pakistan’s 26
November 2008 Mumbai attacks were a direct consequence of India’s failed military
coercion.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">On the other hand, an example of successful military
coercion is the three-week intrusion in April-May 2003 by Chinese border forces
in Depsang plains (Ladakh). At the political level, Union minister of state for
home, Kiren Rijiju told the Rajya Sabha (13 August 2014) that ‘No intrusions
have been reported or taken place on the Indo-China border during last five
years (since 2009).’ <b>At the military level, the Chairman of the National
Security Advisory Board, Shyam Saran wrote to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on
10 August 2013 after a spot-inspection ordered by the Prime Minister Office
that, ‘the PLA troops are not allowing their Indian counterparts to patrol the
Indian perception of the LAC in eastern Ladakh.’</b> (<i>Hindustan Times</i>, 3 September 2013).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">The inference is obvious: China’s successful military
coercion compelled India to reduce its patrolling limits. Moreover, New Delhi
(Modi, and not Manmohan Singh government), as evident from Rijiju’s statement,
acquiesced to Beijing’s diktat as it does not want military escalation assessing
that it has little hope of winning a war. Indian political leadership correctly
concluded that it is easy to start a ‘localised showdown’, the difficult part
is to control escalation which has its own dynamics. After all, there is the
dictum that no war plans, however brilliantly conceived, usually survive first
contact in war.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">In the larger sense, when Chinese shot down one of its
own satellite in the low earth orbit demonstrating its Anti-Satellite (ASAT) capability
in February 2009, the Pentagon saw this as a coercive reminder to the United
States that it could not count on uncontested control of space commons. Within
months, the US’ Raytheon was given the contract to work on a defensive shield
in space to ensure that Chinese ASAT capabilities do not interfere with US’ military
use of space with debris from destroyed satellites hampering their optimal
utilisation.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Against this background and without digressing any
further by explaining the implications of the 20-day recent stand-off in
Chumar-Demchok (Ladakh) which coincided with Chinese President Xi Jinping’s
visit to India starting September 17, I would like to return to Gen. Hasnain’s
comments on my writing (reproduced below for the readers).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">To Gen Husnain’s suggestion of a ‘localised showdown’,
I argued that China would prefer military coercion through three probable methods,
namely, shooting our satellite, cyber-attacks, or by test-firing its ballistic
missiles with conventional warheads. This will be done to remind us of our miniscule
capabilities in these non-contact war areas, and also to rub in that the PLA is
well past the 1986-87 Sumdorong Chu crisis when both sides had more or less
matching military capabilities. To be sure, China has no reason for a border
war with India when it could achieve its purpose through lesser methods like
the 2013 Depsang crisis.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><b>What is Gen Hasnain’s response? He writes that I
(Sawhney) do not ‘understand perception management’, which according to him
means a gradual build-up for war. ‘Conflicts do not reach levels of shooting
satellites out of sky without a build-up,’ he adds. Now, why is a forces’
build-up required for shooting satellite? Gen. Hasnain read about military
coercion! I recommend Joseph S Nye’s brilliant book ‘The Future of Power.’</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Coming to ‘perception management’, this is meant for
psychological operations (psy ops) as a part of counter-insurgency operations.
An adversary, however, does not get swayed by ‘perception management’, but does
a ‘reality-check’ of the opponent’s capabilities and capacity before deciding
the form of military power to be used in pursuance of his political objectives.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">For argument’s sake, why will China get into a
‘localised showdown’ with India when there are few political objectives to be
won? In a worst case scenario (extremely unlikely) it will go for a full-scale
war with a capability to pump in 38 to 40 divisions in addition to unleashing other
domains of war against India. This is where military strategy and operational
art, where the PLA has mind-boggling capabilities, comes into play.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><b>While Gen. Hasnain boasts of teaching operational art,
he, to be sure, has, while in uniform, been a tactical player. According to the
Indian Army doctrine, a corps (the highest field formation that he has
commanded) is the highest tactical level of war; operational art is practiced
at the command level. This is not all. He seems to have an aversion for
operational art as he commanded the elite 21 strike corps (any officer will
feel blessed to command an offensive force) for an unprecedented low period of
mere three to four months before getting himself posted to 15 corps in
Srinagar. A strike corps by practising manoeuver contributes to operational art
in a land war. </b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">However, considering Gen Hasnain teaches higher levels
of war, I recommend three basic books for his reading and reflection. These
are: Colin S. Gray’s ‘<i>Explorations in
Strategy</i>’, Gen E.B. Atkeson’s ‘<i>The
Final Argument of Kings: Reflections on The Art of War</i>’, and Edward N. Luttwak’s
‘<i>Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace</i>.’<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">To appreciate things closer home, I suggest that the he
read my first book, ‘<i>The Defence
Makeover: 10 Myths that Shape India</i>’s Image,’ written in year 2001, when he
was probably a colonel posted somewhere. This book was reviewed among others by
Maj. Gen. Ashok Mehta, Amitabh Mattoo and P.R. Chari. <b>The reason why he should
read my book is also to know that CI ops in J&K have floundered because its
strategic underpinning was never spelt out. The political leadership should
have given two directives to the army, namely, the end-state and the need for a
mix of offensive and defensive methods. It is a truism that no insurgency can
survive without a robust sanctuary outside (Pakistan Occupied Kashmir in our
case).</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">During the initial years of the insurgency we were
fortunate to have army chiefs like Generals Rodrigues and especially Bipin
Joshi. I remember too well how Gen. Rodrigues urged me (I was in <i>Times of India</i> then) to visit the LC and
see how our units were responding to Pakistan’s machinations by aggressive
firepower and raids; the Pakistanis were on their toes. The next army chief,
Gen. Joshi spent a lot of time with me (I was in <i>Indian Express</i> then) assuring that the army should not and will not
do CI ops open-endedly. Gen. Joshi died early and his successors,
unfortunately, realised that there were rewards and awards to be won in CI ops
besides of course an elevation of status. Where else but in J&K can a corps
commander challenge an elected chief minister publicly? The pits came in 2004. With
Operation Fence, the Indian Army reduced itself to being a (glorified) paramilitary;
the Pakistani troops could now sleep well at night. The fence has instilled a
Maginot Line mentality in the army. Nowhere in the world there is a fence on a
military-line.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Generals like Hasnain who pontificate on the virtues
of the fence are unmindful of the three harms it has done to the army. One, the
over 450 suicides in the army (in 2013-14 given by the defence minister Arun
Jaitley in Parliament) are a consequence of the continuous war-like situation (with
a defensive mind-set) in J&K since 1990. The army leadership does not agree
with this and reels out a list of other reasons underplaying the primary one. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Two, the army has found itself less than prepared in
all crises since 1990, namely, the Kargil conflict, Operation Parakram, and
26/11 attacks. It is rueful that with the largest annual capital acquisition
budget amongst the three defence service, in 2013-2014, the air force spent 48
per cent of the total capital outlay followed by the navy. The army leadership
is so obsessed with CI ops that war preparedness has taken a back-seat. In the
latter, the focus is not on consolidation of assets, but on expansion of
manpower. And three, as a consequence of the above, the air force, unlike in
the previous wars, is no longer in a supporting role to the army. It is
actually the other way round, something that the army leadership is yet to come
to grips with.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><b>All this pains me because I care for the Indian Army,
an organisation that I am proud to have served. But, those days we did not have
officers like Gen. Hasnain. We had professionals who understood war and
operational art. They were not obsessed with CI ops and perception management.</b>
And self-projection.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
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<br /></div>
</div>
FORCEhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17033758774826339971noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2043962667781155759.post-31629354741795280022014-09-24T00:50:00.000-07:002014-09-24T00:50:20.476-07:00Round One to China<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">By Pravin Sawhney</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">The Chumar-Demchok military
stand-off in Ladakh will end to China’s advantage. There are two reasons for
this. At the strategic level, China gives far more importance to psychological
victory than to military gains. The postponement of army chief, General Dalbir
Singh’s Bhutan visit is indicative of the stress within the Indian
establishment; the Prime Minister Office certainly does not assess the
stand-off as a tactical show of strength. Hypothetically speaking, if the
Chinese were to show signs of reinforcing their capability in the entire Ladakh
(which given its infrastructure is no big deal), even Prime Minister Narendra
Modi would be hard-pressed to reconsider his US visit.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">At the
operational level, Chinese would be amused at Indian generals and television experts
who proclaim Indian Army’s capability to take-on PLA might. For example,
recently retired Lt Gen. Syed Ata Hasnain wrote in Indian Express (September
24): ‘Beijing would do well to realistically analyse India’s military
potential, which may appear weak but, in effect, is sufficient to dent China’s
image should there be a localised showdown’. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">Really? Why
will the PLA join a ‘localised’ conflict when for example, it can destroy
India’s communication satellites with its proven Anti-Satellite capabilities,
jam its cyber communications and test-fire a salvo of its ballistic missiles with
conventional warheads from Tibet Autonomous Region as part of military coercion.
In any case, give the shabby state of the Indian Army in terms of its capabilities,
capacities, training and mind-set, does Gen. Hasnain’s claims do India any good
by his pretensions? The PLA which always fights in so-called ‘self-defence’
will use this hollow bravado to its advantage. The problem with generals like these
is that they mix up China with Pakistan (two adversaries as apart as day and
night) and tactics with operational art of war where the PLA has mind-boggling
advantages over the Indian military. Fighting a war with China is not an option
for India; balancing China with a mix of politico-military means is. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">Specific to
Chumar-Demchok when President Xi Jinping was visiting India, experts should
know two fundamental things about China: it can pursue aggression and talks
simultaneously as the premium is on psychological victory rather than military
(tactical) advantage. And, negotiations are never about instant gains and losses,
but are a part of protracted confabulations meant to tire and frustrate the
opponent so that he starts seeing advantage in Chinese’s viewpoint. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">To reflect
on these truisms, I recommend two books as a beginning: Qian Qichen’s ‘Ten
Episodes In China’s Diplomacy,’ and Henry Kissinger’s, ‘On China.’ Qichen was
Chinese foreign minister (vice minister for foreign affairs) and vice-Premier
from 1988 to 2003. He was witness to two momentous events: Tiananmen Square and
the demise of Soviet Union. The well-known Kissinger, probably the best western
observer on China, has personally interacted with four generations of Chinese
leadership before the 2012 arrival of President Xi Jinping.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">In the
aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre, the world came down heavily on China.
Starting 5 June 1989, the US, Japan, the European community, and the G7
Economic Summit announced one after another that they would stop all bilateral
high level visits, stop exporting arms for military and commercial purposes,
and defer new loans to China provided by international financial institutions. Amidst
all this, US President George Bush (senior), who did not want to sever all ties
with China, sent his National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft on a secret
mission to Beijing to assess how the damage could be minimised. What did China
do? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">According to
Qichen, Deng Xiaoping told Prime Minister Li Peng, ‘We will talk only about
principles today. We don’t care about the sanctions. We are not scared by
them.’ Then, he reminded his team a Chinese saying, ‘It is up to the person who
tied the knot to untie it.’ The saying, according to Qichen is ‘not an ordinary
argument about the meaning of words. It is the crux of bilateral relations.’ In
another context, the prescient Qichen in a lecture told Chinese student in 2002
that, ‘I believe, as long as our overall strength (political, economic and
military) continues to grow, Sino-American relations will change in our
favour.’ <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">In his book,
Kissinger explains the difference between western and Chinese strategies.
‘Western strategists reflect on the means to assemble superior power at the
decisive point, Chinese address the means of building a dominant political and
psychological position, such that the outcome of a conflict becomes a foregone
conclusion. Western strategists test their maxims of victories in battles;
Chinese test by victories where battles have become unnecessary.’ <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">He further
writes that, ‘They (Chinese) do not think that personal relations can affect
their judgments, though they may invoke personal ties to facilitate their
efforts. They have no emotional difficulty with deadlocks; they consider them the
inevitable mechanism of diplomacy. They prize gestures of goodwill only if they
serve a definable objective or tactic. And they patiently take the long view
against impatient interlocutors, making time their ally’.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">So what is
the PLA up to? As a continuation of what it did in Depsang plains (Daulet Beg
Oldie) in April-May 2013, the PLA is doing the following: At the tactical
level, it is seeking to position itself advantageously in Chumar-Demchok area.
At the operational level, it is pushing the military Line of Actual Control in
Ladakh westwards to reach its 1959-1960 claim line. And, at the strategic
level, it is putting psychological pressure through coercive diplomacy to
remind India of its Achilles Heel.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
FORCEhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17033758774826339971noreply@blogger.com0Southern Asia19.31114335506464 78.3984375-8.42544514493536 37.0898435 47.04773185506464 119.7070315tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2043962667781155759.post-7814260521422227032014-09-18T22:59:00.001-07:002014-09-18T22:59:20.198-07:00President Xi Jinping Checks Prime Minister Modi<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;"><b>By Pravin Sawhney</b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">By PLA’s massive intrusions
in Chumar (Ladakh) which were timed with President Xi Jinping’s three-day India
visit beginning September 17, China managed to humble Prime Minister Narendra
Modi on his home turf.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">Modi who appeared
totally in control on the first day in Ahmedabad and had Jinping’s ears for
most of the day, was reasonably subdued in Delhi. Even in the press statements,
Modi, unlike Jinping, flagged the border stand-off right in the beginning,
asking for clarity on the Line of Actual Control (LAC). However, by underplaying
the border issue, Jinping seems to have sent a powerful message to India’s
neighbours about Beijing’s might. The latter will help Beijing get fulsome
support from littoral nations in the Indian Ocean for its ambitious maritime
silk route project, which could, with time, acquire military overtures.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">Unfortunately,
this unsaid message got lost on India’s thinking community which cannot
differentiate between the two adversaries, Pakistan and China. Some experts
said that the PLA, like the Pakistan Army, is a state within state and does not
listen to Jinping and its own foreign office; Jinping was seen to have been
embarrassed by his own troops. Others prognosticated that a humiliated Jinping
had committed to resolve the border dispute at an early date. Nothing is
further from the truth.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">China,
unlike the western nations, does not view aggression or war as an end of
diplomacy. Aggression for Beijing is less about military and more about
psychological victory; it is an inalienable part of its negotiating style. Moreover,
China does not consider a particular negotiation, whatever its level, as a make
or break event which should either show result or be dubbed failure. Negotiations
are meant to frustrate and stress the opponent till he, at an opportune time,
accepts Chinese viewpoint as his own. This explains why China adopts a
historical and at times deceptive perspective in diplomacy till it suits it to
arrive at a quick favourable conclusion.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">When the
Chinese fifth generation leadership under President Jinping came in office in
2012, it was confident of exploiting its enormous economic might garnered by
earlier leaderships to both consolidate its territories and expand its
strategic frontiers. This explains Jinping’s elevation as head of all three
high offices, namely as head of the Politburo Standing Committee, Central
Military Commission and government at the same time. This consolidation was
done to obviate the possibility of more than one power centres in China;
Beijing had clearly decided to assume the leadership role in Asia by taking on
the most powerful nation in the world. During my visit to Beijing in July 2012
at PLA’s invitation, the Chinese military was vocal in naming the United States
as its sole adversary; suggesting by default that it did not consider India worthy
of rivalry.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">Against this
backdrop, India should know that let alone resolve the border dispute, or agree
to a LAC, China will not even disclose its perception of the LAC. Why? Because
it helps China nibble Indian territory and also keep India under great
psychological pressure fearing a war where no outside country will come to its
assistance. While India misleads its people on its military preparedness against
China, Beijing understands the hollowness of Delhi’s claims made regularly by
its political and military officers and scientific community.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">Of the total
3,488km disputed border, the 1,488km in Ladakh (Jammu and Kashmir) is most
vulnerable and, by Delhi’s own admission, has been transgressed and even
intruded more. This is not coincidental but is a part of Chinese strategy to
encircle India where it is weakest. Unlike Arunachal Pradesh which has the
McMahon Line drawn by the British in 1914, Xinjiang’s (China) border with
Ladakh has historically been an open frontier till 1959, when both India and
China made strong territorial claims.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">In an abrupt
development, which Delhi underplayed, China in December 2010 declared that its
border with India was 2,000km and not 3,488km as claimed by India. Beijing had
said that it did not have a border with India in Ladakh, where Indian troops
are locked in a confrontation with the Pakistan Army in the Siachen glacier
since May 1984. With a mere LAC, which by definition is a military line, in
Ladakh, China is now pushing the frontier westwards by denying any advantages
that the Indian forces have, for example, in Chumar-Demchok area. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">This should
tell Delhi that the border dispute is not a tactical issue. It is the sole
strategic issue which unless balanced with politico-military efforts will
impede India’s rise. Increased bilateral trade and commerce can surely wait.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
FORCEhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17033758774826339971noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2043962667781155759.post-35766168357122483232014-01-26T03:23:00.000-08:002014-01-26T03:24:53.866-08:00At the Crossroad<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<h4 style="text-align: left;">
<i style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 115%; text-align: left;">In the January 2014 issue Pravin Sawhney wrote an essay chronicling the downfall of the Indian Army over the last 24 years since it got mired into counter-insurgency operations in Jammu and Kashmir. Even though the retired military community has lapped up the essay, the current senior officer cadre is not happy. It is not difficult to understand why. Read on</i></h4>
<h2 style="text-align: left;">
<i style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; line-height: 115%; text-align: left;"><span style="font-size: small;">The threats have changed and the Indian Army needs to
change too</span></i></h2>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">By Pravin Sawhney</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">The 13-lakh strong Indian Army cleared by the
government to add another one lakh soldiers straddles two opposite worlds. One
is the No-War-No-Peace (NWNP) environment in Jammu and Kashmir, and the other
is a probability of ‘hot war’ with Pakistan and China; both requiring different
mind-sets, equipment and training. Unfortunately, the NWNP combat, which is
inward-looking, takes priority because it is both real and the army has honed its
skills in it over 24 years since 1990.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Today, 40 per
cent of the army is in the J&K theatre under the northern command
headquarters in Udhampur, while an equal number prepares itself to replace
those in the NWNP zone after four-week re-orientation training in defensive
counter-insurgency operations (CI ops) at three corps battle schools in the
troubled state. Considering that NWNP is the only familiar battle zone, it is
here that a generation of officers have grown and won awards, laurels,
promotions, prestige and status. This explains the long list of decorations
with most senior army officers’ names, something which their predecessors who
participated in ‘hot wars’ and ‘hot war’ exercises did not have. India’s Field
Marshal Sam Manekshaw, who won the 1971 war for India, was a mere Military
Cross.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">On the other
hand, with all present generals having donned uniform after the last war in
1971, preparedness for ‘hot war’ is an elusive concept which is more notional
than real. Unless the army’s prioritisation gets reversed, India’s territorial
integrity would be severely affected. India after all has three military held
lines — the 746km Line of Control (LC) and 76km Actual Ground Position Line against
Pakistan and 3,488km Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China —, which require
boots on the ground to provide credible and offensive conventional deterrence. The
present army is over-worked and over-stretched and poses little threat to
either adversary. This is borne by Pakistan’s uninterrupted infiltration of
terrorists across the LC since 1990, and China’s successful military coercion
in April-May 2013. Nothing short of a strong political leadership is needed to
put the army back to its basics: training for its primary task of preparing for
‘hot war’.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">The 24 years of
army’s involvement in CI ops in J&K has witnessed five distinct phases. The
first from 1990 to 1996 was the most difficult with numerous twists and turns.
During chief of army staff (COAS) General S.F. Rodrigues’ tenure from 1990 to
1993, large numbers of regular army for the first time were inducted in Kashmir
for internal security operations. General Rodrigues maintained that increased
deployment of the army was in ‘aid to civil authority’ and not in
counter-insurgency operations. The implication was that the army would leave
the Valley as soon as the situation was brought under control to allow the civil
administration to function.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Pakistan, meanwhile,
was in no mood to let the opportunity of the insurgency in the Valley (which had
surprised it as much as it had New Delhi), let go easily. So, Prime Minister
Benazir Bhutto declared from Muzaffarabad (Pakistan Occupied Kashmir) in April
1990 that the accession to Pakistan was the only option open to Kashmiris. And,
Pakistan told the US that it feared that the massive induction of the Indian
Army in J&K would be used to spring a surprise attack on Pakistan across
the LC. This led to the 1990 Robert Gates’ US mission to the subcontinent when
numerous confidence building measures between India and Pakistan, including the
once-a-week telephonic conversation between the two director generals of
military operations, were agreed.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">The Gates
mission put India on the back-foot with little hope of the Indian Army crossing
the LC. Moreover, the blooming insurgency energised the Kashmiri youth to cross
over into POK for training to liberate the Valley. From 1990 to 1993, the
militants had an upper hand, with the Indian media reporting of ‘liberated
zones’ in the Valley. Credit, however, must go to General Rodrigues that
despite odds, the army by beginning 1993 managed to have an upper hand over indigenous
insurgents in the Valley. The army came down with a heavy hand and Human Rights
were given a short shrift.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Indian Army’s tactical
successes forced Pakistan’s ISI to change its strategy of support to the
insurgency through five well-thought steps. One, by 1993, radical Hizbul
Mujahideen replaced JKLF; and well-equipped mercenaries from Afghanistan,
Syria, Libya and Algeria found their way into the Kashmir Valley by negotiating
high-mountain passes in the north. The foreign mercenaries were a determined
lot who took on both the paramilitary forces and the Indian Army in pitched
battles to support the indigenous Hizbul. Alongside, the Laskhar-e-Tayabba,
created in 1990 in Afghanistan with headquarters in Mudrike (near Lahore), was
encouraged to commence operations in Kashmir. Two, Pakistan shifted terrorist
training camps from POK to Afghanistan in 1993 as the US under India’s
insistence came close to declaring Pakistan a state sponsoring terrorism.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Three, to
relieve pressure on insurgents in the Valley, the ISI took advantage of the communal
divide in Jammu. With Muslims of Doda having an affinity with those in the
Valley, it proved an excellent place to provide succour and sustenance to
insurgents on the run in the Valley across the Pir Panjal range. Moreover,
towns of Doda, Kishtwar and Bhadarwah are contiguous to the thinly populated mountainous
areas of Himachal Pradesh, which also became a good hiding place. By beginning
1994, the situation in Doda had deteriorated considerably. To operate in Doda,
the army wanted the Disturbed Area Act followed by the Armed Forces Special
Powers Act, which, since 1990 had been applied in the Valley and a 20km belt
along the LC in Poonch and Rajouri districts, to be extended to Doda at the
earliest. This was done. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Four, international
concern over Human Right violations in Kashmir reached a high point in February
1994 when Prime Minister Bhutto raised the issue at the United Nations
Commission for Human Rights in Geneva. India, meanwhile set up a National Human
Rights Commission in October 1993, followed by the army establishing a Human
Rights cell for trials of excesses by soldiers the same year. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">And Five, Pakistan
helped create the Hurriyat, an umbrella organisation of 27 militant groups,
mostly pro-Pakistan, with dubious and untested political clout, in May 1993.
The Hurriyat drew strength not from the ‘people of Kashmir’ that it claimed to
represent, but from the pro-Pakistan militants in fear of whom the ordinary
people, especially in the Valley, lived.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">The year 1993
could have been a turning point for the Kashmir insurgency. The new COAS,
General B.C. Joshi, who took office on 1 July 1993, was determined to take the
bull by the horns. Unlike his predecessor, he refused to call the Kashmir problem
a ‘law and order’ issue, implying that the governor, retired General K.V.
Krishna Rao (the state was under governor rule) would be disallowed to dictate
to the army in the troubled state. General Joshi advised Prime Minister P.V.
Narasimha Rao in August 1993 to allow the army to hit insurgent bases in POK,
and conduct raids at Pakistani posts close to the LC, especially south of Pir
Panjal. He reasoned that no additional troops were needed for these tasks. And
such pro-active action would help raise the morale of the troops, put Pakistan
on the defensive, and help sever growing ties between the people and the radical
Mujahids operating in Kashmir. General Joshi was of the firm conviction that
the army should not continue in counter-terrorism operations for long, but go
back to its primary task of external defence. In hindsight, the timing was
opportune as insurgency had yet not spread to Jammu division, the Hurriyat was
not formed, and the army had the militants under manageable control.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Prime Minister
Rao was not the man for the moment. He backed Governor Rao to the hilt making
it clear to the defunct state administration and the army that he wanted to
hold parliamentary and state assembly elections in J&K at the earliest;
these were eventually held in 1996 amidst widespread reports that the security
forces including the army had helped rig the Kashmir elections by bogus voting.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Meanwhile,
taking stock of the situation, General Joshi revived the idea of the Rashtriya
Rifles (RR was to comprise retired servicemen) mooted in 1987 by minister of
state for defence Arun Singh and the COAS, General K. Sundarji, to being regular
army with another name, but with a temporary paramilitary status (which remains
till today). As it became clear that the army would have to be in J&K
longer than he had wished, General Joshi decided to raise large numbers of RR
units completely from within the army resources, with the intent to save time
by dispensing with getting the government’s approval for new raisings. Even as
a portion of his army was to become the RR, he was keen to not use the northern
command and even strike corps reserves for counter-terrorism operations in
J&K. A total of 30 battalions and 10 sector headquarters (brigade
headquarters) were ordered to be raised in nine months starting January 1994 by
milking existing army units and using War Wastage Reserves (WWRs). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">The raising of
nearly 40,000 RR troops in a record time was a nightmare for the army. At a
time when the army was struggling to maintain equipment because of the sudden
collapse of the Soviet Union, WWRs with the army for vehicles, tentage and
small arms were depleted to precarious levels. To cater for the force’s lack of
cohesiveness as they were gathered from disparate units, General Joshi became
the honorary ‘Colonel of the RR regiment’ to ensure the best troops and
officers came to the RR. As the RR units took three to five years to stabilise,
regular troops including reserve forces, and Special Forces continued to be
employed in CT roles.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Being conscious
that RR would have to operate amongst the people under media glare, General
Joshi issued strict dos and don’ts to troops to check Human Rights violations.
He also decided to raise a psychological operations (psy ops) division under a
major general rank officer drawing from officers of the military intelligence
and operations directorate, and reporting to the vice-chief of army staff, to
beat the insurgents’ propaganda. This was the beginning of the Army Liaison Cell
which over time transformed into the present Directorate of Public Information,
different from what it was intended to be. The ALC was meant to assist the
media with timely and accurate information to counter militant’s propaganda,
and not to project senior army officers as the ADGPI and its affiliate
organisations at lower command levels seems to be doing.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: red;">The Second Phase</span>: </span></b><span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">The sudden death of General
Joshi was a set-back to army’s determination to go back to its primary task on
the LC. It also marked the second phase from 1994 to 1998 under COAS, General Shankar
Roychowdhary, when the army consolidated its hold on CI ops under difficult
conditions: the RR after its rapid expansion was showing unmistakable signs of
distress; the flow of hardened foreign militants into Kashmir increased
progressively; the army’s strategy of ‘winning hearts and minds (WHAM)’ under
operation Sadbhavana was viewed with scepticism by the people; and the United
Headquarters formed in May 1993 by Union minister of state for home, Rajesh
Pilot with retired Lt General M.A. Zaki as its chairman was not working as
various security forces failed to cooperate with one another.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">An elaboration
on the RR during this period is necessary. Compared to the motivated militants,
the RR lacked cohesion, motivation, good communications and weaponry. There
were several instances of soldiers running amuck. Cases of soldiers inflicting
self-injuries as a way of being eased out of the Valley were not uncommon. The
commanding officers of most RR units were simply not communicating with their
troops. There was discernable decrease in discipline and patience.
Round-the-clock vigilance, lack of sleep, and an all-pervading fear was taking
its toll on the troops. Added to this was a shortage of young officers. In a
classified study in late 1997 ordered by the northern army commander, Lt
General S. Padmanabhan, the following reasons were found to be responsible for
the existing state of affairs: command break-down, battle fatigue, overall
shortage of young officers, peacetime administration found to be overloaded,
environmental stress, work culture, general disturbance, troops succumbing to
enemy propaganda, officers using any method to get postings cancelled, and
inadequate allowances for troops combating insurgency in the state. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"> Thus, between 1995 and 1998, as many as six
regular brigades were sucked into CI operations. Little thought was given to
the fact that these were reserves of the Northern Command, a fact which
comforted Pakistan when planning the 1999 Kargil conflict. The Indian Army was
to pay dearly by losing many more lives during Operation ‘Vijay’, the 1999
conflict in the Kargil sector, because these soldiers took time to reorient themselves
from conducting CI ops to fighting a conventional war.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">The army,
however, patted itself for having played a yeoman’s role in the conduct of 1996
assembly elections and the installation of the Farooq Abdullah government in
October 1996. This landmark event convinced the army leadership of its role in
the running of the state administration. The army senior brass had tasted
blood. Two years back, Kamal Mustafa, Farooq Abdullah’s younger brother told
FORCE that the army had then approached the chief minister with a queer
proposal. It wanted senior army officers to fill in the posts of deputy
commissioners and commissioners in the state. The suggestion, however, was
immediately shot down by the Union home minister, L.K. Advani. Not deterred by
the refusal, the army, convinced of its indispensability in the state,
continued to seek a larger role for itself through its WHAM strategy.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: red;">The Third Phase</span>: </span></b><span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">But, to carry the story
forward, the 1999 Kargil conflict was the third and a crucial phase in army’s
involvement in CI ops. Plenty of lessons should have been learnt, yet few were sought
let alone learnt by the army leadership. The army was caught off guard by the
conflict and had difficulty in re-orienting itself to conventional operations. With
the sudden shifting of attention of 15 and 16 corps commanders towards
conventional war, the RR was rendered headless. By extension, the United
Headquarters, which was formed to institutionalise cooperation and coordination
between all security forces especially the RR and paramilitary forces (BSF and
CRPF), and had been less than optimally functional since its inception in May
1993, was rendered defunct. This meant grave threat to internal lines of army’s
communications for soldiers fighting on the LC. Thus, to provide command and
control to the RR troops and support to United Headquarters, Army Headquarters
ordered the shifting of RR overall force headquarters (OFH) under its director
general, Lt General Avtar Singh from Delhi to Srinagar in June 1999 at the
height of the conflict.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Unfortunately, the
paramilitary forces (BSF), under the Union home ministry, refused to cooperate
with this new headquarters. And, the chief minister, Farooq Abdullah, who had
not been consulted regarding the replacement of his 15 and 16 corps security
advisors by OFH, went into a sulk. Thus, within three months, the OFH was
forced to beat an ignominious retreat from the Valley back to Delhi, with most
its staff posted to the newly raised 14 corps headquarters near Leh (Ladakh). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">What lessons did
the army learn from this? It raised two additional CI force headquarters to
combat militants. The ‘Kilo’ or Kupwara CI force headquarters was raised in
September 1999, and the ‘Romeo’ or Rajouri CI force headquarters came into
being in January 2000. These moves demonstrated army’s resolve to continue with
CI ops with vigour and if needed all by itself. The idea of greater involvement
of paramilitary forces in both CI ops and in security of internal communication
lines during war was glossed over.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: red;">The Fourth Phase</span>: </span></b><span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Even as the infiltration of
hard-core militants increased after Pakistan’s defeat in the Kargil conflict,
the army was also recovering from the jolt of the unexpected limited war. This
impacted most on the field commanders, who became restive, setting stage for
the fourth phase in year 2000. During this year, in a replay of the early
Nineties, the army at lower levels was raring to go, having been encouraged by the
COAS, General V.P. Malik enunciation of the doctrine of a ‘limited war’, which
was publicly endorsed by the defence minister, George Fernandes. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Thus, in a tacit
understanding, while the senior brass in Kashmir winked, the units adopted a
calibrated offensive action across the LC to engage the Pakistan Army and to
sanitise areas of infiltration. For example, on 22 January 2000, fighting in
the Chhamb sector left 16 Pakistani soldiers dead. While both sides blamed one
another, the truth was that Indian troops, in strength, attacked a Pakistani
post and overran it. Similar instances occurred in Akhnoor, Mendhar, Kotli,
Naushera and Pallanwala between January and August 2000. It was payback time on
the LC. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Formations
commanders on the LC started justifying the need for such action on grounds that
Pakistan must face local military defeats. It was argued in private that body
bags going home in the glare of cameras would compel the Pakistan Army to
re-think its proxy war in Kashmir. Local artillery commanders said that in
addition to punitive raids by infantry and Special Forces on Pakistani posts,
more Bofors regiments should be inducted into J&K. Heavy artillery pounding
of Pakistani positions in areas where infiltration occurred would be a morale
booster for Indian troops.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Given this
situation, the COAS, General Malik, in December 2000, said that chances of a
war with Pakistan were high. His assessment was based on the thinking that
Pakistan may, in anger, retaliate in strength which could result in a
full-scale limited war. The army chief’s public statement was enough for the
Indian leadership to get alarmed. Thus, the unsaid calibrated offensive action
policy was over by April 2001.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">To appease the
army, the government cleared the raisings of more RR battalions in January
2001. (Moreover, for the first time, separate financial allocation was made for
the RR in the annual defence budget.) The proposal to raise 30 more RR
battalions, six each year, was accepted. Two additional force headquarters and
eight sector headquarters to control the additional forces were to be raised
accordingly. This marked the end of army’s pro-active strategy. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">The next 13
years would see the army justify merits of a defensive mind-set, and the
benefits of CI and anti-infiltration ops done by 62 RR battalions controlled by
five force headquarters. Like the earlier period of 1994-1998, the chasm
between officers and men would grow once again, but for entirely different
reasons. The erstwhile disharmony within the RR is no longer there. Instead,
mutual respect between officers and men, which is the <i>raison d’etre</i> of an army unit the world over, has diminished. More
on this critical aspect will be discussed later.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: red;">The Fifth Phase</span>: </span></b><span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">The fifth or present phase
of army’s internal involvement in J&K, which has been the longest of all, began
with the end of Operation Parakram in October 2002. Five events during this
period have motivated the army to frenetically continue in the CI role. These
are the ceasefire on the LC starting 26 November 2003, Operation Fence (or
Anti-Infiltration Obstacle System, AIOS) since 1 July 2004, two successful
state assembly elections of 2002 and 2008, and the release of the army’s
‘sub-conventional warfare doctrine’ in January 2007 by defence minister, A.K.
Antony. The last two events were without fanfare, but the army extrapolated and
imbibed powerful self-serving messages from both. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">The successful 2002
and 2008 assembly elections convinced the army brass of its indispensability to
the political process in the state. In the absence of cogent political initiatives
on Kashmir by New Delhi, these have spurred the army to rough-shod the regular
protestations since January 2009 of the state chief minister, Omar Abdullah for
partial lifting of the AFSPA. And the release of doctrine during the tenure of
COAS, General J.J. Singh signalled that fighting CI ops was officially more
important than preparedness for ‘hot war’.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">The LC ceasefire
offer was a masterstroke by Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf. By the silencing
of firepower, especially artillery guns, all artillery units in the J&K
theatre were suddenly short of hands-on training. Until the ceasefire, all
artillery units had a battery (six guns) on call ready to fire salvos at short
notice; the artillery fire was a morale booster for troops living in eyeball-to-eyeball
confrontation on the LC. In the last 10 years, the artillery guns have been
lying in sheds with gunners detailed on CI role. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">A sense of
frustration borne out of unending and punishing CI role has gripped the
soldiers. As an aside, all soldiers that these writers spoke with immediately
after Operation Parakram (10-month long military stand-off with Pakistan) had
said that they were happier training for conventional war. General Musharraf
had achieved the strategic purpose of tiring the Indian Army from within by compelling
it to fight an elusive enemy rather than train for combat with the real one. This
is not all. General Musharraf had alongside directed his then director general,
ISI, Lt General Ashfaq Kayani to take terrorism from J&K theatre to
mainland India. India, therefore, was to witness many spectacular terrorism
attacks supported by ISI in various degrees starting 2004, with of course, the
26 November 2008 Mumbai attacks being the boldest of them all.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Operation Fence
was a disservice by the then COAS, General N.C. Vij, who having been the DGMO
during Operation Vijay and the vice-COAS during Operation Parakram should have
delivered better. Utilising the ceasefire to fence the entire LC, and taking
cue from the BSF guarding the 198km International Border in Jammu (called
Working Boundary by Pakistan), the Indian Army erected a fence on the remaining
556 km of the LC. The fence or the AIOS was completed on 1 July 2004. Given the
nature of the LC which arbitrarily cuts across villages and divides streams,
rivers and mountains, the run of the AIOS varies from place to place from being
close to the military-held line to up to three km inside.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">The AIOS meant
to check infiltration presents a dilemma: it is simply not cost-effective in
the higher reaches in winter months where 20-25 feet of snow destroys the fence
every year. The annual cost of repairing the AIOS on the LC is more than Rs 150
crore for materials alone. As only a small window of summer months is available
for repairing the AIOS, one army pioneer battalion (900 men) with ponies and
mules to lug materials is employed every year in addition to other support
services to ensure that the work is finished in time. This task obviously is at
the cost of annual stocking effort for forward posts in high-altitude which,
too, have the same summer window for work. For these reasons, in 2011-2012, 15
corps in Srinagar did a successful pilot project of replacing the fence with
permanently buried wooden pointers (called <i>Punjis</i>
in jungle warfare) as the AIOS to deter infiltration. The recommendation was
sent to the northern command (responsible for Jammu and Kashmir), but nothing
much happened as the army commander was due for retirement.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Considering that
the present northern army commander, Lt General Sanjiv Chachra has called the
fence a game-changer, it will be status quo. The argument that the fence is
cost-effective (the cost does not matter) and prevents infiltration will
continue to be made. While attributing benefits to the fence as AIOS, the
Indian Army is unwilling to concede its biggest drawback: It has instilled the
Maginot mentality. Any worthwhile military commander the world over will attest
that a fortification induces a false sense of security and stifles the
offensive spirit and offensive action. With the silence of artillery guns and
fencing on the LC, the Indian Army’s mind-set has decisively transformed from
an offensive to a defensive one, focussed on fighting terrorism in Jammu and
Kashmir by counter-insurgency operations without an end-state.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Unfortunately,
instead of waking-up to the realities, the Indian Army continues to make the
case for prolonged involvement in CI ops in Jammu and Kashmir. When General
Kayani took office in November 2007 and ceasefire violations had commenced, the
Indian Army had said that after the crucial state assembly election of 2008, it
would review its involvement in CI ops. This did not happen. Today, the Indian
Army is yet again busy making the case of its involvement in CI ops in Jammu
and Kashmir. Its argument is that post-2014, when the US and Nato troops leave
Afghanistan, the terrorists engaged with the US and Nato forces, will be freed.
They will then be shifted by the ISI to Kashmir. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">To come to the
present, 2013 witnessed maximum ceasefire violations on the LC. Five soldiers
of 21 Bihar battalion were shot dead in Poonch in August 2013 close to where a
soldier of 13 Raj Rif battalion was beheaded by Pakistan’s Border Action Team
(BAT) in January, and for the first time since the ceasefire of 26 November
2003, the tranquil International border in Jammu saw increased exchange of fire
between August and October. Visiting Rajouri (25 division) in August of the
same year, the COAS General Bikram Singh vowed to repay the Pakistan Army at a
‘time and place of own choosing.’<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">However, the
single important reason why Pakistanis are not deterred by the Indian Army is its
very apparent inward-oriented mind-set. All forces, including the BSF, are focussed
on anti-infiltration operations, while the POK battalions are free to do
training for ‘hot war’.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">The Hot War <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Four things that should go hand in hand towards
creating a credible conventional deterrence are: political will, orientation or
mind-set, modernisation, and realistic training. All these have been less than
encouraging for the Indian Army. While the army has travelled a long way since
the 1971 war, it has, unfortunately, been in the reverse gear. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Since the 1971
war, India has demonstrated political will on just three occasions, with a
success rate of 1:2. India purportedly succeeded once against China, while Pakistan
called off India’s bluff at coercive diplomacy twice.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">The so-called
success against China was during the 1986-87 Sumdorong Chu crisis. One day in
June 1986, when a small Indian detachment was away, the PLA occupied its post
in Sumdorong Chu, south of the Thagla-Bumla line in Kameng district of
Arunuchal Pradesh. In a show of military strength to get back the captured
post, COAS, General K. Sundarji ordered a crash forward deployment under
Operation Falcon. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">At the peak of
the operation in 1987, three mountain divisions of 4 corps were pushed to the
McMahon Line; two divisions were deployed in Kameng district to defend Tawang,
and the better part of the third division was placed in Lohit district to
defend Walong. Tawang was designated as the corps vital area, which had to be
defended at all costs. Extremely strong artillery elements were placed in
support of the troops. General Sundarji ordered airlifting of artillery
ammunition worth crores to be stocked in forward areas. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">In a rather rash
move, reminiscent of the pre-1962 forward policy, 77 brigade, to be maintained
by air, was moved close to Sumdorong Chu, which was just three km short of the
Thagla ridge occupied by PLA forces. On the question of Chinese tactical
nuclear weapons raised by the then eastern army commander, Lt General V.N.
Sharma, minister Arun Singh and General Sundarji told the media in Delhi that
‘Indian forces will not fight with their hands tied’, whatever that meant. Somehow,
the Chinese decided that going to war was not worth their while and thus by the
spring of 1987, the crisis was diffused. In hindsight, the Chinese stepped back
to fight another day. A case in point is their successful coercive diplomacy in
April-May 2013 in Depsang region of Ladakh.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Unlike China,
Pakistan has never waited to call off India’s bluff. The first instance was
General Sundarji’s brainchild, exercise Brass-Tacks conducted in the winter of
1986-87, when a total of 13 Indian divisions participated. The concept was to
practice a major thrust to achieve deep penetration in the desert and reach the
Indus river line. The problem came when instead of contesting India’s suggested
thrust in the desert, Pakistan Army vice-COAS, General Arif, in a brilliant stroke
moved his army reserve south towards the north, posing a threat to Amritsar,
Gurdaspur and Pathankot. At this point, India’s strike reserves were far away
from the threatened area. India was suddenly vulnerable at its very centre of
gravity around north Rajasthan-Punjab. Through some deft diplomacy by Pakistani
ruler, General Zia-ul-Haq, the matter was resolved, with Pakistan calling off
India’s bluff at military coercion. In hindsight, it was clear that exercise
Brass-Tasks was not a launching pad for war. It was a purely military exercise
in which politics got mixed with military matters.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">The second
failed military coercion manifested during Operation Parakram, the 10-month
long military confrontation from 18 December 2001 to 16 October 2002. After the
terrorists attack on the Parliament on 13 December 2001, India ordered
mobilisation of its military on December 18. In the first full-fledged
mobilisation since the 1971 war, the army was ready to cross the border by
first week of January 2002 under Operation Parakram. To assert resolve, India
test-fired its new single-stage 700km range <i>Agni-I</i>
missile on January 25. Pakistan, taken by surprise and with its reserve troops
committed in Afghanistan against the US-led war on terror, reached out to the
US for intervention. The US satellites, meanwhile, picked up offensive
reconnaissance manoeuvres by India’s 2 corps which led to the replacement of
the corps commander, Lt General Kapil Vij. This Indian action was the clear
indication that its political and military leadership were out of sync. The
then Vajpayee-led government did not inform the COAS, General S. Padmanabhan
that the mobilisation was not for war but coercive diplomacy.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">As the military
stand-off continued, ISI-supported terrorists struck once again on 18 May 2002
at a military camp in Kashmir leading the COAS to publicly say that India
should not exercise patience against Pakistan. Prime Minister Vajpayee visited
Srinagar and declared that war was inevitable. This time around, the Pakistan
Army was prepared, and to demonstrate tit-for-tat, it conducted three
back-to-back <i>Ghaznavi</i> and <i>Abdali</i> ballistic missile flight tests. The
test-firing of ballistic missiles emerged as the sign of resolve and signalling
deterrence to adversaries and international audiences. Having got the message,
India’s national security advisor, Brajesh Mishra approached his US counterpart,
Condoleezza Rice to help resolve the crisis. India had blinked with little in
return.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Barring the
above instances, Indian political leadership has always exercised the so-called
restraint to Pakistan’s provocations. As General Roychowdhury succinctly said
in his book, ‘Officially at Peace’: ‘Our apparent tolerance towards blatant
terrorist attacks (by Pakistan) was actually due to the run-down in our
military capabilities for decisive punitive action, caused by the government’s
economic preoccupation with the demands and compulsions of a free market
economy. Effective counter-offensive capabilities were the precise area where
the Indian Army’s potential had been greatly eroded.’ The former COAS was
referring to the five-year term of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao which started
in June 1991.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">What were India’s
compulsions for not retaliating to Pakistani blatant support of terrorism in
J&K beginning 1990? The issue becomes curious as before 1990, India did not
have experience of a NWNP environment. Both in 1947-48 and 1965 wars on
Kashmir, Pakistan’s strategy were to have irregulars precede regular forces,
which then led to a full-fledged conventional war. 1990 was different because
the Pakistan Army adopted the strategy of attack-by-infiltration, and for
India, three reasons prevented it from escalation. These were poor political
leadership, empty coffers, and Indian Army’s turbulent past.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">While the first
two reasons are known, the third needs elaboration. The Eighties under General
Sundarji saw the biggest show of military muscle by India: the Sumdorong Chu
crisis in 1986-87, exercise Brass-Tacks in 1987, and Indian Peace Keeping Force
operations in Sri Lanka beginning 1987. Mention has not been made of the army’s
involvement in combating Punjab terrorism (Operation Woodrose) which followed
Operation Bluestar (army operation in the Golden Temple in 1984) for two
reasons: the army formations involved in counter-terrorism had not moved out of
their operational areas (they were forces-in-being available for war), and
unlike J&K, Punjab did not have an insurgency. In case of a war with
Pakistan, the local people, who were terrorised by militants, were assessed to
not sabotage army’s internal lines of communications.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">General
Sundarji’s successor, General V.N. Sharma had an unenviable tenure. The IPKF returned
home in 1990 without much glory and with fatigued troops who were immediately
inducted into J&K. Exercise Brass-Tacks, on the other hand, had battered
the army equipment so hard that it took most units which participated in the
mammoth misadventure more than a year to be restored to a war-worthy state. All
these factors denied the army leadership the opportunity to formulate an
aggressive operational policy in the early Nineties when the clamour for
retaliation was greatest from the field formations.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">A word on the
1999 Kargil conflict is in place. India’s political leadership simply did not
have a choice to overlook or downplay Pakistani occupation in the Kargil
sector. While there was no escaping from the hard fight-back, it was India’s
good luck that General Musharraf had not planned the logical end to the
aggression that he unfolded. Notwithstanding the political mileage that the
Vajpayee drew from Operation Vijay, the truth is that it was a pyrrhic victory.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Regarding Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh, twice during the 10-year tenure starting May 2004,
India showed a total lack of political spine to grave provocations. The first
instance was the 26 November 2008 (26/11) terrorists’ attacks in Mumbai. 166
innocents were killed and over 300 were injured during three days of continuous
mayhem unleashed by 10 terrorists which were supported, funded, trained and guided
by Pakistan’s ISI. It was only on the third day that the three defence service
chiefs met with the Prime Minister to give him their assessment of military
retaliation. After that, nothing was heard from the Prime Minister. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">When senior
Union minister Pranab Mukherjee was asked by the media if all options against
Pakistan were on the table, he replied in the affirmative. Pakistan COAS,
General Kayani responded by saying that Pakistan was ready for war being
contemplated by India, and New Delhi decided that a stoic silence was the best
option. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">The other instance
was the sudden intrusion by Chinese security forces in April 2013, when they
stayed-put 19km inside Indian land in Ladakh for three weeks claiming it as their
own. According to media reports, the Prime Minister sought the advice of his
COAS, General Bikram Singh only after a week of Chinese occupation. Therefore,
in successful coercive diplomacy, Chinese blatant aggression ensured that Indian
troops stopped patrolling in the contested area after the Chinese forces
vacated it of their own accord. This is not all. New Delhi has regularly
downplayed repeated and regular intrusion by Chinese forces all along the LAC,
leaving the hapless army and paramilitary forces guarding the disputed border
helpless. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: red;">Defensive Orientation</span></span></b><span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">: India’s
political pusillanimity has rubbed hard on the military leadership and is
partly responsible for its defensive orientation. For example, during the earlier
years of insurgency in J&K, the thinking at the highest military levels was
that a sudden war by an incensed India could not be ruled out. Hence, Indian
military, unlike the 1971 war, would not get a preparatory time, and will be
forced to fight with whatever they have. This viewpoint has changed with time. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">At present, the
army leadership is unhesitant in ruling out an all-out war with Pakistan;
Pakistan had little need to go to war, when its low-cost strategy of bleeding
India is reaping dividends. And, India, which is focussed on its economic
growth and inclusive well-being of its people, seems reconciled to daily
martyrdom of its soldiers fighting terrorism. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">As a consequence
of the defensive mind-set, at the operational level, the initiative has passed
completely into the hands of the insurgents and their Pakistani patrons. The
latter dictate the rates of engagement, infiltration, areas to be activated and
to what purpose, including methods of initiation.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">The existing
defensive orientation of troops is the anti-thesis for the next war with
Pakistan, which, given the nuclear weapons capability with both sides, has been
assessed to be short, swift and intense. This explains the inclusion and
emphasis upon the ‘directive style of command’ (allowing field commanders
flexibility to re-orient plans to retain initiative) in the Indian Army
doctrine which underscores the ‘pro-active’ war fighting strategy. The army
must realise that its ‘pro-active’ war strategy which involves organisational
re-structuring, offensive operational art, and tactics are predicated on the
premise of fighting the war in enemy territory.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Because of the army’s
complete commitment to CI ops, senior field commanders in J&K have been
disoriented from fighting conventional war. The focus is on anti-infiltration,
which implies surveillance of ravines, nullahs, and lower ground in mountains
rather than heights meant for occupation. For this reason, before the launch of
Operation Vijay (1999 Kargil conflict), GOC 15 corps, Lt General Krishan Pal
had mistaken the occupation of Indian territories as an infiltration attempt by
terrorists. On his advice, the then defence minister, George Fernandes had
assured the nation that the operation by the army would be over in 48 hours. Similarly,
retired COAS, General V.K. Singh informed us in his recently published autobiography
that during Operation Parakram (2001-2002), the northern army commander, Lt
General R.K. Nanavaty had told the COAS General Padmanabhan that his troops
were not ready for war as they needed time to re-orient from CI ops to a ‘Hot
War.’<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: red;">Modernisation</span>:</span></b><span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"> Precisely because of the defensive proclivity of
senior army brass bordering on the verge of passivity, modernisation of the
army has suffered enormously. During Operation Vijay, when the Indian Army was
compelled to fight a limited conventional war, the COAS, General V.P. Malik,
when questioned by the media, had expressed helplessness by saying that, “We
will fight with whatever we have.” <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">It was the same
story during Operation Parakram, when the COAS General Padmanabhan was informed
by the northern army commander that his WWRs were inadequate for war. So, here
was the bulk of the Indian Army in 2001-2002 deployed on a military-line in
turbulent J&K over which Pakistan had fought three wars, without desired
resources and ammunition and completely disoriented. Yet, its senior army
officers have got fame and decorations in this war theatre after the 1990
insurgency. Can it get more bizarre than this?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">On
modernisation, General V.K. Singh wrote a letter to the Prime Minister a month
before his retirement in May 2012 that got leaked. He had said that the Indian
Army was not prepared to fight a war. Ironically, there was a furore over the
disclosure not on why the army was unprepared despite being in a NWNP condition
since 1990, but on how the secret letter found its way to the media. Given the
frivolousness of the media, it was little wonder that when a month later the
next COAS, General Bikram Singh informed the nation through the media that the
army was prepared to meet any challenge, no hackles were raised.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">In reality, the
situation regarding ammunition and equipment for a conventional war remains
precariously low. The Indian Army may not have ammunition to fight the next war
(with Pakistan, not to mention China) beyond three to five days. Holdings for
all types of missiles, and anti-tank ammunition are critically low. Stockings
for artillery (70 per cent fuses needed for firing are unavailable) and armour
fighting vehicles ammunition are unlikely to last beyond four to five days of
intense war. WWRs for most ammunition categories do not exist. (It is mandatory
for the army to have ammunition WWR for 40 days of intense war for long-shelf
life category, and 21 days intense fighting for short-shelf life category like
anti-tank, rocket artillery, and missiles. In addition, the army holds critical
ammunition for two days of war as unit reserves, first and second line
holdings). All this is when the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) responsible for
ammunition has an annual turnover of USD2.5 billion and it regularly passes off
its profits to the defence ministry as dividends.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">This is not all.
Mission reliability of mechanised vehicles is poor. The artillery is obsolete
and inadequate; air defence is antiquated; armour is unreliable due to regular
barrel accidents caused by mismatch between indigenous barrels and ammunition; and
night fighting devices are insufficient. Take the case of small arms which are
the mainstay of the Indian infantry. The OFB claimed in early 2012 to have made
an ‘impressive product range for small arms including 5.56mm INSAS LMG and
assault rifle’. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Interestingly,
defence minister A.K. Antony said in beginning 2013 that, </span><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">“</span><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">The INSAS rifle is planned to be replaced by the new
assault rifle… </span><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">The ministry is in
the process of procuring assault rifles through the global route with transfer
of technology to OFB.” The Request for Proposal (RFP) was issued in November 2011.
Technical evaluation of bids has been completely and there is total silence on
further progress. The Infantry wants a standard </span><span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">multi-calibre
and multi-usage rifle. This is because a soldier holding an INSAS rifle made by
OFB Ishapore, known to have stoppages during firing, is not confident facing an
AK-47 rifle-holding terrorist. Take the case of Carl Gustaf recoilless rifle,
which has been with the army since Eighties. Its ToT was transferred to OFB,
yet even today, the weapon and its ammunition are imported from the Swedish
OEM.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">It is well-known
that the Indian Army was unprepared for war during the 1999 Kargil conflict.
There were umpteen reports in the media of defence ministry bureaucrats
air-dashing to Russia and Israel post-haste clutching suitcases filled with
dollars to procure ammunition. Artillery guns from other theatres were pulled
out and despatched to Kargil to fight the limited conflict, in which the
Pakistan Army did not join combat openly. What if the conflict had snowballed
into an all-out war? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">No lessons were
learnt from the Kargil conflict and the army found itself in the same situation
during Operation Parakram. Part of the reason why maintenance of WWR has never
been a serious exercise is because the focus has invariably been on spending
finances on new procurements. As a consequence of this attitude, the WWRs which
had been depleted by the fast raisings of RR units in 1994 during General
Joshi’s tenure were never made up. The other reason is the self-serving
attitude of the army leadership. The staff officers at all command levels who
should be devoted to providing wherewithal to their field formations are
instead busy serving their bosses; one visible manifestation of this rot in the
prevalent five-star culture in the present day army.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: red;">Training</span></span></b><span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">: The present-day training is not realistic for
preparing the army for war. Let’s look at three different theatres: the plains
sector where 2 strike corps is planned to operate, the desert sector where
India hopes to make territorial gains, and the northern command in J&K. Starting
2005, after the COAS General Vij had announced the new Cold Start doctrine in
2004 following lessons learnt from both Operations Vijay and Parakram, the army
did a series of exercises. FORCE was invited to witness exercise Sanghe Shakti
of 2 strike corps, which is the heaviest corps of the army in terms of mobile
assets. In this exercise far too many capabilities were assumed making the
whole show more aspirational than real.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">For instance,
network centricity, excellent battlefield transparency, desired availability of
equipment and ammunition, good communications, smooth joint and combined
operations, and directive style of command are issues that require serious
consideration. Most of them do not exist or are a work in progress at snail’s
pace.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">It is the same
story with 21 strike corps of the southern army command which is supposed to
make major gains in the deserts. For one, notional capabilities lead to the
impression that the exercises are meant more to test commanders than to train
troops. Moreover, given the fact that Pakistan now has a green belt secured by
its regular army rather than the earlier rangers, it will not be a cake-walk
for the Indian Army as is being war-gamed. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Officers who participated
in exercise Brass-Tacks in 1986, attest that the full authorised equipment and
vehicles was made available in the expansive exercise theatre to make training
realistic. Today, this is not considered cost-effective, and most exercises are
conducted in skeleton order (small numbers) and in restricted areas. These do
not provide the feel of battlefield to troops. Moreover, the periodicity of
exercises has been curtailed to save money; skeleton corps exercises are held
biannually rather than every year. There are restrictions on firing as well.
Few officers have seen the full complement of artillery regiment guns firing
salvos together.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Regarding the
northern command, as mentioned earlier, the focus is on anti-infiltration
operations. The contention of senior Indian officers that additional RR troops
are add-on to troops on the LC in case of a ‘hot war’ is suspect as both forces
do negligible desired training on regular basis.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">The Way Forward<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">There is the need to assess the military threats to
Indian’s territorial integrity, which undeniably come from the disputed borders
with China and Pakistan, both non status-quo nations with a strategic
partnership against India. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Of the two
adversaries, the bigger threat is from China for four reasons: One, the
disputed border with China, referred to as LAC by the 1993 treaty of peace and
tranquillity, is neither agreed on maps nor on ground, hence is subject to
change by the side with greater political resolve and military power. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Two, China will
not resolve the disputed border except on its own terms however unfair. The
disputed border helps China keep India’s Asian ambitions in check, and assists
Pakistan in maintaining a strategic parity with arch-rival India. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Three, a
catch-up with China by India, especially in the strategic and military domain
is not possible in the foreseeable future. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">And four, in
case of a border war with China, no country will come to India’s assistance.
India should prepare to face the Chinese challenge — strategic and military —
all by itself. The economic and security challenges (freedom of the sea lanes)
are a different ballgame where India will find friendly powers aligning with
its assessments. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">What is the crux
of the border dispute? Since December 2010, China makes a distinction between
the (disputed) border and the LAC, but India doesn’t. According to China, it
has a 3,488km LAC with India, which is the same as India’s position. But,
China’s border with India is a mere 2,000km, while India considers the entire
LAC as its border, earlier (before the 1993 bilateral treaty) officially referred
to as the McMahon Line. This is not all. Since 2009, China has claimed the
entire 92,000 sqkm of India’s state of Arunachal Pradesh as its land, called
South Tibet. To recall, India, during the visit of Prime Minister Vajpayee to
China in 2003 had for the first-time accepted Tibet as a part of China in
writing.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">By a mere
announcement in December 2010 made on the eve of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s
visit to India, China, without firing a shot, cut the disputed border by
1,488km, which it has with India in Ladakh (Jammu and Kashmir). Instead of
challenging the Chinese temerity of claiming so much of Indian land, New Delhi
underplayed the Chinese interpretation of the border dispute. This opened the
path for the PLA to shift the LAC in Ladakh (in Depsang valley in April-May
2013) by its security forces while maintaining that it had not intruded into
Indian land. Once the PLA left Depsang after three-weeks of occupation, New
Delhi instructed its security forces to not patrol the new disputed area.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Why would China
start a border war with India when it has succeeded in military coercion? Perhaps,
the only militarily vulnerable area for India is Ladakh where China says it
does not have a border with India and Pakistan has a LC and no-man’s land (Actual
Ground Position Line) abutting Siachen glacier. So, a strong possibility of a localised
two-front war exists for India in North Ladakh with the Siachen glacier as the
pivot. But, it is unlikely to be a traditional two-front war with both Pakistan
and China shooting together at India forces. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">China, which views
itself as a global player would abstain from a ‘Hot War’ with India by itself,
and also not fight openly alongside Pakistan with India. The most plausible
scenario in North Kashmir (Siachen) would be Pakistan fighting a war with India
with Chinese providing it real-time operational logistics across the Karakoram
highway and strategic support by maintaining military pressure on the entire
LAC (including Ladakh) by aggressive patrolling. This will ensure that the
Indian Army will find it difficult to shift its dual-use formations from east
to west against Pakistan. The purpose of their war would be to force Indian
troops out of the Siachen glacier, threaten Leh and eventually sever Ladakh
from Jammu and Kashmir.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">This is not all.
China, which has capability to fight in five domains of land, air, sea, space
and cyber, would unleash its non-contact assets on India. For example, China,
which demonstrated successful anti-satellite capability in 2007 could hit and
destroy India’s communication and navigation satellites for its armed forces in
the low-earth orbit. China, which has recently signed for sharing its
indigenous Beidou navigation system (presently with 16 satellites to be expanded
into 36) with Pakistan, would support its armed forces by providing it military-size
resolution for navigation of its ballistic and cruise missile. Similarly,
China, having developed formidable cyber-attack capabilities, which it has been
using against India since 2009, would employ them during hostilities to create
panic within India. Moreover, China has a plethora of unmatched ballistic and
cruise missiles for land, sea and air.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">But, this is not
how the Army Headquarters assess the threat from China. Thinking in a linear
fashion, as the army can do little about the four other domains of war, the
army is, unfortunately, preparing itself to fight the last border war of 1962
better. The COAS, General Deepak Kapoor, who should be credited with initiating
the case for major army accretions and by pushing them with the government by publicly
talking about the possibility of a two-front war in beginning 2009, told FORCE
that chances of a war with China over the border dispute exist. So, the army’s
strategy against China will be ‘strategic defence with limited counter-attack’.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">This strategy
formulated sometimes in 2002 was given an accretion-push and priority by
General Kapoor immediately on taking over as the COAS in September 2007. During
a briefing to FORCE in 2004 at 33 corps headquarters (Sukhna), it was said that
the army envisaged three levels of threat from the PLA: low level, medium level
and high level. The threat levels were worked out based on PLA’s air and road lift
capabilities, its’ forces-in-being in TAR, and the terrain which puts restrains
on fielding of combat potential. The army had assessed that the low-level
threat would be a total of 10 to 12 PLA divisions across the entire LAC, and
the high level threat could be between 32 to 34 divisions. This assessment was
revised after Chinese succeeded in building the rail link between the mainland
and TAR. It was now felt that as the PLA had built capability to transport all
32 to 34 divisions at once, the Indian Army should be prepared for the worst
case scenario of 34 divisions facing it across the LAC.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">General Kapoor’s
initiation the force accretion case with the government was to be achieved in
two phases. Phase one was raisings of two new mountain division (first army
accretion after 1983) meant to reinforce the existing nine-and-half division
against China for a better defence posture. These divisions completed their
raisings on 31 March 2007, the day General Kapoor retired from service. In
phase two, a mountain corps (17 mountain corps) having two divisions with
support and logistics elements as well as three independent brigades have been
cleared by government and the raisings commenced on 1 January 2013 (COAS,
General Bikram Singh interview). These second phase accretions are meant for
limited counter attack in a border war. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">On Pakistan, the
army headquarters’ war strategy remains largely unchanged since the 1971 war.
It is still ‘strategic defence and operational level offence(s).’ Pakistan is
viewed as the bigger of the two threats, which is why eighty per cent of the
army’s assets, including the three strike corps, remain poised against
Pakistan. The war aims also remains unchanged, namely: capture of territory,
attrition of Pakistan war assets, and prisoner of war.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">A nuanced change
in strategy has been effected to meet the challenge of the envisaged short,
swift and intense war. It is felt that maximum war aims will have to be realised
within a week to 10 days of war after which intense international pressure
would end the war. This reason is the main driver for re-structuring within the
army, where learning operational and tactical lessons from Operation Parakram,
the war strategy was modified to cater for three operational requirements: a
shortening of mobilisation time (for strike formations), a swift crossing over
of the border without preparatory time, and to effect shallow penetrations all
along the border while retaining surprise about the main ingress to operational
depth by strike corps.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">It was realised
that after a strike corps broke-out, the holding formations with enormous
locked-in combat potential would remain unutilised for the remainder of the
war. So, the holding corps having been re-named as pivot corps will now have
combat capabilities to both prepare a bridge-head for the strike formations as
well as make shallow penetrations six to 12km inside enemy territory all along
the border depending on the war theatre.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Moreover, the
mobilisation time for formations especially with permanent locations in central
India has been shortened. The three strike corps while being allocated to three
pivots corps have the option to break-up into up to eight self-sufficient
mobile battle groups centred around an armoured brigade. Some of the strike
corps formations which would constitute battle groups, if and when necessary,
have been stationed in forward locations. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">To facilitate
the fast moving war, two new formation headquarters for improved command and
control, namely 9 corps and south-western command have been created. From the
above narrative it become evident that the new doctrine requires two basic
things: directive style of command to succeed, something that the Indian Army
has not displayed during previous 1965 and 1971 wars, and given the existing
officers’ mind-set may not be able to do so in the next war. And, there is the
need for realistic training for troops, which is becoming a rarity. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">To put war
matters in perspective regarding Pakistan, three myths need to be demolished.
First, there is a belief that India has a conventional superiority over
Pakistan. This is not true, because this perception is based on bean-counting
of assets of both sides. The Pakistan Army scores over the Indian Army in
strategic command, control, coordination and higher directions of war. However
much the Indian Army may shorten its mobilisation time, it is impossible to
beat Pakistan Army’s advantage of operating on internal lines. Thus, at the
operational level of war, the two armies are nearly matched. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">The operational
level can be successful because of higher direction of war, surprise,
firepower, coordination, orientation or mind-set, and training despite fewer
numbers in terms of manpower and equipment. This is not all. Pakistan today is
the only professional army in the world which has developed expertise to fight
war simultaneously at two levels: regular and irregular. India does not have an
institutionalised mechanism to combat this challenge. Moreover, as the land war will be a joint
air-land effort, the Pakistan Army will use its plethora of ballistic missiles
accurately with conventional warheads to supplement its air force numbers, a
war fighting strategy it has learnt from the PLA doctrine. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">The second myth
is that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and especially its unstated nuclear weapons
policy has prevented war. If this was true, the Pakistan Army would not make
all out efforts to maintain an operational level parity with the Indian
military. In reality, two factors that prevent India from retaliating to
Pakistan Army’s regular provocations are: a weak and uncaring political
leadership which has scant respect for territorial integrity and formulates
foreign policy without inputs from the military. The second reason is that
given the overall matched capabilities of the two sides, there are no
worthwhile military aims to be achieved in a short and swift war. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">The third myth
is that Pakistan’s recent acquisition of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) will
unravel the strategic command and control of nuclear weapons and bring
instability to the battlefield. Readers are advised to read the recent book, ‘<i>Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani
Bomb</i>’, by the insider retired Brigadier Feroz Hassan Khan of the strategic
plans divisions responsible for Pakistan’s nukes. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">He writes that:
‘Pakistan has no plans to move towards battlefield weapons (TNWs). The
introduction of Nasr (60km range ballistic missile) is a purely defensive
measure. Should a nuclear warhead system be used in a tactical role, it will
still have strategic impact. This warrants the highest level of command and
control and use of authorisation from the National Command Authority.’<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Given the above
discussion, the Indian Army, especially its perspective planning directorate is
strongly advised to review overall threats, and more importantly to focus on
consolidation rather than expansion. Some issues to be debated are: <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt 0.45in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -0.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Which is the bigger threat, China or Pakistan? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt 0.45in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -0.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Has the war pivot shifted decisively towards the
mountains, if so, what needs to be done? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt 0.45in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -0.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">What doctrine is required against China and what is
feasible against Pakistan? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt 0.45in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -0.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Is there a need to continue with 80,000 strong RR,
or can this force be used elsewhere? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt 0.45in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -0.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Does the Indian Army need to raise the 17 mountain
corps or should it consolidate its existing assets against revisited doctrines for
the two adversaries? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt 0.45in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -0.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Have nuclear weapons been dovetailed into
operational war plans? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt 0.45in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -0.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">What is the probability of Pakistan using its
low-yield TNWs with strategic control vested at the highest army level? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt 0.45in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -0.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">What if the PLA uses TNWs in a border war against a
determined Indian Army to end the war quickly with minimal collateral damages? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast" style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt 0.45in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -0.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Should the army give up its expansive CI ops role
to focus on its primary task?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"> The last issue will be the hardest to resolve.
For example, recently retired GOC, 15 corps, Lt General Syed Ata Hasnain wrote
in a newspaper article that: ‘In 2011, we (the army) enunciated our own joint
politico-military aim for our commanders — integrate Jammu and Kashmir with
mainstream India, politically, economically, socially and psychologically.’ The
general was perhaps speaking for numerous others of his kind, who have
unwittingly brought the army to this dangerous crossroad where it lacks
conventional deterrence.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
FORCEhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17033758774826339971noreply@blogger.com6tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2043962667781155759.post-67825728773665182922013-10-28T02:22:00.000-07:002013-10-28T02:22:26.479-07:00Between Lies and Ignorance<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<i><span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Pravin Sawhney comments on </span><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's recent visit to China</span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed nine
agreements during his recent visit to China. The most awaited agreement, which
took a long time to get mutually accepted, and on which both sides have
expressed complete satisfaction was on Border Defence Cooperation (BDC). This
has been hailed by the Prime Minister as the bedrock of harmonious
relationship, without which the bilateral relationship may come unstuck. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">According to
India’s ambassador in China, S. Jaishankar, the BDC agreement lays out a
protocol to prevent incidents like the April-May Depsang (Ladakh) intrusions
when Chinese troops came in and sat 19km inside Indian territory. And importantly
it does not put any restrictions on India to enhance military capabilities
along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Elaborating, Jaishankar said that
according to the ‘principle of mutual and equal security’ emphasised in the
BDC, both countries are free to take military measures according to their
security needs. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">This is not true.
India is legally committed under the 1993 and 1996 agreements, which have been
unambiguously mentioned in the BDC agreement, to get China’s consent before enhancing
its military capability on the 4.000km LAC. The 1993 agreement says that the
two sides will have military forces along the LAC ‘in conformity with the
requirements of the principle of mutual and equal security to ceilings to be
mutually agreed’. Thus, the operative words in the principle are ‘mutually
agreed ceilings.’ <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">The 1996
agreement, which provides details of the confidence building measures along the
LAC, once again emphasises on ‘mutually agreed ceilings’ by stating that,
‘major categories of armament to be subjected to ceilings include: combat
tanks, infantry combat vehicles, guns with 75mm or bigger calibre, mortars with
120mm or bigger calibre, surface-to-surface missiles, surface-to-air missiles
and other weapons system mutually agreed upon.’ <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">The 1993 and
1996 agreements are testimony to Chinese foresightedness and involvement of the
People’s Liberation Army; both qualities lacking on the Indian side. To
obfuscate matters, the BDC agreement has been drafted cleverly and mentions
only ‘the principle of mutual and equal security’, and says that this should be
read in conjunction with the 1993, 1996, 2005 and 2012 agreements. This way
India has been helped by China to sell the BDC proposition back home by saying
that India would be free to enhance its military prowess along the LAC
according to its wishes. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">To put matters
further into perspective, even the principle of ‘mutual and equal security’
enshrined in the 1993 agreement was a blunder by India. Three Chinese military
advantages make this principle meaningless. One, India will never be able to
match Chinese rapid troops’ mobilisation through its excellent infrastructure
including road and rail links to Tibet from the heartland, and enormous airlift
capability. Two, Chinese troops have no requirement for acclimatisation in
Tibet battlefield. Indian troops would need a minimum 21 days after its
relatively slow mobilisation to be ready for war. And three, China being a
closed society can easily hide its ballistic missiles in Tibet, something India
will not be able to do. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">This is not all.
Coming back to the BDC agreement, it states that, ‘the two sides shall not
follow or tail patrols of the other side in areas where there is no common
understanding of the LAC.’ Except for the 553km Middle sector, there is no
mutual understanding on the remaining LAC in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh.
Thus, Chinese patrols could once again walk past the LAC to where they want and
stay for whatever duration they want on India land. All they have to do is
assert that they are on their side of the LAC. And, unlike the Depsang
incidence, they, under the BDC, will not be ‘tailed’ by Indian forces. Think
about the humiliation of Indian soldiers purportedly guarding the LAC at freezing
heights of 10,000feet to 18,000feet round the year, when they will find Chinese
patrols go merrily past them and they watch haplessly waiting for instructions
from Delhi. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Given these
realities, the BDC agreement has in essence demoted the military-held LAC to a
frontier between India and China, akin to what it was during the heydays of the
British rule in India. The word ‘frontier’ is defined as the limit of a
nation’s political and military influence, while ‘LAC’ denotes the limit of
national sovereignty that has to be defended at all costs. As China today is relatively
more powerful economically, politically and militarily, the free trespassing of
the LAC will be a one-way affair. A catch-up with Chinese growing political and
military power will, for various reasons, not be possible for India into the
foreseeable future. Thus, crossing the LAC is unlikely to become a two-way
affair. As Chinese patrols go deeper and deeper into India territory as their
global clout increases, are we not looking at an unfolding scenario where Sun
Tzu’s famous words, ‘to defeat the enemy without a battle,’ may come true?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
FORCEhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17033758774826339971noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2043962667781155759.post-75173863669806581942013-05-16T23:44:00.001-07:002013-05-16T23:47:52.646-07:00What India should watch out for during Chinese Prime Minister's visit<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">By Pravin Sawhney</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"></span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">We now know from the horse’s mouth why the Chinese border guards trooped in, pitched tents on Indian land in Ladakh, and left suddenly in 20 days. Their objective of getting Indian commitment to hold its capacity (infrastructure) and capability (troops and equipment) building below the threshold of military activism had been achieved. Encapsulated in the Defence Border Cooperation Agreement (DBCA) which was handed over to foreign minister Salman Khurshid during his recent Beijing visit, China is determined to operationalise a dormant clause of the 1993 Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement (BPTA) on its terms for a quieter border.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"></span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">Speaking recently with select Indian journalists, Qin Gang, director general, external publicity in the Chinese embassy in Delhi, gave two Chinese takeaways from the recent tension. One, ‘both sides did not allow it (intrusion) to contaminate other spheres of cooperation’. Translated, this means that Beijing is happy that India disregarded its core-interest of border resolution by focussing instead on overall bilateral relations. And two, ‘the incident should spur both sides to make greater efforts for a quieter border’. Explained, India should abandon its plans for more troops (proposed mountain strike corps, about 40,000 troops), equipment, airfields and advanced landing grounds, ballistic missile silos, and border infrastructure along the 4,056km Line of Actual Control (LAC). These issues will be discussed under the DBCA.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"></span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">Unlike India, China does not have regular troops on the LAC. Instead, it has awesome air lift capability, a preponderance of accurate ballistic and cruise missiles, formidable Special Forces, world class space and cyber capabilities, and a flat Tibetan plateau to fight a border war. Above all, it has the psychological advantage of having vanquished Indian political leadership in the 1962 war. Given all this, India, under pressure of the 20-day Ladakh stand-off, should not have agreed to discuss the DBCA which fundamentally calls for reduced Indian military presence on the border.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"></span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">To be sure, the DBCA will set the stage for bilateral relations under the fifth generation Chinese leadership, beginning with Prime Minister Li Keqiang’s visit on May 19. Beijing had been uneasy since 2008 when in a bottom-up approach, the Indian defence ministry had given the go-ahead to the army and the air force to build capacity and capability along the Western (Ladakh) and Eastern (Arunachal Pradesh) sectors of the LAC which is neither demarcated (identified on ground) or delimited (agreed on maps). In the classified ministerial directive issued to the defence services in February 2009, defence minister, A.K. Antony had instructed them to prepare capabilities for a two-front (Pakistan and China) threat. To China’s discomfiture, the tussle between the activist military seeking means to defend the disputed border and the pacifist foreign ministry mandarins who since the 1988 visit of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to China had accepted that the border dispute was not India’s core-interest had to be settled.<s><u style="text-underline: double;"><o:p></o:p></u></s></span></span></div>
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"></span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">Chinese reasoned that burgeoning Indian military activism would not only impede its grand strategy of strategic encirclement of India from land and sea, but could also cross path with China’s core-interest of Tibet. For instance, after the passing away of the Dalai Lama, China is certain to ask India to ban the Tibetan government-in-exile in Dharamshala. And the means to exert pressure would be the disputed border with imbalanced capacity and capability for a border war. Thus, by relenting on Chinese terms to discuss and settle the DBCA, India is likely to deprive itself of the muscle for meaningful and serious diplomacy, which must involve a give and take. Considering that the foreign ministry has taken credit for resolving the 20-day Ladakh crisis, its policy of appeasement is expected to prevail.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"></span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">This will please China, accustomed to signing advantageous treaties with India since 1988 when Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited China. Gandhi accepted Deng’s terms for building bilateral relations. The border dispute was not discussed by them and emphasis was placed on developing overall relationship. Worse, in a unilateral goodwill gesture, the 15-year border infrastructure and military build-up plan which was started in 1980 by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and General K.V. Krishna Rao was abandoned. India decided to take-on the Chinese challenge by diplomacy alone. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"></span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">The September 1993 BPTA signed during Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao’s China visit re-named the entire disputed border as the Line of Actual Control (LAC). India’s sense of agreeing to this was that instead of resolving the entire border as one whole, both sides could now do so progressively in three parts (Western, Middle and Eastern) and make it peaceful. In reality, it worked to Chinese advantage. With the entire border being called the LAC, intrusions and border skirmishes increased, as Chinese with more gumption kept pushing the border envelopment. Thus, while between 1962 and 1993, there were only two border incidents in 1967 at Nathu La and the 1986 Sumdorong Chu crisis, thereafter, border intrusions rose steadily with each year. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">Now, China wants to activate a generic sentiment listed in the BPTA which seeks less troops on the border; something that Delhi has agreed to work upon. However, having accepted to discuss DBCA, Delhi should not agree to any more Chinese conditions for a quieter border, for these will put Indian military at a disadvantageous position.</span></div>
FORCEhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17033758774826339971noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2043962667781155759.post-26687158799091356742013-04-12T03:59:00.000-07:002013-04-12T03:59:10.993-07:00Cruise Control<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;"><em>The recent BrahMos test-firing has
brought into focus the importance of cruise missiles</em> <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;"><strong>By Pravin Sawhney<o:p></o:p></strong></span></div>
<span style="font-size: 10pt;"><o:p><span style="font-family: Verdana;"> </span></o:p></span><br />
<br />
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;">
<span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Verdana;">The
successful maiden test-firing of BrahMos supersonic cruise missile from an
underwater pontoon on March 20 was more important than has been understood in
the popular perception. Media focus, unfortunately, has been on the negatives:
there is no submarine platform (Project 75I) to use this version of BrahMos
missile; the missile has been test-fired from a stationary underwater pontoon
and not a submarine; as Project 75I acquisition is a good decade away (the RFP
has still not been issued), the underwater cruise missile technology would
become obsolete, are some of the comments which betray both a lack of
understanding of the subject and its operational utility and context.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Verdana;">It seems to have been forgotten that Pakistan
successfully test-fired its long range 1,000km sub-sonic Babur cruise missile,
in August 2005, which since has joined its army’s inventory, upsetting the
operational balance between the two militaries. While bean counting of assets
between India and Pakistan is unnecessary, a new weapon system joining one’s
inventory has serious operational implications for both sides, since neither is
expected to use nukes early in a war. Probably a step by step approach is
required to understand the latest progress in the BrahMos phenomenon: how
cruise missiles relate to war? The quality of cruise missile with India and
Pakistan, and the road ahead, are questions that need to be pondered over. The
issue assumes importance since cruise missiles, unlike ballistic missiles, will
be used freely in a conventional war. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Verdana;">A cruise missile is a dispensable, pilot-less,
guided, continuously-powered, endo-atmospheric (stays within the atmosphere)
vehicle that is supported by wings and is powered by the same kind of jet
engine as an aircraft. Unlike a ballistic missile, that is powered and usually
guided for only the brief initial part of its flight till it leaves the
atmosphere, a cruise missile requires continuous power and guidance, since both
the velocity and the direction of its flight can be unpredictably altered by
local weather conditions or changes in the performance of its propulsion
system. For instance, a ballistic missile is guided for the first five of the
20 minutes it takes to travel 5,000km; a cruise missile, which usually flies at
subsonic speed, would require close to six hours of continuous guided flight to
cover the same distance. Hence, guidance errors that accumulate with time would
be almost a hundred times larger for a cruise missile than for a ballistic
missile with a comparable range. Accurate arrival of a cruise missile at a
target is achieved with continuous inertial guidance only by correcting it from
time to time with fresh information about the missile’s position.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Verdana;">In terms of cost, cruise missiles are less costly
to design, develop, procure, maintain and operate than ballistic missiles. In
operational terms, cruise missiles are better suited than ballistic missiles
for use with conventional warheads as their accuracy is far better. The
aerodynamic stability of the cruise missile permits the use of
less-sophisticated and therefore, less costly guidance and control methods than
in the case of ballistic missiles, which undergo the stresses of re-entry into
the atmosphere with high speed. For example, cruise missiles can receive
satellite navigation corrections all the way to the target from the US Global
Positioning System (GPS) or Russian Global Navigation Satellite System
(GLONASS) leading to 10 metres Circular Error Probability. CEP is a measure of
accuracy, defined as the radius of a circle in which 50 per cent of missiles
are successfully delivered.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Verdana;">Another appealing operational feature of cruise
missiles is that they can be placed in canisters, which makes them easy to
maintain and operate in harsh environment. Their relative compact size offers
more flexible launch options, more mobility for ground-launched versions, and a
smaller logistics burden, which reduces their battlefield vulnerability to
detection — and thus improves their pre-launch survivability. Moreover, cruise
missiles dictate no special launch pad stability requirements and can be
launched from ships, submarines, aircraft and ground launchers with ease. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Verdana;">Most importantly, cruise missiles can fly low and
hence pose severe detection challenges even for airborne radars due to ground
clutter. Moreover, cruise missiles’ exhaust plumes are not generally detected
by launch warning systems, and unlike ballistic missiles, their flight paths
are unpredictable. Given the fact that reductions in radar cross-section are
easier to accomplish in cruise missile designs than in manned aircraft, cruise
missile pose a formidable challenge to modern air defence systems. In
comparison, at least to a limited extent, defences against ballistic missiles
are available with the US, Russia, Israel and China. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Verdana;">In more specific terms, the operational importance
of cruise missiles owes to the advances in propulsion (engine), guidance and
navigation technologies. The air breathing engines for propulsion are of two
types: turbojet and turbofan. Turbofan engines consume much less fuel than
turbojets of equivalent size; hence are more complex system and extremely
expensive. Accordingly, turbofan engines are considered suitable for long-range
cruise missiles with ranges between 600km to 2,000km. At present, only a few
advanced countries have mastered the turbofan propulsion technology.
Interestingly, China is amongst them. In 1994, the Clinton administration in
the US approved a half-billion-dollar sale of turbofan engines by AlliedSignal
to China for use in business aircraft. These engines were reversed engineered
by the Chinese to upgrade their Silkworms Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM) to
600km range. China publicly unveiled its WS500 turbofan engine (subsequently
used in Babur Land Attack Cruise Missile) at the Zhuhai Air Show in late 2004.
Developed by the Chinese Gas Turbine Establishment, the WS500 is claimed to
produce around 1,125lbs of thrust. By comparison, the US Tomahawk engine
produces 700lbs thrust. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Verdana;">The turbojet engine is more widely used in cruise
missile with ranges up to 500km, referred to as tactical missile. The ramjet
propulsion engine is a derivative of turbojet engine. Unlike in the case of
turbojet propulsion that produces subsonic speeds, in ramjet, adequate pressure
is built up within the engine to produce supersonic speeds of Mach 2 (Mach 1 is
equivalent to the speed of sound which is 1,000km per hour) to Mach 4. The main
disadvantage of the ramjet is that it requires to be boosted from static to a
suitable high velocity, usually around Mach 2, to create a high enough pressure
(called ram pressure) for the ramjet propulsion to work. However, a ramjet is
much simpler than turbojet or turbofan propulsion.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Verdana;">Regarding the navigation and control of cruise
missiles, it can be done by various methods that include simple mid-course
correction by pre-programmed autopilot, and terminal guidance by passive radio
frequency homing, radar, or passive Infra Red. The Inertial Navigation System
(INS) that uses accelerometers and gyroscopes that detect motion and calculate
changes in relative position are not very helpful with cruise missiles as given
their slow motion and long range, adequate inaccuracies accumulate that make it
unreliable for use in conventional missions. The answer is to integrate GPS
with INS. The problem with the GPS is that the US defence department has
intentionally added an inaccuracy in the system called Selective Availability
(SA), so that only the US military gets the accurate signal codes for its use.
Interestingly, US companies themselves have created a technique called the
Digital Ground Precision System (DGPS) which has removed most of the inherent
GPS’ SA inaccuracies. Commercial DGPS are available in the open market and
India and Pakistan are amongst the many countries that have sought the DGPS.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Verdana;">Probably what makes cruise missiles an attractive
weapon system for developing countries is the stronger consensus amongst the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) members that restricting ballistic
missiles is more important than cruise missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
(UAV) systems. This has motivated many countries to upgrade ASCM and UAV to
Land Attack Cruise Missile (LACM). Moreover, the MTCR threshold of 500kg
payload and 300km range is more suited for ballistic rather than cruise
missiles. From an engineering standpoint, it is relatively easy to scale-up the
range of an existing cruise missile system than a ballistic missile. The
technology required to produce a 600km range cruise missile is not
fundamentally different from that needed for very short-range cruise missiles.
Hence, UAV technologies falling clearly below the MTCR threshold can be
exported and applied to the development of long-range cruise missiles.
Moreover, the structures, propulsion, autopilot, and navigation systems used in
manned aircraft are essentially interchangeable with those of cruise missiles.
Against this backdrop, Pakistan’s Babur and India’s BrahMos cruise missiles
need to be assessed to determine their operational capabilities.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><o:p><span style="font-family: Verdana;"> </span></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Verdana;">Babur<o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;">
<span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Verdana;">Babur’s
two technology advantages are its turbofan propulsion, and its navigation and
guidance system comprising the radar altimeter and a digital imaging infrared
seeker. Unlike India that started with the low-end of technology by making
BrahMos into an ASCM to be upgraded to LACM, Babur’s evolution appears to be
the other way round. It has been developed as a long-range LACM and its naval
version will be made in limited numbers to be carried by F-22P guided missile
frigates. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Verdana;">The radar altimeter enables the cruise missile to
fly as low as 20m over water, 50m over moderately hilly terrain, and 100m over
mountains. (This capability makes the missile difficult to detect with
ground-based radar). Fitted with turbofan propulsion, a cruise missile is
capable of ranges up to 2,000km at low altitude and perhaps 50 per cent more if
the first 1,500km are flown at higher altitude and the rest at tree top level. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Verdana;">As a thumb rule, more fuel is consumed if a cruise
missile travels low, and inversely, less fuel is expended if a cruise missile
travels at higher altitudes within the atmosphere. Given these technical
parameters, Pakistan media reports claiming that the 10 August 2005 test-firing
of Babur achieved a range of 500km at a low cruising altitude of 100m at a
speed of Mach 0.7 sound plausible. Moreover, Babur has tremendous inherent
potential to be made into an accurate long range LACM.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Verdana;">The introduction of Babur missile by Pakistan
coincides well with the Chinese focus on cruise missiles with longer ranges
since the Nineties. For example, China reportedly has a number of cruise
missile programmes underway. These include the YJ-62 long-range ASCM, as well
as air and ground launched derivatives. For missile guidance, China has
acquired active radar guidance for terminal guidance in addition to
electro-optical seeker for LACM. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Verdana;">It will be appropriate to assume that China, which
cares little about international non-proliferation treaties and obligations,
would have shared advanced cruise missile technology with Pakistan. In
summation, Babur, with state-of-the-art turbofan technology procured from
China, is expected to be used as sub-sonic LACM and on surface ships. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><o:p><span style="font-family: Verdana;"> </span></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Verdana;">BrahMos<o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;">
<span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Verdana;">What
makes BrahMos cruise missile extraordinary is that it is the only significant
weapon system produced by the Defence Research and Development Organisation
(DRDO) which has evolved in reasonable time and cost-lines and has been
accepted by all the three defence services (navy, army and air force) readily
without government pressure. The missile has two-stage propulsion — solid
propellant rocket for initial acceleration and liquid fuelled ramjet for
sustained supersonic cruise — achieving a speed of 2.8 Mach to deliver a 300kg
payload. Russia has provided propulsion, while India is responsible for
navigation based on inertial navigation system. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Verdana;">A brainchild of Dr APJ Abdul Kalam, BrahMos has
matured through Dr Sivathanu Pillai’s efforts as a multi-role cruise missile.
The inter-governmental joint venture agreement signed between India and Russia
on 12 February 1998 formed the BrahMos Aerospace to build ASCM to be jointly
designed, developed, produced and marketed. Fifteen years later, in February
2012 when BrahMos celebrated its landmark anniversary, it had achieved the
unexpected. Starting with INS Rajput in 2005, BrahMos has been accepted by the
navy to be its offensive weapon on all surface ships. The army has accepted
three versions of BrahMos LACM. Three regiments of BrahMos Block I and II have
been raised as part of artillery divisions. Block I is with radio frequency
seekers, while Block II has indigenous software developed by BrahMos and DRDO
for better accuracy against smaller targets. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Verdana;">In tandem with GPS, an accuracy of 10m has been
achieved. Block III version is meant for mountains, where BrahMos’ steep-dive
capability meant to cover targets behind mountain ridges (called dead ground in
army parlance) was successfully demonstrated to the army on 5 September
2010.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Orders for a regiment of BrahMos
LACM Block III version have since been placed. The BrahMos LACM version will be
provided with an Infrared missile seeker with an inbuilt camera to provide
simultaneous photographs of the target to minimise collateral damage.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Verdana;">Meanwhile, work has started on adopting BrahMos for
the air and undersea versions. The air version will be lighter in weight and
the government has cleared modifications on 42 numbers of Su-30MKI aircraft to
have the supersonic missile. All checks and analysis by HAL and the Sukhoi
design bureau have been completed and the field ‘drop test’ of BrahMos from the
Su-30MKI is slated for the end of the year, with the production expected to
commence in 2014. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Verdana;">Meanwhile, BrahMos created a record of sorts by its
recent underwater launch from a pontoon platform. The navy is satisfied with
the tests and preliminary acceptance to have eight vertically launched BrahMos
supersonic cruise missiles on each P-75I submarine has been cleared. Consider a
realistic naval firepower potential a decade from now: All Kilo-class
submarines will be fitted with the Russian Klub 3E-14E LACM. With each
submarine carrying 16 to 18 of these 300km range missiles, the navy will have devastating
firepower to employ in various tactical scenarios. This is not all. With P-75I
submarines getting inducted into service, they would be fitted with both Klub
3E-14E LACM and improved BrahMos missiles; then, even reduced submarine numbers
will be made good by better capabilities. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Verdana;">Probably the biggest limitations of BrahMos are its
290km range and 300kg warhead, well under the MTCR range threshold of 300km and
500kg. Fitted with ramjet propulsion, BrahMos rises up to an altitude of nearly
10km to 12km, before the ramjet propulsion takes over to provide the missile
with a speed of Mach 2.8 during the cruising phase. BrahMos’ advantage is that
with its high speed, it is capable of travelling its maximum range in four
minutes. Even as the missile during its initial phase will provide a sizeable
signature for the enemy acquisition radar, there will be little time to take
counter measures to stop the missile.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Verdana;">On balance, BrahMos has three distinctive features.
One, except for the air version, it has a universal launcher for its naval and
land versions. Two, the same missile, without any modification, can be employed
against any ship or land targets. And three, no land forces in the world are
equipped with supersonic cruise missiles. Specific to Pakistan, with kinetic
energy nine times more than Babur, BrahMos is a formidable supersonic cruise
missile.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Verdana;">What India now urgently needs is a cruise missiles
policy, whose long-term developmental focus should be three-pronged: to improve
BrahMos to hypersonic speeds, to work on a long range subsonic cruise missile
with indigenous turbofan propulsion, and Cruise Missile Defence (CMD). There
will also be the need to decide various platforms for cruise missiles, as being
the prime target of the enemy these will be vulnerable. For example, the LACM
can be fired from mobile launchers, hardened silos and submarines; the ideal,
of course, will be to have a mix of all three. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Verdana;">There is a need to exploit BrahMos, which is
available in all three sea, land and air versions, optimally. At present,
BrahMos uses the GPS. It is known that the Indian Space and Research
Organisation (ISRO) is working on an indigenous GPS, which has been partially
successful. Once accomplished, this will be a major breakthrough in providing
secure and improved guidance to cruise missiles. Another cruise missile project
should concentrate on scramjet propulsion, to take the missile to hypersonic
speeds of Mach 10, something that BrahMos Aerospace has initiated. It may be
recalled that conceptual work on hypersonic propulsion was started in 1993 by
the then DRDO chief, Dr APJ Abdul Kalam. In addition to the engine itself, the
need will be for composite materials that can withstand high temperatures for
trans-atmospheric flight. Unfortunately, material management has never been
India’s strength and outside help (Russia) would be needed.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Verdana;">Probably the most daunting challenge will be the
Cruise Missile Defence (CMD), especially when futuristic missiles are expected
to have hypersonic propulsion. The answer to this lies in directed energy
weapons, which derive their destructive power from electromagnetic energy or
subatomic particle beams aimed against an incoming warhead, and travel close to
or at the speed of light. For example, laser light can be used as directed
energy weapon. Laser guided weapons differ from the anti-missile weapon systems
in three fundamental ways: One, in laser weapons destructive energy is
transported to the target in the form of an intense beam of electromagnetic
waves rather than in the form of an explosive charge carried inside a missile
or shell. Two, this energy travels at the speed of light, that is, 3.10 (to
power 8) metres per second, compared with 1,000 to 2,000m per second that a
supersonic missile should be capable of. And three, the laser beam can damage a
target only if it physically strikes it. It is axiomatic that laser weapons are
best directed from space. While India is in no way near such advanced research
and in principle opposes militarisation of space, it must start appreciating
the non-military applications of space.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Verdana;">In a rare candid admission, a former DRDO chief, M.
Natarajan has said: “The lack of success in developing indigenous propulsion
systems for the country’s major programmes is a cause of concern. Affected are
programmes such as the aero engines for fighter aircraft and unmanned aerial
vehicles, engines for tanks and naval propulsion and ramjet and hypersonic
propulsion for missiles.” Taking cue, the DRDO should abandon its penchant for
hype and boasting, and indeed concentrate on essentials with transparency. The
growth trajectory of BrahMos Aerospace has set the roadmap for future
developments.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
</div>
FORCEhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17033758774826339971noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2043962667781155759.post-46070152575016708432013-04-12T03:53:00.000-07:002013-04-12T03:53:43.155-07:00Risks to Women<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<br />
<em>A few weeks ago, FICCI organized a round table discussion on risks to women in India. I was invited to moderate the discussion. This is what I said...</em><br />
<br />
<h2 style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span class="MsoIntenseEmphasis"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"></span></span> </h2>
<h2 style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span class="MsoIntenseEmphasis"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">T</span></span><span class="MsoIntenseEmphasis"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">wo
observations: One, it is indeed progress that an industrial federation has
found it worth its while to organise a discussion on risks to women. Given that
industry is notorious for living by the balance sheet, it is very heartening to
see attention being given to a subject which has traditionally been
low-priority.<o:p></o:p></span></span></h2>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;"><o:p> </o:p></span></div>
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">My second
observation is that despite this initiative, women’s security is still
considered a woman’s matter. Not for a moment I want to undermine the eminence
of this panel, but the very fact that it overwhelmingly comprises women suggests
that men still consider this a bit of a non-issue. This is not only undermines
woman’s safety in the public spheres, but also underlines the primary reason
why they are unsafe. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;"><o:p> </o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">Why this undermines
woman’s safety? Simply because our public spaces are overpopulated by men.
Hence, no matter what we do at our end, to a very large extent, women will
always have to depend upon a male guarantee to their security. Right from her
workplace to a public park, women have to bargain space and security with men.
A woman’s security is not a woman’s issue, it is a societal issue which has to
be addressed by both men and women.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;"><o:p> </o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">And why this
underlines the reasons for women insecurity? Because by putting the
responsibility of their security on women, the men willy-nilly apportion the
blame on women, should anything happen to them. By holding the victim
responsible for the fate that befells her, they showcase the mental make-up
which discriminates against women, and not just in public spaces. Even at home,
women are vulnerable, and most often this vulnerability is reinforced by women
themselves, whether their mothers or mothers in law. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;"><o:p> </o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">Coming to the
specifics, what are the risks to women’s safety? At home, it can be an abusive
or exploitative childhood, violent marriage and dowry harassment. Or something
as invisible as undermining of her personality and spirit by constant emotional
and psychological battering: by isolating her from decision-making; by not
allowing her to spend her earnings, if at all, in the manner she wishes to; by
isolating her from her family and friends; by running down her abilities and so
on.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;"><o:p> </o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">At workplace,
sexual harassment is the most obvious threat. But that apart, a lot of threats
that exist at home exist at the workplace too. For instance, women workers are
mocked for their inability to put in certain number of hours; they are
arbitrarily considered less efficient for certain jobs or conversely are
considered more efficient for certain jobs, like public relations which is a
not so subtle reference to their sexuality.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;"><o:p> </o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">In public places,
from verbal assault (which we delicately put as eve-teasing) to physical
assault, it’s an open field.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;"><o:p> </o:p></span></div>
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">The irony is, even
in the so-called safe environs, the gender and cultural insensitivity leads to
further violations of a woman, whether it is the police stations, the hospitals
or the court rooms.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span class="MsoIntenseEmphasis"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"><o:p> </o:p></span></span><br />
<br />
<h2 style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span class="MsoIntenseEmphasis"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">So
where do we begin? After all these years, it is clear that our deterrence
against the predators who stake women out has not worked. In fact, punishment
has not been a deterrence at all. It is some kind of unfathomable vileness that
leads men to commit sexual crimes against women. It just cannot be the
over-confidence that they won’t get caught. What explains the behaviour of the
hotel owner in Agra? How did he imagine he would get away with whatever he
intended to do?<o:p></o:p></span></span></h2>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;"><o:p> </o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">After the gruesome
December incident, all kinds of mind-numbing and blood-curling statistics
appeared in the press underlying how unsafe women are. Figures don’t really
register in my mind. But what did, was a traditional lunch that I and a group
of my girlfriends have once in two months. We have known each other on an
average for about 10-12 years. But somehow personal incidents of sexual
harassment or abuse never really figured in our conversations. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;"><o:p> </o:p></span><br />
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">However, such was
the impact of the December rape and murder case that we started sharing our
personal histories. Shockingly, each one of us had an incident or two to
narrate; ranging from every day verbal assault to more invidious instances of
stalking and indecent propositioning at workplace. One had even suffered persistent
molestation by her tutor as a child. Ironically, the shame of it was reinforced
in all our cases by the women in our lives, our mothers, aunts and older sisters.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;"><o:p> </o:p></span><br />
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">So really, where do
we begin? </span><span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 11pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
FORCEhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17033758774826339971noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2043962667781155759.post-5600481203605664272013-01-09T22:39:00.000-08:002013-01-09T22:43:35.163-08:00Giving Pakistan a taste of its own medicine<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<br />
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;"><strong>By Pravin Sawhney<o:p></o:p></strong></span><br />
<strong>
</strong><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span><br />
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">While confirming that the recent mutilation
of two Indian soldiers on the Line of Control was the handiwork of Pakistani
regulars, defence minister A.K. Antony said that India was watching the
situation, a euphemism for military inaction. Taking cue, the army, has
confirmed its resolve to continue with counter-terrorism operations adding that
2,500 infiltrators are waiting to cross the LC. Pakistan, on the other hand,
slipped into denial mode, with its foreign minister, Hina Rabbani offering
cooperation for a UN probe into the matter, which India rejected. This was
clear evidence, if one was needed, that the raid had sanction from the highest
level at General Headquarters, and the latter controls India policy. Meanwhile,
having got a good sensational story, the Indian media went into an overdrive
speculating motives behind the dastardly act and what India should do to teach
the Pakistan Army a lesson.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Writing in the Hindustan Times newspaper,
one defence analyst with army background has suggested that the Pakistani post
from where the raiders came should be decimated by massive artillery firepower.
This is what should not be done. The Pakistan Army will seize the opportunity
with ferocious firepower retaliation leading to the end of ceasefire on the LC.
The latter will both then facilitate infiltration under cover fire and India
will be seen as aggressors in Kashmiri perception. The Indian response should also
not be more CI ops, something that works to Pakistan Army’s satisfaction; the
India Army continues to bleed itself in an unending war with little threat to
Pakistan. The answer lies in giving the Pakistan Army a taste of its own
medicine. This should be done by regular raids by Indian Army Special Forces
across the LC at a time of its own choosing, while keeping a firm grip over the
war escalatory ladder. How? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Three simultaneous actions by Indian
defence ministry will get Pakistan army chief, General Ashfaq Kayani to the edge
of his chair wondering what to do next? In the next three months, the Indian
Army should move 40 to 50 per cent of its Rashtriya Rifles (RR) troops from its
CI role in the hinterland to the LC. Of the present five divisions (called RR
Force Headquarters), two divisions or about 25,000 troops can be pulled to the
LC for the conventional war role. This should not be difficult as forward
elements of these forces (reconnaissance and order groups) have been
familiarising themselves for the war contingency. In addition, two Special
Forces units doing CI ops in Kashmir should also be moved to the LC.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Meanwhile, the fence on the LC which
gets damaged by snow, especially in the higher reaches, each year, should not
be re-built this season. This will both facilitate Indian raids when they
happen, and will leave the Pakistan Army perplexed about Indian motives. And
lastly, in a war-like mode, defence ministry officials should procure
ammunition and missiles from abroad to make up war wastage rate deficiencies of
the Indian Army, something that was done during the 1999 Kargil conflict. Even
if India does not want war, the army should have adequate ammunition for a
credible holding (and probing, if<a href="http://www.blogger.com/null" name="_GoBack"></a> needed) action on the
border.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Once these preparations are afoot,
the Pakistan Army, in all possibility, will get the message and be compelled to
even scale down infiltration across the LC, something that usually goes up each
year with the melting of snow. The Indian Army offensive strategy will become
clear to GHQ, Rawalpindi. It will be raids across the LC, and should Pakistan
escalate operations, there will be credible Indian forces (pivot corps) on the
border to checkmate the machinations without venturing into Pakistan territory.
The Pakistan Army leadership, committed on its western front against
Afghanistan, will find it difficult to keep supporting the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Jehadis</i> (Laskhar terrorists) across the LC. The Pakistan Army for
once in 22 years, when insurgency started in Kashmir in 1990, will be on the
back-foot.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;"></span> </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;"><em>(For more on the subject visit </em><a href="http://www.forceindia.net/"><em>www.forceindia.net</em></a><em>)</em></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;"></span> </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;"></span> </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;"></span> </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;"></span> </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;"><o:p></o:p></span> </div>
<br />
</div>
FORCEhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17033758774826339971noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2043962667781155759.post-15027925171271625192013-01-09T00:34:00.001-08:002013-01-09T00:34:33.583-08:00Highlights from the January cover story<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;">
<span style="color: red; font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;"><span style="color: black;">The Indian Army may not have ammunition to fight the next war (with
Pakistan, not to mention China) beyond three to five days. Holdings for all
types of missiles, and anti-tank ammunition are critically low. Stockings for
artillery (70 per cent fuses needed for firing are unavailable) and armour
fighting vehicles ammunition are unlikely to last beyond four to five days of
intense war. War Wastage Reserves (WWR) for most ammunition categories do not
exist.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<span style="color: black;">
</span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;"><span style="color: black;">--<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<span style="color: black;">
</span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;">
<span style="color: red; font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;"><span style="color: black;">How has the prestigious 13 lakh-strong army remained unprepared for
so long? At the heart of this tragedy is the government’s weird idea of
indigenisation with the fulcrum around the 41 units of OFB and the 10 Defence
Public Sector units (DPSUs) being run as personal fiefdoms by defence ministry
bureaucrats.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<span style="color: black;">
</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;"><span style="color: black;">--<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<span style="color: black;">
</span><br />
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<span style="color: red; font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;"><span style="color: black;">Over 50 per cent of the T-72 tank fleet (around 2,500 numbers) gun
barrels require urgent replacements as being sub-standard they cannot be used.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<span style="color: black;">
</span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;"><span style="color: black;">--<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<span style="color: black;">
</span><br />
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<span style="color: red; font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;"><span style="color: black;">70 per cent of artillery ammunition is without fuses and hence,
cannot be used. Units have found sealed ammunition with fungus on them and
there have been regular cases of propellant leakages from charges.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<span style="color: black;">
</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;"><span style="color: black;">--<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<span style="color: black;">
</span><br />
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<span style="color: red; font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;"><span style="color: black;">Take the case of Carl Gustaf recoilless rifle, which has been with
the army since Eighties and its ToT was transferred to OFB. Even today, the
weapon and its ammunition are imported from the Swedish OEM.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<br />
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">For full story visit </span><a href="http://www.forceindia.net/"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">www.forceindia.net</span></a></div>
FORCEhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17033758774826339971noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2043962667781155759.post-15707676847791079152012-12-03T23:55:00.000-08:002012-12-03T23:59:00.674-08:00Engaging Kashmir Youth<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">FORCE's Ghazala Wahab was invited by Indian Army's Srinagar-based 15 Corps to deliver a talk on how the Indian Army can engage with the Kashmiri youth. This was part of the seminar on youth empowerment. Here is Ghazala's paper:</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"></span><br />
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</span><br />
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"><em>This is a difficult subject primarily because
of the limitations on both sides of the divide – the army and the Kashmiri
youth.<o:p></o:p></em></span></span></div>
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</span><br />
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">The
Army’s Limitations<o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
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</span><br />
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">One, Kashmir is a political problem and not
a military problem. Hence, both the management of the problem and the
resolution has to come from a political process. Whether we do it within the
country or engage with our neighbour — that’s a different subject. The army can
only play the role of a facilitator by keeping violence down; so that there is
room for the political process. The more army expands its role, more vulnerable
it will render itself to allegations of having vested interests.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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</span><br />
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><o:p><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"> </span></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">Two, despite army’s exemplary
(non-military) contribution to the state of J&K, through its ‘Winning
Hearts and Mind’ programmes and Operation Sadbhavana, the army at the end of
the day remains an instrument of State’s (read Union government) policy. As a
result, the animosity towards the State (remember, Kashmir is a political problem
stemming from the animosity towards the state) is channelled through its more
visible instrument which is the army. So, anything that the army does is always
viewed with a degree of cynicism and suspicion. Additionally, as army moves
into non-military areas, more it hampers the political process, because this
gives fodder to the perception that India holds Kashmir through force. The army
must perforce be as invisible in populated areas as possible for a resolution
to come about.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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</span><br />
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"></span><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"></span><br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">Three, the army primarily started the
Sadbhavana programme to put into place an intelligence grid. Hence, one of the
earliest relationships that it forged with the people was a transactional one.
People usually do not forget these things, and in Kashmir especially, memories go
very far. So whenever the army would start any process, irrespective of the
nobility of its purpose, there will always be wariness, which will limit its
scope and to a large extent prevent the army from reaching the people who can
actually make a difference.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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</span><br />
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"></span><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"></span><br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">Kashmiri
Youth’s Limitations<o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
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</span><br />
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">One, the Kashmiri youth is the product of
their history. A Kashmiri youth or even a person in his early 20s was either
born in or after 1989. These, nobody can deny, were the darkest years in
Kashmir. Even if this person has not personally suffered, he or she has grown
up seeing close family members, neighbours or friends suffer. Mostly, at the
hands of the Indian security forces which, in popular perception, translates
into the Indian Army. Now, even if this young man or woman wants to build his
or her future, the shared history of his community is the burden he/she must
bear. For them, to engage with the Indian Army for their own betterment would
be a betrayal of the sacrifices made by their family, friends or neighbours.
After all, a sense of martyrdom is not exclusive to the uniformed forces.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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</span><br />
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"></span><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"></span><br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">Two, Kashmiris, especially the youth,
suffer from a persecution complex. And with some justification. They face
regional and religious profiling in other parts of the country. Not only that,
even within the state, they are made acutely conscious of their inferiority
simply because the opposite side holds power. Hence, they feel psychologically
compelled to acknowledge as superior even those who may be unequal to them in
terms of education or social hierarchy. This puts a psychological pressure on
them to huddle together among their own and view the others or the so-called
superior force with fear if not loathing. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span><br />
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">To give an example from yesterday, the
state administration belatedly realised on Thursday afternoon that Friday was
also the 8<span style="font-size: small;"><sup>th</sup> day of Muharram. Anticipating trouble they ordered
curfew to be imposed on Friday in six police station areas of Srinagar. But the
schools were not informed, some of which were conducting examinations. I had an
appointment across the Jhelum, where there was no curfew. As vehicles were not
allowed, I took the lane behind my hotel to cross the river via the foot
bridge. But J&K police and the CRP personnel had put up the barbed wires at
the bridge to restrict movement. Standing on the right bank of Jhelum, I saw
school girls and boys screaming their lungs out demanding to be allowed to
cross as they had an examination. The men in uniform were screaming back,
trying to frighten the school children with their lathis. I was beyond rage.
Whose fault was it? If the curfew had to be imposed, why weren’t schools asked
to close down? At that moment, I could completely identify with the impotent
rage of the school children. How do you engage with them? A young girl at the
barbed wire was trying to talk with one of the CRP personnel in fluent English.
She foolishly believed that her education and knowledge of English had
empowered her. But how long before she realises that education is not power in
her state? A mere <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">danda</i> is.<o:p></o:p></span></span></span></div>
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</span><br />
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</span><br />
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">A connective factor here is that years of
strife have robbed Kashmiri youth of education and other avenues of growth. So,
academically and in terms of human resource development they are far behind
their counterparts in the rest of the country. This is the reason that one sees
the spectacle of long queues of job aspirants — some as qualified as graduates
— at the army’s recruitment rallies for PBORs. The problem with this is that
when you study high enough to get through the college, your and your family’s
expectations from you increase. You expect to get into a white collar job and
not work with those who have just scraped through class 10 or 12<span style="font-size: small;"><sup>th</sup>.
You may accept the job for economic reasons, but disillusionment with the
society and the education system fills you with bitterness. A bitter person is
a dangerous person. He is full of angst, which can be directed towards anything
or anybody.<o:p></o:p></span></span></span></div>
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</span><br />
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"></span><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"></span><br /></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">Engaging
with youth is easier said than done. And here is the challenge<o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
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</span><br />
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">Like most of South Asia, Kashmir is also
facing a youth bulge. I believe almost 60 per cent of the state’s population is
under-30. If you further dissect these age bracket, then the proportions of
early and mid-teens are larger. This, all social scientists accept, is a
dangerous age to be. The children, especially the boys have to deal with all
sorts of adolescent issues, whether they are physical, emotional or
psychological. They are impatient, short-tempered and easily persuaded. This is
the age group which is most susceptible to exploitation because the hormones
are raging and they need an adrenaline rush.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span><br />
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">Sensible adults try and direct the hyper
energies of the children into productive areas. Unfortunately, in Kashmir, a
lot of parents may not be sensitive to this because of their own personal,
political as well as economic traumas. Driving around the old parts of
Srinagar, I have myself seen young boys idling along the road sides. They have
nowhere to go. Their homes have just enough space for them to sleep quietly in
one corner at night. In the day time they simply cannot stay at home because
the space is required to perform several household functions. To my mind, this
is the most volatile and vulnerable group. If engaged correctly, they can be a
great force multiplier. If engaged in a cavalier manner, they can turn against
you. And if ignored completely, they can become tools in somebody else’s hands.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><o:p><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"> </span></o:p></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span><br />
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">With
these inherent limitations, what can the Indian Army do?<o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span><br />
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">The first question that comes to mind is
why does army wants to engage with the Kashmiri youth when it is not its job. I
would think that there could be two reasons to do this.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">One, to improve army’s image among the
youth; and <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"></span><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"></span><br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">Two, to fulfil what could be called the Army’s
Social Responsibility, something akin to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span><br />
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">If this is correct then the way forward
comprises two roads: the easy and the well-trodden. And the unpaved track which
may or may not yield success.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"></span><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"></span><br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">The easy and the well-trodden road is what
the army has been doing so far. Youth empowerment centres, computer classes,
coaching classes for higher education, vocational training centres, sporting
events etc in its areas of comfort. All these are hit and run programmes with
no follow-up. Perhaps, no one even keeps a track of what happens to the students
who participate in these centres or programmes. Sure, you cannot do this
because you don’t have the man-power. In that case outsource these, or enter
into some kinds of MoUs with local universities or respectable NGOs.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">The unpaved track would be to engage with
the urban youth, because these can be the potential opinion-changers. This may
even lead to questioning of the so-called ‘Sentiment’ in the Valley. And the
army does not have to show its overt presence in the Valley to do any of this.
Here is my wish list:<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><o:p><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"> </span></o:p></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span><br />
<ol start="1" style="margin-top: 0in;" type="1"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">The army,
through various organisational headquarters, can institute a number of
scholarships in urban schools, colleges and Universities. While some of
these can be named after local Kashmiri heroes, some can be named after
even military heroes. These scholarships should enable the students to
study in some of the better institutions in the rest of India. In fact,
the students ought to be given the option of even opting for a military
institution if they so desire. This way, they will be able to see the
other side of the uniform.<o:p></o:p></span></span></li>
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">The army
frequently takes group of students from smaller Kashmiri towns or villages
on a ‘Bharat Darshan’ or sight-seeing tour. Similar tours could be
conducted, again in urban areas, but this time not to see Taj Mahal and
Rashtrapati Bhawan, but to military institutions like the NDA, IMA, INA or
the AFA. The student profile should be mid- to late-teens so that such
visits have an inspirational and aspirational value. In fact, instead of
touch and go, a system could be instituted whereby the students spend a
few days at these academies, maybe during a break or something when
accommodation arrangements could be done. Or sponsor a group of youngsters
during Passing Out Parades at different academies.<o:p></o:p></span></span></li>
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">Motivate,
sponsor or build yourself, SSB training or coaching centres. 10 Kashmiri
PBORs will not have the impact that one officer can have. Mentor and
nurture the officer cadre drawn from Kashmir.<o:p></o:p></span></span></li>
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">Institute in
collaboration with private players sporting academies or clubs. Everyone
talks of Kashmiri’s passion for cricket. How come no Kashmiri finds
himself in the national team? Especially today, when there is a test team,
a one-day team, a T20 team and God knows how many more. I could be wrong,
but I haven’t heard of a Kashmiri player even in IPL. Last year, the army
organised a Kashmir Premier League tournament. When so much money was
spent on that, why couldn’t you get senior cricketing heroes or officials
from mainland India who could adjudge the best players and offer them
scholarships to learn cricket from the best coaches in Delhi or Bombay.
Ditto for football. In fact, engage with the South American footballer’s
Academy in Srinagar (don’t remember if he is Brazilian or Argentinian). I
believe he even takes kids abroad for youth tournaments.<o:p></o:p></span></span></li>
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span></ol>
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><o:p><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"> </span></o:p></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">These are random ideas. The main question
that remains, however, is that, is this really the army’s job? I’d say no. It
is the state government’s job, followed by the Union government. But because
the people of the state have suffered so much in the last two decades, maybe
they can use as much help in rebuilding their broken lives as they can get.
After all, they cannot remain slaves of history forever. But because of the
inherent limitations of the army, I feel the best bet for the army would be to
work as much through the private sector as possible. You can generate ideas and
offer security. Let the private players be the executors of those ideas. This
way you can probably reach out to a much larger section, than you would be able
to if you were to do this on your own. Sure, credit would be hard to come by;
but if it is change that you are looking for, that would be the price for it.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"></span> </div>
FORCEhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17033758774826339971noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2043962667781155759.post-5025672758130661712012-08-21T23:35:00.001-07:002012-08-21T23:35:22.191-07:00Operation Geronimo<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Now that
the American<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"> </b>journalist Richard
Miniter claims in his book that the US government briefed Pakistan Army Chief General
Ashfaq Pervaiz Kayani on Operation Geronimo almost six months before the
operation, here plugging the FORCE comment written within days of Osama bin
Laden’s killing. Even as the best analysts went to town gleefully castigating
Pakistan Army’s incompetence, FORCE insisted that Geronimo couldn’t have been planned
without its connivance. Pakistan Army gave up OBL because it no longer had any
use for him.<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><o:p></o:p></b></span></i></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Osama
Bin Laden and Beyond<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">With
Afghanistan in his pocket, Kayani agreed to bin Laden’s dramatic killing <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">By Pravin Sawhney and Ghazala Wahab<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">To look forward beyond Osama bin Laden, it
is essential that the present be known. This is the hard part, as both the
United States and Pakistan, equally complicit in the bin Laden killing plot, are
hiding more than revealing. While stakes for both are high, the Pakistanis hold
better cards in the aftermath of bin Laden exit. For the US, it was important to
kill bin Laden in as spectacular fashion as he did the 9/11. This would boost
US’ chances of getting its boys home from Afghanistan earlier than expected. However,
the condition was that the Pakistan Army could not be trampled upon. This is
the reason for the song and dance by US President Barack Obama and his key
advisors absolving its dubious partner of insincerity.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">In his opening announcement on bin
Laden killing, Obama did not forget to mention Pakistan’s cooperation in
counter-terrorism. His chief counter-terrorism advisor, John Brennan, while standing
before cameras within 48 hours of bin Laden killing, refused to accuse Pakistan
of anything; much out of context, he noted that Pakistan, since 9/11 had
captured and killed more terrorists than any country. Once the domestic heat built
upon the Pakistan Army chief, General Ashfaq Kayani and his ISI buddy, Lt.
General Shuja Pasha for complicity or incompetence, the US National Security
Advisor, Tom Donilon decided to forego his Sunday holiday on May 8 and appeared
on five of six US talk shows. He hammered the single point that the US had no
information to suggest that Pakistani security establishment knew of bin Laden’s
whereabouts in their midst.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Regarding incompetence, the US has
put out stories of their radar-evading helicopters and brilliant
human-intelligence that led to bin Laden. This theory has been seconded by
former Pakistan Army chief, General Pervez Musharraf, who disclosed that
Pakistani air defence systems on the Afghanistan front are weak if not non-existent.
Contrary to the Abraham Lincoln wisdom that you cannot fool all people all the time,
the US and Pakistan seems to have pulled the feat, at least for now. However, FORCE,
which has followed the story, has a different view of what happened. With minor
variations on details, we believe that the Pakistan Army (ISI is a part of it,
and not an independent entity) has sold a stone for a precious diamond; Osama bin
Laden had not only outlived his usefulness, but was an impediment in the
follow-on plot of reconciliation with the Taliban in Afghanistan. He had to be
dispensed with.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">While it may be true that the US got
a vague lead on bin Laden six months ago through a Guantanamo detainee, it
could not have zeroed-in on to bi Laden’s house in Abbottabad without Kayani’s
complicity. The story about CIA hiring a neighbourhood house to watch bin Laden’s
activities is simply incredible. It would also be wrong to suggest that Kayani
succumbed to the US pressure to confirm bin Laden’s abode; had he wanted he
could have moved bin Laden and his entourage to another place. Osama bin Laden
was moved to the military cantonment under Kayani’s (then, ISI chief) watch six
years ago, to be used as a triumph card subsequently against the US. Another
reason was to maintain a watch and hold on the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, the
leader of the Quetta Shura, who had sacrificed Afghanistan for bin Laden’s
friendship. During the protracted banishment, once friends, bin Laden and
Mullah Omar drifted apart ideologically. Osama bin Laden propagated global
Jihad while Mullah Omar was fighting to regain Afghanistan from the US (reports
emerging after bin Laden’s killing clearly suggest that the two had not
communicated since years). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Washington, with overstretched
military capabilities amidst a recession, and with NATO allies threatening to
quit the war, wanted an honourable exit from Afghanistan. The way out for the US
was to have a reconciliation government (Hamid Karzai and Taliban) in
Afghanistan, an invisible US military presence to keep the Taliban and
Pakistani misadventures in check, and to be part of a regional assistance
effort for Afghanistan. While Pakistan has an essential role in the formation
of the reconciliation Afghanistan government, the CIA with proven predator
capability and in cooperation (whatever possible) with the ISI would maintain
US intelligence footprint in Pakistan. It is not a coincidence that the US
overall forces commander, General David Petraeus will be the new CIA chief.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Four recent events settled the
Afghanistan chessboard with the US, Pakistan, Taliban and Karzai as key
players. The first was the unprecedented April 16 meeting in Kabul in which
Kayani and Shuja Pasha took Premier Yusuf Raza Gilani to meet President Karzai.
Until now the two sides were talking separately with the US; it was time to
settle Afghanistan, politically and from security perspective, face-to-face.
Once the future of Afghanistan was agreed in which both Karzai and Mullah Omar
would have prominent roles, it was time to free senior Taliban leaders from
captivity. Within days, news came of the Kandahar jail break-out where 450 Talibans
helped themselves to freedom. This was assurance for Mullah Omar that he was
onboard. These developments pleased Kayani so much that the usually reticent Pakistan
Army chief could not suppress his glee during his April 23 visit to Kakul
Military Academy; stone throw from bin Laden’s house. His remarks that Pakistan
had broken the back of terrorism sounded out of context on that day. The final
event was curtains for bin Laden. To make it dramatic, the US insisted that bin
Laden had to die in his present house; he could not be shifted elsewhere. With so
much in his pocket, Kayani agreed. He could not be unaware of the risks he was
taking; his own and his army’s reputation was at stake. After all, he would
have delivered Afghanistan to Pakistan.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">It will be a while before frayed
nerves in the US and Pakistan calm down. The US Congress needs to know why an
unreliable ally should be rewarded, just as Pakistanis are asking hard
questions about the holy cow, its army. The coming months will see a lot. The
formation of the Afghanistan reconciliation government, the announcement of a quick
US drawdown of troops from the war zone, financial and military assistance for
Pakistan, and release of US armed drones for the Pakistan Army to name a few.
Where does this leave India which has invested over USD1.3 billion in
development in Afghanistan and had hoped that the US military presence would
remain in the war torn country long enough for a regional effort to emerge. The
latter will still happen, but having been fence-sitters, India will be sidelined
by Pakistan, China and Iran for the regional role in Afghanistan.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Key words: Osama bin Laden, Barack Obama,
Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, Afghanistan, Shuja Pasha, ISI, Global Jihad, Abbottabad,
US-Pakistan relations<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
FORCEhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17033758774826339971noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2043962667781155759.post-45481522478486885602012-08-09T00:17:00.000-07:002012-08-09T00:17:15.239-07:00Pressure on the Ground<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><strong><em>FORCE Bangalore correspondent</em> Atul Chandra<em> was invited by CVRDE to visit the Arjun tank facility at Avadi. Here is his report.</em></strong></span><br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgD1xXFzUP5bDmYuidIuhpsCUcPVFcU_EbC7EoiDgrNr8HoSSwCiBtTm5BRweDCx9E9EDnTOdZFLxyot7II6aDyfgij-0mPBnyGij6jSXno8lMn1wfWf0RoCTrgbvm1goGcWfJOG3tsnLA/s1600/IMG_1647+(2).jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="265" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgD1xXFzUP5bDmYuidIuhpsCUcPVFcU_EbC7EoiDgrNr8HoSSwCiBtTm5BRweDCx9E9EDnTOdZFLxyot7II6aDyfgij-0mPBnyGij6jSXno8lMn1wfWf0RoCTrgbvm1goGcWfJOG3tsnLA/s400/IMG_1647+(2).jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Avadi,
Chennai: </span></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">After
more than three decades of development, <st1:country -region="-region" w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country>’s Arjun Main Battle Tank
(MBT) has literally emerged like a phoenix from the ashes, surprising even its
most sceptical observers. Last year, the Arjun outgunned the Indian army’s T-72
and T-90 MBT’s, when trials were conducted with the respective units putting up
their best tanks and personnel.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">FORCE visited the Combat Vehicles
Research & Development Establishment (CVRDE) for an exclusive insight into
the programme. We learnt that while the Arjun Mk-2 is substantially improved
and more capable than the Arjun Mk-1; it is too heavy, limiting areas where it
can be deployed by the Army. And that renders it unsuitable for the army’s
operational requirements for a Main Battle Tank (MBT). According to P
Sivakumar, Director CVRDE, “the weight of the Arjun prevents it from being
deployed in all the areas required by the Army”.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Keeping this in mind, the Arjun
Mk-2’s improved performance seems to have put the Army in a spot. What does one
do with a tank that is fast, can shoot accurately on the move and is relatively
well protected but is too heavy to be deployed in the deserts near the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:country -region="-region" w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:country></st1:place>
border as a replacement for the T-72 or T-90? Paradoxically, while the tank
itself has demonstrated high speed and mobility, its weight precludes it from
being able to operate anywhere the army wants it to. The Arjun Mk-2 will weigh
around 67 tonnes and this fatally limits the tank’s operational effectiveness
for the Indian Army.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">The tank is too heavy to be deployed
across the border with <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:country -region="-region" w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:country></st1:place>.
It is unable to effectively traverse terrain filled with natural and/or artificial
obstacles. Or areas criss-crossed with rivers and canals. That rules out most
places in Rajasthan, <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> and the mountainous
terrain of the J&K sector.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">This has forced the army to identify
areas where the Arjun can safely be deployed and its operational units based.
This probably means the Arjun will not fight alongside the T-90s and T-72s. It will
certainly not be part of the Indian Army’s strike corps formations, as it could
get bogged down in unfamiliar terrain. This runs counter to the philosophy of armoured
formations, which are designed for mobile offensive operations deep inside
enemy territory. Unlike the T series tanks that have been airlifted to high
altitudes like Leh and even out of the country, the Arjun cannot be airlifted
by the IL-76 and C-130 J transports of the Indian Air Force (IAF). The C-17
Globemaster to be inducted by the Indian Air Force (IAF) has a maximum payload
of 75 tonnes — insufficient to airlift the 67 tonne Arjun Mk-2 with attendant
support equipment. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">During this correspondent’s visit to
the CVRDE facility at Avadi in Tamil Nadu, it was evident that despite the best
efforts of its highly committed team of designers and scientists, the Arjun is
unlikely to ever be ordered in significant quantities by the Indian Army — which
fields close to 3,500 tanks in its Order of Battle (ORBAT). The total orders
for the Arjun as of today are 240 (124 Mk-1 and 116 Mk-2). For the Army,
ordering more tanks would result in it having to devote more resources — something
it seems loath to do. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">As things stand presently, the first
Arjun Mk-2 will roll off the production line at Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF)
Avadi, two and a half years (30 months) after the order is placed. With the
orders likely to be finalized towards the end of the year, the first Mk-2 tank
will enter operational service in 2016. With HVF Avadi looking at a production
rate of 30 tanks a year, all 116 tanks will be delivered by 2020. If work on
the Future Main Battle Tank (FMBT) begins now in right earnest, then the first
tanks could be ready for operational service circa 2025. Until then, the army
would rather soldier on with its T-90 and upgraded T-72 tanks, which in any
case have the required infrastructure in terms of training, manufacture and overhaul.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">The major improvement in the Arjun
Mk-2, is its missile firing capability from the gun barrel. This was
demonstrated in 2004, with Israel Aerospace Industries’ (IAI’s) <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Laser Homing Attack/Anti Tank Missile</b> <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">(LAHAT)</b>. But the tank did not have an
integrated Laser Target Tracker (LTT) at that point of time. That is now in the
final stages of inspection and is being demonstrated to the user. The army has
also asked for more types of ammunition on the Mk-2. This includes Thermobaric
rounds and Penetration cum Blast rounds that will be developed in <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:country -region="-region" w:st="on">India</st1:country></st1:place>.
Thermobaric warheads create a sustained and intense pressure wave, which can be
used against bunkers and hardened targets, while causing minimum damage to the surrounding
areas. The army has also asked for two types of practice rounds, including
blank rounds for ceremonial purposes. These will also reduce wear and tear on
the barrel during training. In terms of protection, the Mk-2 will have full
frontal Explosive Reactive Armour (ERA) and since commonality was desirable, it
will use the same structuring as the T-series. The Defence Research &
Development Organization (DRDO) is re-developing the explosive element, which
is currently Russian, with better protection capability. It is being developed
at the High Energy Materials Research Laboratory (HEMRL). This will be used for
the Arjun, T-90 and T-72 tanks. Active Protection Systems (APS) that help evade
attack — both by confusing enemy sensors (soft-kill) or by physically destroying
incoming warheads (hard-kill) — will also be incorporated on the Mk-2. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">The Israeli ‘Trophy’ system is being
considered for the Mk-2. There will also be a mine plough to deal with pressure
based mines, magnetic mines and tilt based mines. The driver’s seat on the Mk-2
is now suspended from the roof, compared to being fixed to the floor on the
Mk-1 — this provides better mine protection capability. With the Explosive
Reactive Armour (ERA) and mine plough together weighing 3 tonnes and additional
add-ons expected, the MK-2s weight is expected to increase from 62 tonne to 67
tonne. The suspension has been re-designed to handle 70 tonne. To cater to
complaints of track shedding, the revised tracks will have an increased horn
length (19 mm) and the wheels have become slightly bigger. The tracks are
imported from <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:country -region="-region" w:st="on">Germany</st1:country></st1:place>
but the rest is indigenous. The engine will remain the same on the Mk-2. With
the original power pack on the Mk-1, the final drive catered to a top speed of
72 kmph. For the Mk-2, the final drive has been changed by increasing the
reduction ratio from 4.4 to 5.3 and the top speed is now reduced 58.5 kmph but
the torque and the force available at the contact between the track and the
road has increased which can cater for the increased weight. Despite the
increased weight, CVRDE claims that the acceleration is better than the Mk-1,
while fuel efficiency remains the same.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">The Arjun Mk-2 programme also
suffered a severe setback with the unfortunate demise of senior scientist G K
Kumaravel a few months ago. Kumaravel died in a road accident, while at Pokhran
for trials of the Arjun Mk-2. He was heading the Arjun programme and slated to
take over as Director, CVRDE in the future. He had played a crucial role in the
developments and system integration of the Arjun MBT Mk II. The Arjun programme
will now be led by V Balamurugan. The biggest problem being faced by the Arjun
and a fate that is shared by almost all other indigenous programmes, is the
small numbers ordered — that precludes investment in the required production
and tooling. Sivakumar told FORCE that “Greater numbers are essential for
reducing the price, establishing the process, good quality control mechanisms
and continuous consistency in production”. This is also the reason he says that
orders are a must. The Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF) has not been producing
Arjun MBT’s for two years and lot of the know-how is being lost. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">While officials at CVRDE say the
Army has been happy with the performance of the Mk-1, FORCE learnt that
non-availability of spares is a continuing problem — the usage of spares was
greater than anticipated. There have been complaints of track shedding, though
CVRDE officials say that’s caused by inexperienced drivers who’re used to the
T-72 and T-90. The 120 mm tank gun has been proved on the Mk-1 series and today,
the Arjun barrel offers better life when compared to the T series of tanks.
There have been barrel issues on a few tanks and a committee is looking into
the matter, according to CVRDE officials. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgSnkoIlbnsQtlgXzyQq5QqM2EKkkkHZunX9vVuyG8PwIwX3rDRYTP-bvG8gCs1Pdt7n4_nmGCP3zP78j9XcXZr_QaaoEqkE3vs7tECigPCGgBZJ7C9gj30o56Vq5j0DLHVu5oUOBbqC98/s1600/IMG_0516.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="258" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgSnkoIlbnsQtlgXzyQq5QqM2EKkkkHZunX9vVuyG8PwIwX3rDRYTP-bvG8gCs1Pdt7n4_nmGCP3zP78j9XcXZr_QaaoEqkE3vs7tECigPCGgBZJ7C9gj30o56Vq5j0DLHVu5oUOBbqC98/s400/IMG_0516.jpg" width="400" /></a><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">The process of obtaining replacement
spares is time consuming, since there are a number of agencies involved. Limited
production numbers further exacerbate the problem. Director Sivakumar told FORCE
that steps were being taken to tackle this problem and “unlike the Mk-1, where
orders for the tank and the Engineering Support Package (ESP) were handled
separately, in the Arjun Mk-2 this will be done simultaneously. That will
reduce the time taken for delivery of the required items”. According to him,
production has improved dramatically and an Israeli firm is now working on
computerization of the line. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Meanwhile, the Indian Army is
struggling to maintain its ageing fleet of T-72 MBT’s. While the T-72 was
acknowledged to be one of the finest Russian tank designs, the ageing tank
fleet is now increasingly difficult to maintain. Its small size and cramped
turret make it difficult to incorporate the latest technology — like fire
control systems, night vision and electronics. Unfortunately for the Army, the
T-90 has not proved to be as sterling a performer as its predecessor. A number
of glitches have come to the fore and production at HVF has been slow to take
off. <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:country -region="-region" w:st="on">Russia</st1:country></st1:place>
has also refused to transfer technology related to metallurgy for T-90S gun
barrels and armour plates to the HVF. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Despite all that, the Arjun
outgunning the T-90 and T-72 in comparative trials, is akin to the Light Combat
Aircraft ‘Tejas’, defeating the F-16 in a dogfight! The units that took part in
the competition put up their best tanks and crew. The Arjun managed to fare
very well. Army sources have freely admitted to FORCE, that there is a mind
block with regard to the Arjun, by those who have operated the T series tanks.
But they also admit that the Arjun is appreciably more modern in comparison to the
T-72 & T-90, in many respects. For example, the Arjun can fire almost twice
the number of rounds the T series tanks can, from its main gun.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">The Arjun Mk-2 in many ways is what
the Arjun Mk-1 should probably have been. Tragically, total orders for the
Arjun over the next decade are unlikely to exceed 400 to 500 units including
the 240 already ordered, plus other variants like the Armoured Repair and
Recovery Vehicle (ARRV), Catapult 130 mm Self Propelled Gun and SP-155 gun
chassis. The last refers to a tracked base that was to be mated with a Slovakian
gun, in collaboration with Bharat Earth Movers Limited (BEML). That proposal
has already run into rough weather. It remains to be seen if the army will
accept such indigenous offerings or prefer to go abroad for proven systems, which
can be inducted quickly and in meaningful numbers, to arrest the alarming
decline in its armoured and artillery capability. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">What is however clear is that
continued production and development of the Arjun must be allowed to continue,
if critical design, development and production know-how is not to be frittered
away. It is also essential to keep the production line functional — through
manufacture, repair, overhaul and upgrades, till the Future Main Battle Tank
(FMBT) programme begins to gather steam. Keeping this in mind, it is likely
that the DRDO will be able to prevail on the army for a few more orders, to enable
low-rate production to continue. It is imperative that the DRDO and the Army move
faster on the FMBT programme, to ensure that it is ready in time to replace the
T-72. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">In all, the army’s armour profile
through 2015-2020 could comprise of approximately 1700 T-90S, 1800-2000
upgraded T-72M1s, and 250-500 Arjun’s. Surely, prospective orders for the FMBT,
which at the very least would be for 1000-1500 tanks, are incentive enough for
this to be taken up as a national project. This futuristic tank is unlikely to
cost less than Rs 50 crore a piece — the total orders would be worth Rs 50,000
to 75,000 crore.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<br />
<h2 class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">
Training Tools<o:p></o:p></span></h2>
<br />
<h4 class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;"><em>Simulator Based Training on Arjun<o:p></o:p></em></span></h4>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">The Arjun also features a state of the art
simulator facility for training of drivers and crew. Canada-based simulator
manufacturer CAE developed and delivered the initial suite of Arjun tank
training systems, to efficiently and cost-effectively train the driver, gunner
and commander in the Arjun tank. The Arjun tank training system offers: standalone
training for the driver and gunner; turret level training for the gunner and
commander; integrated tank level training for the gunner, commander and driver;
troop level training, by networking Arjun tank simulators to rehearse troop
tactics, movement and joint operations.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">CAE’s Arjun tank training system
comprises a CAE Medallion-6000 visual system, with a detailed, realistic
external environment view of actual tank operations. It also has a sound
simulation system, which produces sounds heard during tank operations, synchronised
with the motion and visual cues in the training device. There’s a simulation
host system for software management and software sub-systems to simulate tank
behaviour in real-time operations. Also on offer are content rich geo-specific
databases; an instructor station to conduct training exercises & offer
evaluation solutions; an Interface Electronic Unit (IEU) to provide a link
between tank crew controls and simulation software; and networking, to connect
the Arjun driving and turret simulators.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">The driver trainer for the Arjun is
mounted on a six Degree-of-Freedom (DOF) motion platform. It faithfully emulates
the interior cabin of the tank. There is also the Arjun turret simulator, to
replicate the interior of the gunner and commander stations. Mounted on a six
DOF motion platform, the Arjun turret simulator features a 220 degree by 40
degree open hatch visual display, to provide trainees with the high-fidelity
visual cues required for gunnery training.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoListParagraph" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<h2 style="text-align: left;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> Fists of Iron<o:p></o:p></span></h2>
<h4 style="text-align: left;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;"><em>Future Main Battle Tank<o:p></o:p></em></span></h4>
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">The quest to indigenously design and
develop a Future Main Battle Tank (FMBT) by the Defence Research and Development
Organization (DRDO), must be accorded the status of a national project, if it
is to succeed. The prize could be a minimum order of at least a thousand tanks,
to replace the Indian Army’s T-72 tanks, starting 2022. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">It is more likely that the FMBT will
be ready only around 2025. DRDO will require at least a decade to have the
first examples ready for trials and then roll out production variants a few
years later. While the estimated development cost of Rs 5,000 crore might seem
large, the investment would pay itself back many times over. An order for 1000
FMBT’s would be worth Rs 50,000 crore (Rs 50 crore per piece) over two to three
decades. It would boost indigenous Tier-1 and Tier-2 industries involved in the
programme.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">The FMBT at present is expected to
be a highly mobile Main Battle Tank (MBT) in the 50-55 tonne class. It would
have the latest technology, like advanced materials to keep the weight down, a smooth
bore 120 mm main gun capable of firing missiles and advanced munitions, a modern,
high powered engine (1800 hp) with state of the art transmission, suspension
and running gear. It will incorporate a high level of crew protection, through
use of next-generation Active Protection Systems (APS) to supplement its armour
protection. It will also provide a high level of situational awareness to the
crew through sensors, data links and the ability to operate in a networked
battlefield. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">While the Army has asked CVRDE to
refrain from talking about the programme, work has already begun on the engine
development — a good sign for the programme. Interestingly, companies like Renk
and AVL have refused to provide consultancy for engine development. The
development of the 120 mm smooth bore main gun will also provide its own
challenges, in terms of design and weight. Keeping in mind the Israeli
involvement in the Arjun programme, it is very likely that Israeli companies
will play a vital role in the development of the FMBT.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">CVRDE has gained considerable
experience in tank design and development with the Arjun and Arjun MK-2
upgrade. Designing a 50 tonne tank with the features demanded by the Army, will
be an extremely difficult task. However many of the parts of the FMBT are
likely to be indigenous — such as the power pack, suspension and running gear,
120 mm smooth bore main gun, explosive reactive armour (ERA) panels,
communication and data link sets. Facilities would have been set up by then for
either joint production, or license manufacture of night sights, targeting and
fire control systems etc.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<br /></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<h2 class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">‘At Present, the Army has Decided
to Induct 118 Arjun Mk-2 Tanks Instead of 124’<o:p></o:p></span></h2>
<br />
<h4 class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;"><em>Director, CVRDE, Dr Sivakumar, gives
us the low-down on the Arjun programme</em></span></h4>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; tab-stops: 0in; text-align: justify;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">What is
the status of the Arjun Mk-2 programme currently?<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiBsEiNfhIZ4qTQUyd-yk2_Xp1Ev9UjJy90AKs4tgEowiUBhlLo-Ck8KtL6pUwDwy0j6BnmgrjMYbPs77tJcHbnjDXZsESjvkk7aJdVr0BkxHuKfb1QbQ_9q2MYG-4bJ8gfi5kMQFCEmrw/s1600/Director.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="200" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiBsEiNfhIZ4qTQUyd-yk2_Xp1Ev9UjJy90AKs4tgEowiUBhlLo-Ck8KtL6pUwDwy0j6BnmgrjMYbPs77tJcHbnjDXZsESjvkk7aJdVr0BkxHuKfb1QbQ_9q2MYG-4bJ8gfi5kMQFCEmrw/s200/Director.jpg" width="155" /></a><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">The Arjun Mk-1 with a total of 89
improvements decided upon with the Army, is called the Arjun Mk-2. These 89
improvements have been made not only keeping in mind the concerns and issues
faced on the Arjun Mk-1 tank but also to cater for future requirements of the
army. At present, the army has decided to induct 118 Arjun Mk-2 tanks instead
of 124. This is the result of a policy decision that will see the war reserve
for all armoured regiments in the future being reduced by three. And so, two regiments
of Arjun Mk-2 will be short of six reserve tanks. The indent for 118 tanks is
almost in the final stage.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">The army has said that it will
decide if it is satisfied with the Arjun Mk-2, only after the trials (which
began last month and are expected to go on for two to three months) are
completed. The Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) will require 30 months (2.5 years)
from the placement of the order, for the first batch of Arjun Mk-2 to be
delivered to the army. The Mk-2 will incorporate all that we learnt while battling
issues with the Arjun Mk-1, in terms of production, performance, quality etc.
CVRDE is working to ensure that whatever problems were faced by the Mk-1 will
not be repeated in the Mk-2. Based on the Mk-2 programme, we have formed a core
committee called the Arjun Core Committee that will monitor the progress of the
Arjun Mk-2 on a monthly basis. All the stakeholders starting from the DRDO, the
Directorate General of Quality Assurance (DGQA), the Corps of Electronics &
Mechanical Engineers (EME) and the users, are present on the committee and we
have obtained excellent support from all the stakeholders.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; tab-stops: .25in; text-align: justify;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">What
are the major changes in the Arjun Mk-2?<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; tab-stops: .25in; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">The Arjun Mk-2 will see the tank
weight increase from 62 to 67 tonnes, as a result of specific requirements from
the user — which include additions such as the track width, mine plough and
Explosive Reactive Armour (ERA) on the glacis plate, as well as the front of
the turret. These two requirements alone will add three tonnes to the weight of
the Arjun Mk-1. Along with other additions, the Mk-2 is expected to top out at
67 tonnes. We decided after studying the power pack (MTU engine with RENK
transmission), that it is excellently suited for Indian desert conditions. We
have steadily made this engine and transmission more and more rugged over the
last many years, besides improving things like the air filtration system and cooling
system. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; tab-stops: .25in; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Hence, we have
convinced the user that the same power pack, with a new final drive using a higher
reduction ratio, can be used for the Arjun Mk-2. This was proved to the Army
last year, when we drove 1350 km with the power pack modified to this standard and
simulated weights of up to 66 tonne. We converted production vehicle P-1 into
Mk-2 with 53 improvements, to obtain feedback. This tank took part in an
exercise last summer that lasted almost two weeks, with temperatures of 46
degrees. We have improved the suspension — to provide the same life to
components despite the increase in weight. To cater for this new suspension, we
have developed a new hull for the Arjun Mk-2. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; tab-stops: .25in; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">The Mk-2 variant is
now capable of firing missiles, which was not possible in the Mk-1. We had
already proved the LAHAT missile as a standby. We are now integrating it on the
Mk-2. Apart from that, the Mk-2 will feature a remote controlled weapon system
atop the turret. In Mk-1, this required the loader to come out and fire the
weapon. The Mk-2 will have an improved commander’s panoramic sight with night
vision, hunter killer capability between the commander, gunner and loader. Auxiliary
Power Unit (APU) which is not present in T series tank is present. It has been
enhanced from 4.5 kW to in excess of 8 kW for the Mk-2. With regards to the
Chassis Automotive System, we have digital communication systems, advanced
navigation systems etc. We have increased the track width, to ensure that the
ground pressure remains the same in spite of the increased weight. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; tab-stops: .25in; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">What is
the status of the Arjun Mk-1 at present?<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">The Arjun Mk-1 received orders for a total
of 124 numbers. The two regiments equipped with 45 Arjun tanks each, are the 43rd
armoured regiment and the 75th armoured regiment at Jaisalmer. The Arjun is
fully operational with these two regiments now. The balance 34 tanks will be
used to meet the Army’s BRIC requirements and these are spread across the Corps
of Electronics & Mechanical Engineers (EME), war reserve, training
establishments, DRDO/DGQA etc. Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF) Avadi has
dispatched 116 Arjun Mk-1 tanks. The remaining eight tanks will be delivered
over the next five to six months. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Most of the spares for the Arjun MBT
were consumed during the various trials. We are now working to ensure
availability of fresh spares. The other part is the Engineering Support Package
(ESP) for the Arjun which includes spares, training and training aids. This is
being done in parallel. As far the Arjun Mk-1 is concerned, about 90 percent of
its tasks are complete. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<br /></div>
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">What is
the cost of the programme till date?<o:p></o:p></span></b><br />
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Each Arjun Mk-1 costs Rs 20 crore plus.
Each Arjun Mk-2 with all improvements will cost approximately Rs 34 crore. The
Arjun Mk-1 programme cost approximately Rs 360 crores. With that money, we made
11 prototypes and 15 pre-production series tanks and the required spares. This
included the cost of creating the production line. We are looking at a number
of variants based on the Arjun platform, such as Armoured Repair and Recovery
Vehicle (ARRV) which is close to finalization. We are also looking to use the
Arjun chassis to mount a Russian 130 mm Catapult gun, which was earlier mounted
on the Vijayanta chassis. We will also be competing for the Indian Army
requirement for a self propelled, tracked gun. We will offer a Slovakian 155 mm
gun mounted on the Arjun along with Bharat Earth Movers Limited (BEML). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">We have also built the Arjun Bridge
Laying Tank (BLT) but the Army says it may not be required. The cost per tank
will certainly go down if we get more orders. This will help reduce the import
content as well. The Mk-1 has nearly 60 percent imported content and even
though there is a lot of value addition being done, the import content will
remain the same for the Mk-2. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">Since
the size of the order is small, no foreign company is willing to offer Transfer
of Technology (ToT). I feel that if the Mk-2 is ordered by four regiments, then
the import content could go down to 43 per cent and further down to 25 per cent
if orders are placed for a total of six regiments. The lifecycle costs of the
Arjun will be much cheaper than other tanks. The programme has also been able
to offer numerous improvements to a number of indigenous programmes and
armoured vehicles in service with the army.</span></div>FORCEhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17033758774826339971noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2043962667781155759.post-63653970434185549632012-08-08T23:56:00.000-07:002012-08-09T00:42:49.235-07:00Seven Days in China<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiy8-xx8s9bvW-55ZuKMcQjs0c0Jrdt5E0L68vJT5CvD4UJLSgpFJMn9hDCXo7tUxQE_BYy700VlBBCGtKwp5-UPQ9w-eGPn9rQ5w_VOghw2y4itjqyIjmhDRmYna6kU85vXjV_RWDv6I8/s1600/Pravin.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="313" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiy8-xx8s9bvW-55ZuKMcQjs0c0Jrdt5E0L68vJT5CvD4UJLSgpFJMn9hDCXo7tUxQE_BYy700VlBBCGtKwp5-UPQ9w-eGPn9rQ5w_VOghw2y4itjqyIjmhDRmYna6kU85vXjV_RWDv6I8/s320/Pravin.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"><em>Pravin Sawhney at the Great Wall of China</em></span></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<h4 style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><em>FORCE Editor</em> Pravin Sawhney <em>spent a week in China at the invitation of the Chinese ministry of national defence. In Beijing and Shanghai, he met officers from PLA Army, PLA Navy and PLA Air Force, plus members of Chinese press. Here are his 10 takeaways from the visit</em></span></span></h4>
<br />
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">Beijing/Shanghai:
It took me some time to figure out who had invited me on a week-long visit to
Beijing and Shanghai. The call came from the first secretary, press section at
the Chinese embassy in <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:city></st1:place>.
When told by my office that I was in <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Munich</st1:city></st1:place>,
he called me there. Extending the invitation on behalf of the All China
Journalists’ Association (ACJA), he asked me to join a group of ‘senior Indian
journalists’ to visit <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:country -region="-region" w:st="on">China</st1:country></st1:place>.
The proposed dates did not suit me, so in less than 48 hours the Chinese
graciously altered their dates by a week. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">Two
things struck me as unusual. Why did the ACJA not invite me directly and why were
the dates changed to accommodate me? When I asked the Chinese press officer
about the programme, he spoke about the opportunity to meet with Chinese
military officials and visit defence installations. The detailed itinerary, he
said, was being worked out and would be provided on arrival in <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Beijing</st1:city></st1:place>. I had never been
to <st1:country -region="-region" w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country>
and here I was being offered the opportunity to meet with Peoples’ Liberation
Army (PLA) officials. That I was excited is putting it mildly. I have been
working on China for years and my first book: ‘<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">The Defence Makeover: 10 Myths that Shape India’s Image</i>’ published
in 2001, long before the Indian government woke up to the military threat,
listed ‘China is not a military threat’ as the foremost myth successfully
perpetrated by New Delhi. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">My
maiden visit to <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:country -region="-region" w:st="on">China</st1:country></st1:place>
from June 17 to 22 was a success and here are my 10 takeaway observations:</span><br />
<br />
</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhXrA49jzf21Jmumnn1ElJIlStcCbyNgXCK_UMZMdebrDOsEvy7Vhk1zUKeQb0aBiQf7JoHLqVCzet2cL02L9SNRXwIxc7JchGN5Ult2sBR0k2dKB9CFcM_YBhhVJK6KEby_SVHUkpKOhk/s1600/Blog+Image+1.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="175" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhXrA49jzf21Jmumnn1ElJIlStcCbyNgXCK_UMZMdebrDOsEvy7Vhk1zUKeQb0aBiQf7JoHLqVCzet2cL02L9SNRXwIxc7JchGN5Ult2sBR0k2dKB9CFcM_YBhhVJK6KEby_SVHUkpKOhk/s400/Blog+Image+1.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
<br />
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 7pt/normal "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">Months before
the visit of Prime Minister Wen Jiabao to India in December 2010, China decided
to unilaterally announce its perception of the border, making any further
negotiations on border resolution impossible. For this reason, at the 15<sup>th</sup>
round of Special Representatives (SR) talks held in Delhi on 17 January 2012,
both sides signed the ‘Border Mechanism Framework’ for stability on the Line of
Actual Control. The two foreign offices had established formal means to keep
the border peaceful. Against this backdrop, Colonel Guo Hongtao, staff officer
of the Asian affairs bureau, foreign affairs office, Ministry of National Defence
(MND), who had participated in the Special Representatives (SR) talks on border
resolution, told me with an air of finality: “China’s border with India is
2,000km long”. <a href="http://www.blogger.com/null" name="_GoBack"></a><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 7pt/normal "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">China has
indicated that its claims on the disputed border are more complex than are
understood in India. “Indian security forces have made more intrusions in 2011
into Chinese territories (disputed border) than we Chinese have made into India,”
said Major General Yao Yunzhu, director of the Centre of China-America Defence Relations,
PLA Academy of Military Sciences. She was seated next to Colonel Guo Hongtao
during the long interaction with us (visiting Indian journalists) at the Ministry
of National Defence (MND) in Beijing. In another interaction, the deputy
director general, information department, ministry of foreign affairs, Ma
Jisheng, went a step further and asserted that: “All reports (in Indian media)
of Chinese ingressions are false.” <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 7pt/normal "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">China says
that the complex border resolution should not come in the way of overall
bilateral relations, especially trade. “As both sides have agreed to have
peaceful borders, the (Indian media) focus should not be on the border issue,”
General Yao said. In another meeting, another day, Ma Jisheng cautioned, “There
are HIGH difficulties in border resolution. I believe the issue will be resolved
with time.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 7pt/normal "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">There is an
extraordinary consistency in what the PLA (MND) officials and diplomats
(ministry of foreign affairs) say on the disputed border issue. Unlike in
India, not only is the PLA authorised to speak on the politically sensitive
border issue, it has an extremely important, if not the leading role in this policy-making.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 7pt/normal "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">There were
repeated suggestions for the Indian media to exercise overall restraint when
talking about China so as not to impede improvements in bilateral relations.
The lead in conveying this was taken by senior editor, Zhu Shouchen, executive
secretary, member of the board of leadership, ACJA. He spoke at length about
the ‘code of conduct’ followed by the ACJA. Most of the Chinese media are
members of ACJA organised in 494 media committees under six major regional
centres, across China. </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Each
regional centre contributes a vice-chairman to the Board of Leadership of ACJA.
The ACJA has three tasks, namely to train journalists, teach them to abide by
the code of conduct and facilitate foreign journalists in China. Any lingering
doubts on Chinese media and journalism were cleared by senior editor, Wang Lan
of the multi-billion dollar Wen Hui group in Shanghai. The code of conduct, she
said, meant journalism with Chinese characteristics. “My media group is open to
healthy criticism of the government on health, education and science and
technology matters,” she said with a smile. Earlier, a senior editor at the
China Daily newspaper office in Beijing admitted that a government constituted
board cleared every evening what news would go into the paper.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 7pt/normal "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">China is conscious that as a (the) risen
power, constantly on the global radar, it needs to open up and be transparent.
This has been accentuated by an inter-dependent world shrunk further by the
information revolution. The world’s focus on China is clearly in two areas:
defence and diplomacy. China opened its State Council (council of ministers)
Information Office in 1990, established the foreign ministry’s Press Information
Office in 2001 and set-up the </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">Ministry of National
Defence (MND) </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">spokesperson
system in 2008. Both the state council and foreign ministry information offices
that we visited are grand buildings with posh facilities and extremely competent
staff. I was told that there are nearly 700 foreign journalists living in
Beijing alone. The daily regular press briefing (packed with foreign
journalists) that I attended could well have been at the US state department,
the only reminder that it was Beijing was the Chinese spokesperson speaking
native language through a translation gadget provided on each desk.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhYwq66TeXVBfyB7WqSXGZco-PmEptZbRrFKpg7Un4fuRJd6TGyNbnTFzeZh1kbrojVYcg01xu0BEl0eOs7Hcso_Ke0hbjTxc3uUMff057ffQ92opZ4Peaa7w2b62h0nbhWSr1-Qi_M8u4/s1600/Blog+Image+3.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhYwq66TeXVBfyB7WqSXGZco-PmEptZbRrFKpg7Un4fuRJd6TGyNbnTFzeZh1kbrojVYcg01xu0BEl0eOs7Hcso_Ke0hbjTxc3uUMff057ffQ92opZ4Peaa7w2b62h0nbhWSr1-Qi_M8u4/s320/Blog+Image+3.JPG" width="320" /></a><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">The chief information officer at the
State Council Information Office, Xi Yanchun was a bright and attractive lady
in her thirties (she told us) who had worked in the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:country -region="-region" w:st="on">US</st1:country></st1:place> media for four years when she
was offered the present position. She has been in this position since 2002 and
was happy to talk about <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:country -region="-region" w:st="on">China</st1:country></st1:place>’s
public relations system. “Before 2002 there were no press conferences and the
news releases, if any, were ad hoc. There was no mechanism,” she recalled. “Now,
this office does a variety of things, from press releases to organising press
conferences and briefings, to interviews and replies to emails and of course
publicity on the internet,” she said. With a pause and smile she added that it
was still difficult to get officials to understand the importance of media
interaction. The staff under her has increased and many people have been sent
to the <st1:country -region="-region" w:st="on">US</st1:country> and the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:country -region="-region" w:st="on">UK</st1:country></st1:place> for
‘internet training.’ She admitted that after the foreign ministry and MND
opened their own information offices, few journalists come to the state council
information office. “Those two offices are considered important,” she added
rather ruefully. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 7pt/normal "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">All the Chinese officials I spoke with
agreed that <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Wei qi</i> (pronounced <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">way chee</i>) is the most popular
intellectual game in China as opposed to Chess in the rest of the world. More
as an afterthought, one PLA officer said that many Chinese now play both games
with equal interest and ease. At one of the official dinner banquets I
attended, another PLA official told me that in today’s world, it is difficult
to hide capabilities. What <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Wei qi</i>
teaches is the art of hiding intentions, which should never be disclosed. Explained
by Henry Kissinger in his book, ‘On China’ <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Wei
qi</i> is about strategic encirclement as opposed to Chess which seeks a
checkmate with head-on collision. Later, spending some time by myself in a
Shanghai popular market, I discovered that no shops kept chessboards, but <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Wei qi</i> was readily available.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Kissinger provides a keen insight
into the two games in his book. ‘<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">If Chess
is about decisive battle, Wei qi is about the protracted campaign. The Chess
player aims for total victory. The Wei qi player seeks relative advantage.
Chess teaches the Clausewitzian concepts of centre-of-gravity and the
decisive-points, the game usually beginning as a struggle for the centre of the
board. Wei qi teaches the art of strategic encirclement. Where the skilful
chess player aims to eliminate his opponent’s pieces in a series of head-on
clashes, a talented Wei qi player moves into empty spaces on the board,
gradually mitigating the strategic potential of his opponent’s pieces. Chess
produces single-mindedness; Wei qi generates strategic flexibility</i>.’<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Once we finished discussing <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Wei qi</i>, I found that all of us had been
presented with two slim booklets titled ‘<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">The
Wisdom of Sun Tzu</i>’ and ‘<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">The Great
Wall</i>’ by the MND information office in a small gift bag. Sun Tzu is about <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:country -region="-region" w:st="on">China</st1:country></st1:place>’s
distinctive military theory which is in harmony with <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Wei qi</i>. The central message of Sun Tzu, I remembered, is to develop
strategic thought that placed a premium on victory through psychological
advantage and preached avoidance of direct conflict. The Great Wall of China
suggests that <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:country -region="-region" w:st="on">China</st1:country></st1:place>
has no expansionist designs. This was mentioned to me by a PLA officer at
another official dinner. He added that the Chinese fight in self-defence only when
their core interests are affected.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 7pt/normal "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">The Chinese view colonial rule, (which
started in the mid-nineteenth century with the Opium wars and ended with the arrival
of Mao’s communist China), when China was subjugated by Britain, France, Russia
and later Japan, as a period of deep humiliation. During the visit to the
National Museum in Shanghai, our guide dwelt on the humiliations depicted in a
series of paintings. But this was not the real point they wanted to drive home.
Speaking in English, the museum guide and our language interpreter compared
China and India under colonial rules. Unlike all Chinese, many Indians believe
that the colonial period had ‘many positives’ about it, they averred. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">China, we were told, sees itself as
the ‘Middle Kingdom’, conveying the notion of China’s centrality in global
affairs and the importance of both national unity and the need to recover
territories, purportedly lost during the subjugation period, now called core
interest areas. Probably, this is a reason, why all Chinese officials we met during
the visit spoke only through the language interpreter, a pleasant freelancer
called Liu Non, when making official points even when they understood and spoke
good English. An added benefit of speaking through an interpreter is that the
person gets more response time to a query; this may help in thinking up a
credible rather than the real reply. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg8L3Mg6CE5WqWS0ALFrHEer3uyiF0NzsgrbLvkv9QcEYntyVCLsQ4PXpNMEMzcCkZwJjTYs58vdbhI-_3EbIH2K2gDbHkw3nUgjYBGuhzsPw2WpjakC3If9XbeJB61_BfUqxB9YhVA-yk/s1600/Blog+image+2.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg8L3Mg6CE5WqWS0ALFrHEer3uyiF0NzsgrbLvkv9QcEYntyVCLsQ4PXpNMEMzcCkZwJjTYs58vdbhI-_3EbIH2K2gDbHkw3nUgjYBGuhzsPw2WpjakC3If9XbeJB61_BfUqxB9YhVA-yk/s320/Blog+image+2.JPG" width="320" /></a><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 7pt/normal "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">All PLA officials I met were reluctant to
talk about Pakistan, which has been indicated as China’s bilateral relationship.
The need, they said, was for India and China to have more bilateral cooperation
and openness. However, without asking, PLA officials in command positions spoke
about the West and the US in particular as their enemy. For instance, during
the visit to 1 armoured regiment (brigade) outside Beijing, the commanding
officer, senior colonel (brigadier) Su Rong said that during simulation training,
the home forces are depicted in red colour, while the enemy is shown in blue.
With a grin, he pointed to a soldier practicing simulation shooting and said
the tank he was seeking to destroy was the US Abram. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">He did not stop at this and decided
to drill his point further. The PLA soldier, he boasted, can fight better with
a fourth of the food eaten by a <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:country -region="-region" w:st="on">US</st1:country></st1:place>
soldier. And unlike the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:country -region="-region" w:st="on">US</st1:country></st1:place>
which dropped nuclear bombs, Chinese soldiers will fight only in self-defence. Interestingly,
the three military installations we visited — the PLAA (PLA Army) 1 armoured
regiment headquarters, the PLAAF (PLA Air Force) 24 air division outside <st1:city w:st="on">Beijing</st1:city> and the PLAN (PLA Navy) <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Shanghai</st1:city></st1:place> naval garrison — were new and grand
constructions. If indeed the PLA has such good defence works for its
middle-level command headquarters, it conveyed an eloquent sense of generous finances
being spent on acquisitions and capabilities.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 7pt/normal "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">All presentations emphasised on the PLA ‘making
progress towards “information-isation”, which it hopes to complete by 2020.’
Explained, this means total networking of all sensors, communication & reconnaissance
systems and platforms, with computers at each level. To test the waters, I casually
mentioned that Indian senior military officers (especially army officers) aren’t
comfortable using computers. Colonel Yang Yujun, the Deputy Director General of
the information office, MND was quick to tell me that senior PLA officers do
not suffer from this handicap. “All officers are comfortable with computers,”
he asserted. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">However, in private, a senior PLA
officer in a lighter mood conceded that many PLA generals were also
uncomfortable with computers, in which junior and middle rank officers are
adept. If this is indeed true, will the new generation of PLA officers, which
understands equipment and ‘informationised’ operations better, have a larger
say in defence policy making as well? And will they be more assertive? I
wonder.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh7dgtQkWIvT3RHQScPY_YV2afJkLA9PXn5RWsq9ZVm2YRVV22S5rVT_VhuB4pW-cJupUCYOat9XR7oGhaJ49tzwc0mUdwYSYMEB8dBw0uzbkR0BwgX0oIzg6ie2EBxaB8mTeeNYFuCvKQ/s1600/Blog+Image+4.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh7dgtQkWIvT3RHQScPY_YV2afJkLA9PXn5RWsq9ZVm2YRVV22S5rVT_VhuB4pW-cJupUCYOat9XR7oGhaJ49tzwc0mUdwYSYMEB8dBw0uzbkR0BwgX0oIzg6ie2EBxaB8mTeeNYFuCvKQ/s320/Blog+Image+4.JPG" width="240" /></a><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">The answer to who had actually invited
us was provided by the itinerary. The invitation was from <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:country -region="-region" w:st="on">China</st1:country></st1:place>’s </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">ministry of national defence (MND) </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">and the </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">All China Journalists’ Association (ACJA) </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">was merely
the front. This was probably the first time that the MND has invited Indian
journalists for a peek into the enigma that is the PLA. After the visit, the
first secretary, press section of the Chinese embassy sent me a message
expressing hope that the Indian military would consider a reciprocal
interaction. The visit was <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:country -region="-region" w:st="on">China</st1:country></st1:place>’s
attempt at transparency in defence matters. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">The last thing I wondered was why had
the MND invited four Indian journalists with such dissimilar understanding of
the subject? Surely, they would have done homework on the invitees’ backgrounds?
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">Instead
of focussing on PLA’s perspective on various issues, a lot of time was spent by
my colleagues asking questions which could make page-one stories for newspapers
back home. For example, what do you say when an Indian journalist who’s been
covering defence for a Hindi newspaper for over three decades, asked the Shanghai
naval garrison commander what he thought of the INS Shivalik’s combat
capabilities (It had recently come port calling there). All the poor fellow
could say was “The ship was clean and tidy and I understand it has stealth
capability”. Talking through the interpreter, this ate unnecessarily into the
allocated time.</span></div>FORCEhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17033758774826339971noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2043962667781155759.post-81191922727080976342012-08-02T00:45:00.000-07:002012-08-02T00:45:18.704-07:00Learning Wrong Lessons<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<span style="color: orange; font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><em>Here's is Pravin Sawhney's column for this month</em></span><br />
<br />
<br />
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Longer the
army remains enmeshed in CI ops, faster it’ll lose its conventional edge<o:p></o:p></span><br />
<br />
<div class="MsoNormalCxSpMiddle" style="line-height: normal; margin: 1em 0px 0pt; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">By Pravin Sawhney<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;"><o:p> </o:p></span><br />
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">As August
marks the 13<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Kargil conflict (and ninth of the
FORCE newsmagazine), it is fitting to reflect on the avoidable war. The
immediate spur to do so, has been provided by the then chief of army staff,
General V.P. Malik’s article in the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Time
of India</i> newspaper (26 July 2012). His argument is that while troops had
the spirit, they lacked the wherewithal (equipment and ammunition) to fight,
and hence the high casualties. The entire blame has been heaped on the
political leadership and callous bureaucracy who despite urgings by him did
little on procurements. The general writes that ‘Pakistan surprised us
strategically and tactically.’ He adds that, ‘the strength of a military force
lies in the quality of its human resources, weapons and equipment, and its
morale.’ Not once did he mention the army leadership’s role in the fiasco. I
recommend the recently published General Colin Powell’s book: ‘<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">It Worked for Me: In Life and Leadership</i>,’
to him; it could well be made essential reading for all defence services’
officers.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">War is above
all about leadership. This is nothing new that I am writing. My first lesson on
joining the army more than three-and-half decades ago was on leadership, which
means taking responsibility and not passing the buck. To my mind, Kargil was a
failure of the army’s leadership attributable to its obsession with counter-terror
operations (CT ops). While the army was embarrassed to have allowed the
situation, where intruders dug themselves into Indian territory, to develop, it
was hesitant to own up its egregious error. In the absence of the COAS who was away
to Poland, his Vice-COAS, Lt. General S. Chandrashekhar approached the Air
Headquarters to support them with gunship helicopters’ firepower without
informing the government. He was so obsessed with CT ops that he could not
think it would be a conventional war. <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">(We
reproduce our exclusive, the then chief of air staff, ACM A.Y. Tipnis’
first-hand account on the Kargil conflict that first appeared in FORCE October
2006 issue).</i> Even today, the army does not admit to its leadership folly in
the Kargil conflict. Were it to do this, the cardinal lesson would be driven
home: The army’s primary task is conventional war and not CT ops, something it
has come to believe, and ironically, relish. If any proof is needed, all one
has to do is read General J.J. Singh’s autobiography, which FORCE has reviewed
in this issue.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">To
understand why the army is hitched to CT ops, I need to start at the beginning,
which was 22 years ago when Pakistan took India by surprise by its proxy war
unleashed in Jammu and Kashmir in 1990. The then COAS, General V.N. Sharma is
on record saying that he was prepared to retaliate with conventional war. Unfortunately,
his army was not ready; Operation Pawan (Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri
Lanka), Exercise Brass Tacks (against Pakistan), and Operation Trident (against
China) had sapped the Indian Army. His successor, General S.F. Rodrigues,
equally determined to teach Pakistan a lesson realised that the already
fatigued army, without rest and relief, had to be inducted in large numbers in
J&K to first restore the deteriorating internal situation. Pakistan instantly
screamed from roof-top that the Indian Army had amassed troops on the Line of
Control to start a war. To assure the world that this was not the case, I was
asked by General Rodrigues (There was no television those days and I was
defence correspondent with the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Times of
India</i> newspaper) to travel along the Line of Control. I wrote a series of
page-one articles exposing Pakistan’s lie; if anything, troops had been pulled
inwards to assist in law and order.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">By beginning
1993, the Valley was up in arms, the state police and administration had
disappeared, and the Indian media was hysterically writing about ‘liberated
zones’ in the Valley crawling with terrorists. The COAS-designate, General B.C.
Joshi who was to assume office on 1 July 1993, was conscious that something
drastic had to be done. Familiar with my writings, he called me for an extended
meeting two weeks before he took command of the army (the meeting was arranged
by his aide Lt Col. Anil Bhat, who became the army’s public relations officer).
He told me that J&K could no longer be labelled a law and order situation.
It was a proxy war by Pakistan, and he had decided to raise a large numbers of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Rashtriya Rifles </i>units (RR) for CT ops
from within own resources, as he could not wait for government sanction. He
wanted my support (I was defence correspondent with <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Indian Express</i> newspaper), and assured me that the army would get
back to its primary task soonest. From then on, the army’s focus was CT ops,
and procurements for it became the priority; the internal situation had to be
brought under control.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">Needless
to add, the army’s primary task suffered. While all COAS’ after General Joshi approached
the defence ministry on equipment and ammunition deficiencies, replacement of
obsolescent wherewithal and need for upgrade and modernisation for a
conventional war, it was not done as doggedly as the other two services, the
air force and the navy did. The argument being that as Pakistan was waging a successful
proxy war it would not opt for the costlier conventional war. India, on the
other hand, had decided to merely thwart Pakistan’s clandestine war; the need
to teach a lesson to Pakistan was no longer being talked about.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">The
army’s CT ops were succeeding and by 1997 the tide had turned in its favour. The
following year witnessed two major events: the May 1998 nuclear tests by India
and Pakistan, and elevation of General Pervez Musharraf as Pakistan’s COAS in
October. The implication of Pakistan’s nuclear tests was that the Indian
political and military leadership were no longer on the same page: the former
concluded that war had become too dangerous an option; and the latter, not
being in the nuclear policy-making loop, reasoned that nothing had changed for
it. The army remained fixated on CT ops, renamed counter-insurgency ops (CI
ops) to win over the people to help fight terrorists better. Notwithstanding
murmurs of human rights violations, the army was winning accolades; the
directorate of public relations in South Block and media cells in various
formations of Northern Army Command were busy giving out number of ‘kills’ each
month. Killing terrorists with minimal human rights violations became the criterion
for successful command.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">Unlike
the Northern Army Command which is an operational theatre, the Army
Headquarters with more responsibilities was certainly thinking about
procurements for a convention war as well. On taking over as the COAS in
October 1997, General Malik ordered a non-field force review, to find out how
much of the tail ratio (non-combatants) could be pruned without disturbing the
teeth ratio (combatants). He concluded that the army could be reduced by 50,000
troops; the savings being utilised for modernisation. Though much bandied about
in the media, this was an inconsequential step; the need was for a field force
review (operational rationalisation) which in view of the growing numbers of RR
units and formations should have been done. This was a mistake for which the
army was to pay dearly during the Kargil war.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">Between
1995 and 1998, as many as six operational brigades (about 24,000 troops) were
sucked into CI ops, mainly in areas which were hotbeds of insurgency; these
were Kupwara, Rajouri and Poonch. Little thought was given to the fact that
these were Northern Army Command’s reserves; a fact which comforted the
Pakistan Army planning the 1999 Kargil occupation. This was one reason for the
Indian Army to lose more lives in Operation Vijay, because these soldiers took
time to reorient themselves from doing CI ops to fighting a conventional war. There
were two other reasons for the avoidable casualties: the northern command was
unaware for a long time about the numbers of dug-in terrorists, and the extent
of Pakistan Army support to them. Unlike what General Malik writes, the
conflict was a failure at the operational level of war. The other reason was
total panic at the higher military levels; defence minister George Fernandes
was told by the army that terrorists would be cleared in 48 hours which he
announced, without the army’s higher command assessing what it was up against.
Troops were given impossible tasks and were lost. It was akin to the ‘charge of
the light brigade.’ Now, if this is not the failure of army leadership, then
what is? (It was the army and nation’s good luck that the Pakistan armed forces
did not openly join the war).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;">Were
right lessons learnt from the fiasco? No. The army decided it needed more RR
troops and headquarters to separate forces on CT ops and conventional role. Moreover,
the year-long military stand-off with Pakistan (Operation Parakram) in 2002
convinced the army that the political leadership had little stomach to fight
nuclear Pakistan. The much bandied about Vajpayee government’s ‘coercive
diplomacy’ was really a bluff called off by Pakistan. The November 2003
ceasefire and erection of the fence on the Line of Control in 2004 dulled the
army’s edges further on its primary task. CI ops became the army’s <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">mantra</i>, providing it with two
advantages: medals and glory; and promotional avenues with plenty of officers’
vacancies available in RR formations. The present army is a picture in contrast
to what it was in 1990. The army is so entrenched in its new <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">avatar</i> that only a determined COAS or
defence minister can bring it back to the reality of the two-front military
threat staring in the face.<a href="http://www.blogger.com/null" name="_GoBack"></a><o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>FORCEhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17033758774826339971noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2043962667781155759.post-92004338916172542552012-08-01T23:02:00.000-07:002012-08-01T23:02:25.049-07:00General J.J. Singh plays it safe in his memoirs<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">By Ghazala Wahab<o:p></o:p></span><br />
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">General Joginder Jaswant Singh has been bit
of an oddity in the Indian military. While most Indian soldiers, irrespective
of rank and service have been chary of the media, treating it as a necessary
evil to be endured when completely unavoidable, Gen. JJ Singh, affectionately
called Gen. JJ, has always courted the media fearlessly and with great
enthusiasm.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">As Chief of Army Staff (COAS) [and
before that, as General Officer Commanding-in-Chief (GOC-in-C), Western Command],
he seemed to believe that publicity was publicity — it was neither good nor
bad. This is the reason that when even ordinary officers went into spasms of
anxiety at the whiff of a ‘negative’ report, Gen. Singh remained unflappable. He
had a penchant for issuing statements at the drop of the hat and making
headlines every alternate day. That led the grand old man of Indian journalism
Khushwant Singh, to write that if he didn’t stop talking, he’d end up being a
source of more ‘<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Sardar</i>’ jokes. So rattled
was the government of the day (used to mute chiefs), by his garrulousness, that
apparently, he was asked to talk less with the media.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Gen. Singh might have tried to curb his
instincts. But how do you hide a flamboyant personality? When he wasn’t speaking
to the press, he was being photographed at glamorous events like polo tournaments,
with Page 3 regulars. It wouldn’t be far-fetched to say he fashioned himself as
something of a star. Someone who’d walk into a room and immediately draw
attention to himself, whether intentionally or unintentionally. But there was
never any doubt that he wanted to be projected in a certain way. Within a
couple of weeks of taking over as COAS, this correspondent was granted an
interview with the General and his wife, becoming the first guest of the first
couple in the Army House. Not only did they speak extensively about themselves,
about Gen. Singh’s achievements, his war wound (in Kashmir), about adopting
children and so on — post interview, his office even supplied family
photographs for the story. It appeared in the March 2005 issue of FORCE. He was
a refreshing change from his predecessor, who did away with even the
traditional Army Day press conferences during his tenure. But then, there is
something called too much of a good thing. Some would say Gen. JJ Singh spoke
enough for his successors too — they all remained squeamish about the media. Except
Gen. V.K. Singh, who went ballistic towards the end of his tenure.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Gen. Singh is currently the Governor
of Arunachal Pradesh. For someone as irrepressible as him, it was only to be
expected that he’d write his memoirs and present them with the same panache he
presented himself. His autobiography <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">A
Soldier’s General</i>, published by Harper Collins, has already been released
three-times over. It was released in Delhi on June 9, by the Marshal of the Indian
Air Force Arjan Singh; in Mumbai on June 23, by the Governor of Maharashtra </span><span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Times-Bold; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">K.
Sankaranarayanan; and in London on June 25, by </span><span class="text71"><span lang="EN-GB" style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">a British member of parliament
Paul Uppal and </span></span><span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Times-Bold; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">the </span><span class="text71"><span lang="EN-GB" style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Shaheed
Nanak Singh Foundation.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span class="text71"><span lang="EN-GB" style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Talking to the press at one of the
release functions, Gen. JJ Singh said that his book was simply a narration of
his life, of events as he saw them. “There is nothing controversial in my
book,” he insisted with a broad smile. Weeks before the book was released, one
of his former aides cautioned that one should not expect too much from the
book. “It is light-reading,” he said, suggesting it would neither be contemporary
history nor a quick guide to national security.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span class="text71"><span lang="EN-GB" style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Indeed, the autobiography is an
accurate reflection of Gen. Singh’s personality, putting him not only at the
centre of the book but at the centre of every event in it. In that respect, both
the book and the author have been extremely faithful to one another. It’s
another matter that Khushwant Singh, whose advice Gen. Singh sought before
embarking on this literary journey — recently wrote that he’d advised the
former chief not to praise himself too much. People get put-off by that, he’d
said. But the General obviously didn’t take that hint.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Gen. JJ has an explanation for that.
Addressing guests at the book release function in London (a video of the speech
has been uploaded on YouTube), he said that he laboured hard over the format of
the book. He realised that if he was to tell his story, it would automatically
read like self-praise. But there was to be no escape. “Maybe, this is the
reason why so many army chiefs do not write their autobiography,” he told the
audience. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">If so many Indian military chiefs
have desisted from writing their autobiographies, then the reason has to be
more than just reluctance to praise oneself. To my mind, there are three
reasons why an autobiography should be written. One, the author is such a brilliant
writer that he/she has the capability of turning even the mundane into a work
of literature. Two, the author’s life has been unusually eventful, he/she has
been witness to history in the making and has something useful to say. Three,
the author has had a very close/personal association with the powerful and the
rich (mainly the former) to enable him/her to write a kiss-and-tell tale. These
three conditions eliminate the need for putting oneself at the centre of the book,
even if it is an autobiography because one would write as a spectator, seeing things
as they happened.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">While reading Gen Singh’s autobiography,
I wondered if it is really difficult not to succumb to the temptation of
writing things like ‘I did this’. And ‘I told so and so that...’ The immediate
reference that occurred to me, was of his predecessor four times removed, Gen.
Shankar Roychowdhury, COAS from November 1994 to September 1997. His
autobiography, called <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Officially at Peace</i>,
was published by the Penguin imprint Viking, in 2002. The book starts with Gen.
Roychowdhury becoming the chief. He divides chapters on the basis of issues as
he saw them. And not in a chronologically linear manner. Critical of the
political leadership (he worked with four prime ministers starting with
Narasimha Rao and finishing with I.K. Gujral) — which he always found indifferent
to national security issues, Gen. Roychowdhury appears in the book primarily as
a narrator. There are hardly any personal details, because he assumed readers
wouldn’t really be interested. His autobiography reads like contemporary
history, putting in perspective the Indian Army’s state in the mid-Nineties,
its roles across theatres, state of war-preparedness (or lack of it) and the blanket
blindness over nuclear issues. He narrates in great detail his meetings with
various ministers, politicians and bureaucrats at various levels. His recounting
of his first meeting with the minister of state for defence (whom he does not
name) upon becoming the chief and his subsequent meeting with finance minister
Manmohan Singh, pleading for more funds for army modernization, are both funny
and eye-opening. Ironically, Gen. Roychowdhury is not a highly decorated
officer. Like Gen. K Sundarji, he only has a Param Vishisht Seva Medal (PVSM) to
his name. But this is not a review of his book.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Gen. JJ seems to have been hemmed-in
by two self-imposed restrictions. First, he starts with the conviction that his
has been an unusually remarkable life. For him, the fact that he is a third
generation military officer and the first Sikh to become the chief, itself
makes for an interesting story. Hence, this narration takes care of the first
section, without any attempts at giving a perspective to the prevailing circumstances
then. Or insights into the politico-social conditions. Or why being the first Army
chief of Sikh descent, was a big deal. While Operation Blue Star finds no
mention, the 1984 anti-Sikh carnage is dismissed in a paragraph — saying no
violence took place in Jammu where he was posted.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Given that his grandfather was a
sepoy in the British Indian Army (deployed in France during World War I) and
his father was commissioned in the Royal Indian Army Service Corps before
Independence, a more thoughtful narration could have added so much more depth
to the book. His grandfather was injured in France and returned home because of
his debility. Did it ever cross his mind whose war he was fighting, or for what
reason? How did the growing pitch of the freedom struggle affect him? Were he and/or
the people in his village, aware of it or not? Did he have any patriotic
dilemma regarding loyalties? His father joined the service in 1943, at a time
when the freedom struggle had reached a crescendo. What were his reasons for the
choice he made? The idea is not to judge them for their choices. But to
understand a narrative different from what one reads in history books.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Later on, the partition of the
Indian military in 1947, after which his father came to the Indian Army,
deserved more than platitudes like: ‘It was a time of great stress for my
parents... The effect was traumatic as well as tragic in many cases,
particularly for those soldiers and their families who happened to suddenly
find themselves living in the wrong country.’ Taking the easy way out, he fills
his narration by quoting from different sources, often fictional. For example,
to give the readers a sense of India’s Partition, he quotes from Khushwant
Singh’s ‘<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Train to Pakistan</i>’. Or to
establish that his ancestors probably (he is not certain) were Aryans, he
quotes from a glossary on tribes and castes of Punjab and the Frontier
provinces. To think that he had such rich ready-made material at home, (both
his parents and his wife’s parents migrated from what became Pakistan) — borrowing
narrative is nothing but intellectual laziness.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">The second restriction is his choice
of not writing anything ‘controversial’. As a result, he says nothing at all in
his book. This is a huge let-down, considering he served in important positions
during crucial times. During the Kargil conflict, he was Additional Director
General of Military Operations (ADGMO). During Operation Parakram (when India
nearly went to war with Pakistan on two occasions) he was Commander 1 Corps,
one of the Indian Army’s strike corps. He subsequently went on to command the Indian
Army’s prestigious Western Command, before becoming Army Chief. Yet, he writes
about all these events quoting from press reports. As if he wasn’t privy to
anything himself. His chapter on becoming Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee (CSC)
takes the cake. To describe India’s nuclear weapons’ capabilities across
domains, he quotes from Wikipedia!<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">All this begs two questions. Who
exactly did he write this book for? Is it for young soldiers, scholars of
defence, general readers or merely for his extended family? Because there is
nothing in the book, that is not already available in the public domain. Even details
about incidents like the time he was shot near the Line of Control (LOC), or
was nearly ambushed in Baramullah, frequently appeared in the media when he was
the chief. Even I have written about these incidents way back in 2005!<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Perhaps, nobody told Gen. JJ that
writing a book isn’t like making a statement to the press. Unlike a media
report, a book has a shelf life, hopefully longer than the life of the author.
A book remains a reference point for the future; even those who didn’t know you
learn about you through your book. Hence, I believe an autobiography should be very
carefully thought through. Not only in terms of what you reveal in it but also
what kind of image you convey through it. ‘Controversial’ is hardly the adjective
one would use for an autobiography — it can be candid or cagey.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">This raises the second question. What
exactly is the purpose of this book? It is true that to some extent that the
very act of writing an autobiography, smacks of self-aggrandisement. But surely
it is up to the author to determine how high he wants to raise the bar. Whether
he wants to gloss over crucial issues or take them head on. Instead of filling up
the chapter on Kargil (during which he was the ADGMO) with press reports, he
could have pointed out weaknesses in the Indian side, that led to the conflict.
He could have discussed if it was a politico-military disconnect, that led to a
severe loss of lives in the early days. Is it possible that Mumbai’s 26/11
happened because very few lessons were learnt from Kargil?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">What feathers would Gen. JJ Singh have
ruffled, if he had addressed allegations of human rights violations against the
Indian Army? Instead of dismissing them by saying that ‘no violations occurred
during my tenure.’ After all, the fact that violations have happened, is not a
state secret. On the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), he says we should
be open to the idea of incorporating humane modifications in it. But he stops
short of suggesting what these could be.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">And where he does dwell upon the
much-bandied concept of the iron fist and the velvet glove, he draws parallels
between the Indian Army’s operations in Kashmir and the United States/ North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Is he
by any chance suggesting that Kashmir is our Afghanistan? Is the Indian Army,
God forbid, an occupation force in Kashmir?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">His penchant for drawing parallels,
leads him to draw one between himself and Pakistan’s Army Chief and
subsequently its President, Gen. Pervez Musharraf. The chapter Musharraf and I
is the most embarrassing one in the book. The sad part is, it was completely
avoidable — both Gen. JJ Singh and his tenure as chief, had nothing to do with
Musharraf at all. The two didn’t even meet. Comparisons can never be fair. I
would have been horrified if somebody was to compare me with anyone in the
world. And here, Gen. JJ sets himself up for a comparison, concluding that he
was a better chief. Musharraf’s tenure as Pakistan Army chief will be judged by
his army. His tenure as President of that country (during which, in addition to
getting Major Non-Nato Ally status for his country, he got the US to give nearly
USD 20 billion as aid) would be judged by his country. Forget Gen. JJ,
Musharraf in his autobiography does not refer to any Indian military officer;
he only talks of the heads of the state. Even if Gen. Singh believed there were
favourable grounds for comparison, this alone should have dissuaded him.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">The only place where Gen. JJ Singh sparkles
and goes beyond his chosen circle of comfort, is writing about Arunachal
Pradesh, where he is currently Governor. Perhaps, it is his fondness for the
place and its people. Or simply nostalgia (he served here as a young officer).
But he writes about his tenure there with affection and sincerity. Had he marshalled
this sentiment throughout the book, it would certainly have been a collector’s
item.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div align="right" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: right;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">A Soldier’s General: An Autobiography<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div align="right" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: right;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">General J.J. Singh<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div align="right" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: right;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt;">HarperCollins, Pg 356, Rs 799<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>FORCEhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17033758774826339971noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2043962667781155759.post-31847753319398022252012-08-01T22:55:00.002-07:002012-08-01T22:59:20.752-07:00The Meadow suggests the unthinkable<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">By Ghazala Wahab</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">In the end it didn’t matter who killed the
five foreign trekkers in the Kashmiri paradise. What matters is that those who
could have saved them chose not to do so for reasons that can only be termed
diabolical. This is the single most shocking conclusion of the 450-page,
painstakingly researched and meticulously detailed book, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">The Meadow</i>, written by Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">In the summer of 1995, six foreign
trekkers — two Americans (Don Hutchings and John Childs), two British (Keith
Mangan and Paul Wells), one Norwegian (Hans Christian Ostro) and one German
(Dirk Hasert) — were kidnapped near Pahalgam in <st1:place w:st="on">Kashmir</st1:place>
in a span of a few days by an unknown group called al Faran. For a few days,
the story made the front pages of the Indian newspapers speculating the
identity of al Faran but also because within four days of the kidnapping, John
Childs escaped. Thereafter, the kidnapping once again made news when Han
Christian’s mutilated body was discovered more than a month later. Then, it
fell off the radar. Sporadic reports appeared once in a while about the
kidnappers’ demands till those too dried up and the four men disappeared from
public memory. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">I remembered the kidnapping incident
when I started reporting on <st1:place w:st="on">Kashmir</st1:place> nearly
nine years ago. But I could not recall what eventually happened to Don
Hutchings, Keith Mangan, Paul Wells and Dirk Hasert. During one of my visits to
the state a few years ago, I asked a few people, journalists included, about
the aftermath of the kidnapping. Were the hostages killed? Were they released
in a secret compact? The answer was a shrug. People had no memory of what had
happened to them. I was not the only one who had forgotten what had happened to
them. It seems, except for the families of the four hostages, the world had
forgotten too. ‘Until Now’, write the authors in the prologue.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark
have not merely chronicled the kidnapping; they have attempted to tell the
story of six unfortunate souls caught in the wrong place at the wrong time, along
with that of their families. Woven from intensive interactions with the family
members and also from the notes most of them wrote before and during their
confinement, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">The Meadow</i> — racy,
though sometimes overwritten — builds up to the kidnapping almost like a
thriller, introducing each character gradually before arriving at the
denouement through multiple sources. Reading the book, one gets to know each
hostage intimately, developing a fondness for them, fervently hoping for a
happy ending.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">But in the <st1:place w:st="on">Kashmir</st1:place>
of the Nineties, there were no happy endings. The happiest were the tragic
endings because at least there was closure; the surviving members could mourn
and bury their dead. For the rest, as for the family members of the four, life
was reduced to following up with indifferent officials about the fate of the
loved ones; with hope sometimes, but mostly with despair.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">At some point during the incarceration,
the hostages lived in <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Warwan</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Valley</st1:placetype></st1:place>, east of which was
Kargil. On clear days, they could see the majestic Nun-Kun massif, which are
the highest Himalayan peaks in <st1:place w:st="on">Kashmir</st1:place>. The
shorter of the two peaks, Kun, means ‘what is’, while Nun means ‘what appears
to be’. Ironically, the story of the four, as told by Levy and Scott-Clark
constantly hovers between what was and what appeared to be.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">Even by most Indian accounts,
Nineties were the darkest Kashmiri years. Nothing was in black and white,
everything being the colour of blood. Taken completely by surprise, by the
uprising of 1989 and the rapid support it found among the people, the Indian
government was desperate to convey to the world that what was happening in
Kashmir was not an insurgency but acts of terrorism perpetuated by <st1:country -region="-region" w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country>. In
its desperation and also to wrest physical control over the territories where
militants (both Kashmiris and foreign) had a free run, accountability and
humanity were given a go by. The orders from the top were to get rid of the
militants/terrorists and their supporters by all means. Since the desperate
government had given a long rope to the security forces, they in turn
outsourced the dirty job to mercenaries (renegade militants) with one brief:
Each kill will be rewarded in hard cash. In just a few years, <st1:place w:st="on">Kashmir</st1:place>
was in the grip of a different kind of terror unleashed by the renegades,
hordes of whom built palatial houses for themselves on the bodies of those they
had killed for money. It was immaterial who the dead were, as long as they were
dead.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">It was in these times that the
legend of the unknown gunmen first came about and persists even today. The
legend was useful. It hid in its fold the ugliness of both the law-breakers and
the law-enforcers because in the Nineties there was a thin line dividing the
two. The only difference between them was the flag under which they operated.
Countless Kashmiris have been killed by unknown gunmen and the legend
continues. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">In this dangerous land, the trekkers
arrived in the summer of 1995. There were no advisories to refer to, and the
desperate tourism office of <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city>
painted a rosy picture. All trekkers were told at different times that trekking
in and around Pahalgam was perfectly safe. Kicked about the ensuing adventure, the
tourists ignored the fortified valley and the overwhelming presence of the
security forces. The landscape was too beautiful, the people too hospitable;
till they were betrayed by both.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">Al Faran was less of a group and
more of an operation mounted by ISI’s Harkat-ul-Ansar to secure the release of
Masood Azhar and his compatriots lodged in Indian prisons. According to the
book, the middle-level <st1:place w:st="on">Kashmir</st1:place> police officers
were able to figure that out within a few days of the kidnapping. Without any
directions from the government of <st1:country -region="-region" w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country>, as J&K was under the
Governor’s rule then, J&K police crime branch under inspector general
Rajinder Tickoo ordered the creation of a secret investigative team, Squad, to
figure out the kidnappings. A superintendent of police, Mushtaq Mohammed Sadiq headed
the Squad. However, within weeks of the Squad getting to work, Tickoo found
himself in the middle of the kidnapping fracas in the most unexpected manner.
Summoned by the military advisor to the Governor, Lt Gen. D.D. Saklani (retd),
Tickoo was asked to receive a phone call made by the kidnappers’ source.
Tickoo’s brief was to talk and give away nothing.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">Meanwhile, the Squad moved very
fast, spreading its investigators among the local population, even infiltrating
the Gujjar villages where the hostages were being held. Its reports to the
headquarters gave painstaking details about the location and the conditions of
the hostages, as well as the number of kidnappers, their duty hours, their
relations with the victims and so on. The Squad was not the only one keeping a
track of the kidnap party. Military reconnaissance helicopters also frequently
hovered over the area where the hostages were kept for several months. The
pictures it took were so close and sharp that even beads of perspiration could
be seen on the faces of the hostages playing volley ball with their captors.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">Yet, all requests of the Squad for a
rescue operation went unanswered. Tickoo was also directed by Gen. Saklani to
drag the conversation as the government of <st1:country -region="-region" w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country> was in no mood for
negotiations. ‘There’d be no prisoner exchange,’ Saklani had made it clear. With
no room for manoeuvre and no intentions of mounting a rescue operation, people
like Tickoo and Sadiq improvised as they went along trying to ensure that the
hostages were not harmed.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">Since nobody in the government has
spoken to the writers, except retired spooks who ran the unintelligible
government of <st1:country -region="-region" w:st="on">India</st1:country> policy
in <st1:place w:st="on">Kashmir</st1:place>, Chevy and Scott-Clark can only
guesstimate what was going on. The first priority of Prime Minister Narasimha
Rao’s government was the safe conclusion of the Amarnath Pilgrimage. The entire
security machinery, from Rashtriya Rifles to the state police and the
Paramilitary were deployed along the pilgrimage route. Despite this, the fact that
the foreigners were kidnapped from the same location just days before the
pilgrimage baffles the writers. Once John Childs escaped after spending four
days in captivity, the kidnappers returned to the valley where trekkers were
camped and were able to kidnap two more in broad daylight. The impregnable
security cordon neither deterred them nor prevented the kidnapping.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">Not surprisingly, the writers wonder
if the kidnapping was allowed to happen, a belief reinforced by the fact that
every time Tickoo reached some kind of a breakthrough in his secret
negotiations with the kidnappers, eventually coming to the point when the
kidnappers were ready to trade the hostages for a mere Rs 10 million, the contents
of the negotiations were leaked to the press and the talks collapsed. In
frustration, Tickoo went away on a long leave.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">Desperate, the kidnappers approached
Syed Ali Shah Geelani-headed Hurriyat Conference to broker a face-saving solution.
He refused to get involved. As winters approached, the kidnappers’ desperation
increased and they finally abandoned the hostages in December and fled. By Squad’s
account, the hostages were handed over to the renegades (who reported to the
local RR unit) and the notorious STF combine. As the kidnappers made their way
out of the valley where the hostages were left behind, all of them were killed
by the RR. Still, no effort was made to rescue the hostages.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">While the Squad’ sources informed it
that the hostages were killed on December 24 by the renegades/STF on the orders
of their handlers (was it the RR, IB or both, the question is left tantalisingly
dangling in the air) in the spring of 1996, the army produced a man called
Naseer who it claimed was one of the handlers of the kidnappers. The man
confessed that the hostages were killed by the kidnappers in the second week of
December and even claimed to know where they were buried. A grand expedition
was launched in which diplomats from the four Missions were invited apart from
many others, to locate the graves but to no avail. Finally, the search was
abandoned. In the following weeks the state police and the newly-elected state
government discredited Naseer. The families were again told that hostages were
alive. And that’s where the tale hangs.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">Were the foreigners treated as sacrificial
lambs in the unholy game of one-upmanship? Did the Indian government allow the
killing of the foreigners to put an international spotlight on <st1:country -region="-region" w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:country> as the sponsor of terrorism in <st1:country -region="-region" w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country>? After
all, <st1:country -region="-region" w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country>
has always traded prisoners for hostages. It did so before this incident, it
did so after this incident and continues to do so even now. Like the unknown
gunmen, these questions are also part of the murkiness that rules in <st1:place w:st="on">Kashmir</st1:place>; the answers being too gross to countenance.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">There are two ways a book like <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">The Meadow</i> can be treated: junk it as
far-fetched, or read it to reflect on how we allowed short-term politics to
brutalise and dehumanise our people and those who were meant to protect them.
If a uniformed person does not flinch killing an innocent, he is a danger even
to the institution he represents.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: left; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">The Meadow<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: left; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">Adrian Levy and
Cathy Scott-Clark<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">
</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: left; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">Penguin Books<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">Rs
499, Pg 490</span></span></div>
</div>FORCEhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17033758774826339971noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2043962667781155759.post-35608944456150408962012-05-05T04:05:00.000-07:002012-05-07T23:56:14.961-07:00Can Siachen Spring the Next Surprise?<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiQAyzSS5HK1h93wO51O_5rUCSBWWWdfbDT3rpUyKrSydEhkwQ0y5SRj0bl5tlepPwy0V6gHNInEPUb5i0G9x211KK0haGQBiwjDtdrgNA3-PZ-ek0pOvjtE3oRGDHQW239sdPasQXc3kM/s1600/INTERESTS+Pakistan+Army+Chief+Gen.+Kayani+during+a+Pak-China+military+exercise.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="204" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiQAyzSS5HK1h93wO51O_5rUCSBWWWdfbDT3rpUyKrSydEhkwQ0y5SRj0bl5tlepPwy0V6gHNInEPUb5i0G9x211KK0haGQBiwjDtdrgNA3-PZ-ek0pOvjtE3oRGDHQW239sdPasQXc3kM/s320/INTERESTS+Pakistan+Army+Chief+Gen.+Kayani+during+a+Pak-China+military+exercise.JPG" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Pakistan Army Chief Gen. Kayani during a Pak-China military exercise<br />
<br /></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; text-align: justify;"><strong>As Siachen war
enters its 29</strong></span><span style="font-size: small;"><strong><sup style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; text-align: justify;">th</sup><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; text-align: justify;"> year, FORCE looks at what it means today</span></strong>
</span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;"><em>By Pravin
Sawhney and Ghazala Wahab<o:p></o:p></em></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;"></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">After the 1999
Kargil war and the 26/11 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, can Siachen spring the
next surprise for India? Sounds impossible, all regular analysts would say. The
arguments to back this assertion would be that the 28-year-old conflict has
stabilised operationally, with little hope of either side making tactical gains.
Both sides are keen on demilitarisation, which would be a powerful confidence
building measure towards the Kashmir resolution. Both sides continue to lose
troops to weather than combat which has ceased since 26 November 2003. The only
thing that is preventing the pullback of mutual troops is the trust deficit
between India and Pakistan. A move-back from this futile battlefield would
provide a gigantic fillip to the lack of mutual trust.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">While
all these assertions are sensible, what if a new factor with power to change
the existing geo-political and military dynamics gets introduced into this
stabilised scenario? It is well known that the Pakistan Army (PA) is not
reconciled to having lost the Siachen race to the Indian Army (IA). General
Pervez Musharraf has confirmed that the 1999 Kargil war was a response to
India’s Siachen occupation. More recently, on April 7, Pakistan’s 124 soldiers
and 14 civilians were buried alive under an avalanche while sleeping in their
bunkers at Gayari, the battalion headquarters of 6 Northern Light Infantry.
Pakistani leaders of all hue were quick to say that Siachen be dimilitarised
and the conflict end. Former Premier Nawaz Sharif went furthest saying that
Pakistan should withdraw its troops even if India was not agreeable to a mutual
pullback. Sensing the sombre moment, Pakistan chief of army staff (COAS),
General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani muttered homilies, which Pakistan foreign office
was quick to say should not be taken seriously.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">The
powerful factor to change the existing realities could be China. Numerous media
reports in 2011 have written about 10,000 Chinese in Northern Areas (NA), purportedly
for building of infrastructure there. It has also been reported that the 1978-built
Karakoram Highway which connects Chinese Xinjiang with NA over the 19,000 feet
Khunjerab pass well north of the Siachen glacier is to be developed into an
all-weather road with Chinese help. What should alarm India, however, is
something else. The Indian COAS, General V.K. Singh in 2011 spoke about the
presence of nearly 3,500 Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) personnel in
Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). As an aside, when FORCE recently asked a
senior general responsible for Kashmir theatre what could be the implication of
this development, he said that his dual responsibility was counter-insurgency
and anti-infiltration across the Line of Control. People in Delhi should worry
about Chinese troops in POK, he added. If anything, his remarks betrayed a lack
of understanding of the influence of geo-politics (geography’s influence on
relations between nations) on military dynamics, which has propelled power-play
in this region since centuries.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">Now juxtapose
the presence of PLA in POK with two related issues. On the eve of Chinese Prime
Minister Wen Jiabao’s visit to India in December 2010, Chinese foreign office threw
a bombshell by referring to the disputed border (Line of Actual Control)
between the two countries as mere 2,000km long from the known 4,056km. The
Chinese new border with India includes 554km of the Middle Sector, 160km of
Sikkim (this is being dealt outside the preview of border talks), and 1,226km
(with 90,000sq km area) of Eastern Sector (Arunachal Pradesh). China no longer recognises
a border with India in Kashmir (called the Western Sector). The astonishing bit
is that India, given the history of the region, has not raised questions on how
China unilaterally slashed the disputed border by half. By implication, China
has become a stake-holder in Kashmir, and given its relations with Pakistan,
may have no hesitation in supporting it openly on its Kashmir policy.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">The
other news is about Pakistan having leased portions of Northern Areas (NA) to
China. This was reported in the Pakistani media without official confirmation
or denial. As there is no smoke without fire, this could well be true. In March
1963, when Pakistan illegally ceded 5,100km of Shaksgam valley (abutting
Siachen in Ladakh) to China, it quickly became public knowledge as both
countries were still building mutual relations against a perceived common
adversary. Today, given the cemented partnership between the two, what is the
need for either to talk about NA’s status? <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">Given
these realities, what stops China from throwing its weight behind the Pakistan
Army (PA) to enforce the NJ9842-Karakoram line with national security
implications for India? In a military pincer, Indian positions on the Saltoro
Ridge and the Glacier could be outflanked. The PA could attempt to recapture
NJ9842 (surrounded by three distinct glaciers, Gyong, Urdelop and Korissa) in
sub-sector west (renamed Hanif sector in memory of Captain Hanifuddin who died
here during the 1999 Kargil war) presently held by India, and the PLA could
sever India’s operational logistics by land and air maintenance to Sub-Sector
North (SSN) facing the Chinese in Ladakh. In an area of little collateral
damage, and removed from the Kashmir Valley where a ceasefire since 26 November
2003 could continue to hold, the two allies have capability and reasons (both
are non-status quo and pro-active powers) to send a powerful message to India. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">To be
sure, few nations would diplomatically come to India’s rescue. The Siachen
glacier will be interpreted to be on disputed land, and China with its
unchallenged (by India) policy shift towards Pakistan would say that India is
in illegal possession of both Siachen and Kashmir both of which belong to
Pakistan. Such a scenario is plausible. To put this into perspective, two
questions would need to be addressed. Why would Pakistan and China collude against
India over Siachen? And does India have the capability to prevent this? To
appreciate this, there is the need to step-back to 13 April 1984 when India
started the Siachen war with complete disregard to history, the powerful
geo-politics of the region, and military acumen.</span></div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg877IS6l8qSWlkR9kSlkBEWXP2H2MZbBM-8HZ4xkP7hvOyQxHWni9cLJsgUqI0O4-LDV_igcGv9iYOyUWVFMwp-CixNY7_Q8tauvO9U9E-N4BEAJTWlATAixCWIm56oL9jWom9-6V-aXk/s1600/2.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="400" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg877IS6l8qSWlkR9kSlkBEWXP2H2MZbBM-8HZ4xkP7hvOyQxHWni9cLJsgUqI0O4-LDV_igcGv9iYOyUWVFMwp-CixNY7_Q8tauvO9U9E-N4BEAJTWlATAixCWIm56oL9jWom9-6V-aXk/s400/2.JPG" width="342" /></a></div>
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<b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">Two Generals<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">The Siachen
war for India, called Operation Meghdoot, was started by two generals, the
Northern Army Commander, Lt General M.L. Chibber and his junior, the 15 crops
commander in Srinagar, Lt General P.N. Hoon without any cohesive and
comprehensive military planning. Operation Meghdoot was conceptualised as a minor
side-show by the Northern Army Command with little involvement of the army
headquarters. The COAS, General A.S. Vaidya was sidestepped by Hoon with tacit encouragement
from Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. In his book, Hoon has said more than we
would have ever known about the beginnings of this self-defeating war. He makes
an unabashed assertion of close ties between the Hoon clan and Nehru family,
finally taking the credit for briefing Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at his
headquarters in Srinagar on why it was necessary to launch Meghdoot. In later
years, while Chibber conceded that occupation of Siachen was a mistake, Hoon
makes a nonsensical case about the importance of Siachen (see following boxes ‘Meeting
Chibber’ and ‘Hoon Talk’).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">Why did a discerning Indira Gandhi accept Hoon’s incredible
exposition on the strategic importance of Siachen? Because, the war was
politically necessary. Operation Meghdoot
was to be the first military operation since Independence when India conveyed a
clear political message to Pakistan and China: India retains the right and
might to pre-empt rather than react. Pakistan was stopped from having a
free-run in Kashmir especially in the NA. It is a geo-political truism that
unoccupied territory, however marginal, gets occupied over time by the side
which has the military means and muscle to do it. Once India and Pakistan
acquired sophisticated weapons and developed expertise in mountain and high
altitude warfare in the late Seventies, it was a matter of time who would
occupy Siachen first.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">Unfortunately, Chibber and Hoon did not
understand the geo-political significance of Siachen and started the war with
incorrect military perceptions, resulting in faulty military aims and planning.
The Indian political leadership in 1984 understood the need for the Siachen
war, but did not give out political objectives of war to the military
leadership. It could be argued that it was the military leadership who
suggested the Siachen conflict to Indira Gandhi, and not the other way round.
The Prime Minister merely went along with the military decision hoping there
would be little need to baby-walk the generals. Her only term of reference was
that the conflict should not escalate; precisely what happened subsequently.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">This was because the two generals based the
military planning on a wrong assumption that there was no requirement for a
permanent occupation of the Siachen Glacier, or better still to permanently occupy
low areas to the west (Dansum) of the Saltoro Range, the westernmost high ridge
boundary, ranging from 12,000 to 22,000 feet, of the Glacier. It was thought
enough to deter Pakistani troops from reaching the Saltoro Range. The military
leadership failed to appreciate the nature and quantum of Pakistani reaction to
an Indian occupation of Saltoro passes. On one hand, the nature and quantum of
the protracted conflict was assessed wrongly. On the other, two basic military
rules were simply overlooked. That logistics planning is always more important
than strategy in war especially in high altitude mountainous terrain; and
operations in high altitude areas are different from those in the mountains.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">So what did planners of Operation Meghdoot do?
Based on faulty military appreciation, a cardinal principle of war in the
mountains was transgressed. A need for secure and organic logistics and
administration of troops perched on the passes was given least attention. The
Indian Air Force was asked to provide logistics, because Chibber concluded that
the best and the most economical way to sustain this operation would be by the
use of helicopters. An important medical lesson established by the 1962 war
with China was that no acclimatisation for human beings is possible at heights
more than 18,000 feet. While it is good tactics to occupy heights in the
mountains for observation and operations, doing so is a hazardous proposition
in high altitude areas. If only these simple facts had struck Indian
commanders, the Saltoro passes would not have been occupied and a national
tragedy would have been averted. Indian soldiers have taken more casualties
fighting weather than Pakistani troops which occupy much lower heights.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">What should have India done? Instead of occupying
the Saltoro passes, Indian troops should have occupied territory west of the
Saltoro Range, which then was lightly held by Pakistan. Dansum, which after the
launch of Operation Meghdoot became Pakistan’s 323 brigade headquarters, at an
average height of 10,000 feet, was an ideal location. This would have helped an
Indian occupation in six ways:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.45in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -0.25in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 10pt;">·<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 7pt;">
</span></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">One, Dansum is
a relatively flat area at lower heights and is ideal for heliborne operations
and troops build-up. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.45in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -0.25in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 10pt;">·<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 7pt;">
</span></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">Two, the three
major passes on the Saltoro Range — Sia La, Bilafond La and Gyong La — meet at
Dansum. This makes Dansum an excellent base to defend the Saltoro ridge and the
glacier itself. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.45in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -0.25in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 10pt;">·<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 7pt;">
</span></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">Three, an
Indian occupation of Dansum would have threatened Khapalu, which is Pakistan’s
heavy brigade size garrison. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.45in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -0.25in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 10pt;">·<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 7pt;">
</span></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">Four, Indian
casualties due to weather on the Saltoro ridge and the glacier would have been
minimal. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.45in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -0.25in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 10pt;">·<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 7pt;">
</span></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">Five, the
benefit of occupying Dansum was to be in negotiations with Pakistan as India
would have been in a strong bargaining position to trade ‘land for peace’.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.45in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -0.25in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 10pt;">·<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 7pt;">
</span></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">And six,
Dansum provides an easy link-up with Sub-Sector West, area west of map point NJ
9842 which is the most sensitive and fighting prone area in Siachen.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">Both Chibber and Hoon do not agree. According to
them, occupation of Dansum ‘would have violated the Shimla agreement as Dansum
is north-west and not north of NJ 9842. Secondly, Dansum is situated in a
valley and we would have been dominated by Pakistan unless we captured the
heights west of Dansum. Occupation of Dansum would have meant territorial
aggression by India’. This argument is flawed. If a straight line due north is
drawn from NJ 9842, it joins Terram Shehr II glacier, implying that in its
present occupation of Sia La, Indian troops are already eight degrees west of
where they should be; and hence aggressors.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">Moreover, as point NJ 9842 was not identified on
the ground in 1984 when Operation Meghdoot started, how was it known that ‘due
north’ was along the Saltoro ridge? It was only in 1985 that an Indian survey
team identified map point NJ 9842 with an approach from Urdolep glacier. NJ
9842 is surrounded by three distinct glaciers, Gyong, Urdelop and Korisa. Even
if an occupation of Dansum meant a localised war with Pakistan, how would it be
more than what it is now when artillery has been used freely, fiercely and
regularly?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">The simple truth remains that Meghdoot was not a
well thought out military plan, but was a panic reaction, reminiscent of the
pre-1962 ‘forward policy’ against China, when posts were occupied without
ensuring their logistics lifeline. Panic was created by Pakistan’s action, as
its former COAS, General Mirza Aslam Beg later conceded: In 1983 Pakistani
Special Service Group chased Indian scouts from the glacier. The race for
militarisation of Siachen was started by Pakistan, and India thoughtlessly
occupied the Saltoro Range with an incorrect strategy of ‘holding the passes’.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">India’s non-military approach seems strange for
two other reasons. One, the IA has always given importance to this area by
making military gains in this sector in the 1971 war with Pakistan. India’s
major gains in the Western Sector against Pakistan were about 22km in the
Turtok Sector, which it traded with Pakistan’s gains made in the Chhamb sector.
These two tactical changes resulted in the Cease Fire Line becoming the Line of
Control after the 1971 war. And two, since early Eighties, both sides had been
sending military patrols</span><br />
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;"><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">The Siachen war for India, called Operation Meghdoot, was started by two generals, the Northern Army Commander, Lt General M.L. Chibber and his junior, the 15 crops commander in Srinagar, Lt General P.N. Hoon without any cohesive and comprehensive military planning. Operation Meghdoot was conceptualised as a minor side-show by the Northern Army Command with little involvement of the army headquarters. The COAS, General A.S. Vaidya was sidestepped by Hoon with tacit encouragement from Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. In his book, Hoon has said more than we would have ever known about the beginnings of this self-defeating war. He makes an unabashed assertion of close ties between the Hoon clan and Nehru family, finally taking the credit for briefing Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at his headquarters in Srinagar on why it was necessary to launch Meghdoot. In later years, while Chibber conceded that occupation of Siachen was a mistake, Hoon makes a nonsensical case about the importance of Siachen (see following boxes ‘Meeting Chibber’ and ‘Hoon Talk’).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">Why did a discerning Indira Gandhi accept Hoon’s incredible exposition on the strategic importance of Siachen? Because, the war was politically necessary. Operation Meghdoot was to be the first military operation since Independence when India conveyed a clear political message to Pakistan and China: India retains the right and might to pre-empt rather than react. Pakistan was stopped from having a free-run in Kashmir especially in the NA. It is a geo-political truism that unoccupied territory, however marginal, gets occupied over time by the side which has the military means and muscle to do it. Once India and Pakistan acquired sophisticated weapons and developed expertise in mountain and high altitude warfare in the late Seventies, it was a matter of time who would occupy Siachen first.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">Unfortunately, Chibber and Hoon did not understand the geo-political significance of Siachen and started the war with incorrect military perceptions, resulting in faulty military aims and planning. The Indian political leadership in 1984 understood the need for the Siachen war, but did not give out political objectives of war to the military leadership. It could be argued that it was the military leadership who suggested the Siachen conflict to Indira Gandhi, and not the other way round. The Prime Minister merely went along with the military decision hoping there would be little need to baby-walk the generals. Her only term of reference was that the conflict should not escalate; precisely what happened subsequently.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">This was because the two generals based the military planning on a wrong assumption that there was no requirement for a permanent occupation of the Siachen Glacier, or better still to permanently occupy low areas to the west (Dansum) of the Saltoro Range, the westernmost high ridge boundary, ranging from 12,000 to 22,000 feet, of the Glacier. It was thought enough to deter Pakistani troops from reaching the Saltoro Range. The military leadership failed to appreciate the nature and quantum of Pakistani reaction to an Indian occupation of Saltoro passes. On one hand, the nature and quantum of the protracted conflict was assessed wrongly. On the other, two basic military rules were simply overlooked. That logistics planning is always more important than strategy in war especially in high altitude mountainous terrain; and operations in high altitude areas are different from those in the mountains.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">So what did planners of Operation Meghdoot do? Based on faulty military appreciation, a cardinal principle of war in the mountains was transgressed. A need for secure and organic logistics and administration of troops perched on the passes was given least attention. The Indian Air Force was asked to provide logistics, because Chibber concluded that the best and the most economical way to sustain this operation would be by the use of helicopters. An important medical lesson established by the 1962 war with China was that no acclimatisation for human beings is possible at heights more than 18,000 feet. While it is good tactics to occupy heights in the mountains for observation and operations, doing so is a hazardous proposition in high altitude areas. If only these simple facts had struck Indian commanders, the Saltoro passes would not have been occupied and a national tragedy would have been averted. Indian soldiers have taken more casualties fighting weather than Pakistani troops which occupy much lower heights.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">What should have India done? Instead of occupying the Saltoro passes, Indian troops should have occupied territory west of the Saltoro Range, which then was lightly held by Pakistan. Dansum, which after the launch of Operation Meghdoot became Pakistan’s 323 brigade headquarters, at an average height of 10,000 feet, was an ideal location. This would have helped an Indian occupation in six ways:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.45in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -0.25in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 10pt;">·<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 7pt;"> </span></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">One, Dansum is a relatively flat area at lower heights and is ideal for heliborne operations and troops build-up. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.45in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -0.25in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 10pt;">·<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 7pt;"> </span></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">Two, the three major passes on the Saltoro Range — Sia La, Bilafond </span> to the region. For example, two major expeditions by
the Indian Army in 1982 and 1983, called Polar Bear I and II, were military
reconnaissance efforts and left tell-tale signs on the passes climbed by them.
These patrols brought back information about Pakistani mountaineers, Special
Forces and Northern Light Infantry, closing up from the Khapalu side towards
Siachen.<o:p></o:p></div>
</span><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.45in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -0.25in;">
</div>
</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">India today
takes pride in the fact that the entire 110km long Saltoro Range, called the
Actual Ground Position Line (the western edge of the glacier facing Pakistan)
is held by it, thereby denying the advantage of the Glacier to both Pakistan
and China. For this reason, India will continue to hold the Glacier until
Pakistan accepts a mutual withdrawal of troops on India’s terms, which means
that it should formally agree to authenticate in some form the present Indian
positions on the AGPL. In short, the planning and execution of Operation
Meghdoot (Pakistan calls it Operation Ababeel) has been a complete success.
Even as this perception has become widespread over the years, it is not the
truth. Even today, the main effort on the Glacier is to maintain and preserve
the personnel.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">The
operational logistics wholly supported by the IAF drives the Siachen
war-fighting doctrine conceptualised by the IA, instead of the other way round.
In any case, the IA never dwelt on a Siachen doctrine keeping geo-politics and
military imperatives in mind; it concentrated on a presence on Siachen, a
mind-set borrowed from the Line of Control deployments against Pakistan. The
IA’s abysmally poor ability for war-gaming is all too evident: From a
company-group task force for Siachen on 13 April 1984, the troops’ requirement
has grown to nearly two brigade-groups plus holdings under 102 (Independent)
brigade headquarters at Partapur; at any time three battalions hold the three
passes on the Saltoro Range and another three battalions plus are on the
Glacier itself. This is not all. Equal numbers are being trained for troops’
rotation every six months and same numbers are kept earmarked for induction.
The entire operational logistics is being done by the IAF, with casualty
evacuation responsibility shared by the IAF and IA’s aviation corps. Unlike
Pakistan, where troops have the dual advantage of being at lower height and
easy access to their posts, the India side has a single supply route going
across the length of the Glacier. At the southernmost tip of the Glacier lies
the base camp, the hub of all preparatory activities for living on the Glacier
(see ‘NJ 9842 and broadening of the war’).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">Colluding Allies<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">To go back to
why Siachen could be the next surprise by Pakistan, there is a need to revisit
the geo-politics of the region. Of the six mountain ranges in the region, Kun
Lun, Pamirs, Hindukush, Karakoram, Great Himalayan Range, and the Pir Panjal
range, India has traditionally given importance to the Great Himalayan Range,
which until the 1962 war was considered impregnable. Pakistan and China with a
keener sense of history have understood geo-politics better and hence the
importance of the Karakoram. Pakistan’s understanding was the takeaway from the
British who grasped the geo-politics around the old Silk route which passed
along the base of the Siachen glacier towards the Karakoram pass and onto
China. Determined to dominate Tibet, China first occupied Aksai Chin in 1948 and
secured its land corridor to connect Xinjiang (earlier East Turkestan). Then,
in the 1962 war, it pushed its claims to secure areas east of Karakoram. This
was meant to provide depth of the land route to Xinjiang. In later years until
the Eighties, the Chinese offer to trade off the Eastern Sector (Arunachal
Pradesh) and the Western Sector (Ladakh) with India were attempts to secure its
interests in the Karakoram. Except for Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh did not have
any importance for the then weak China.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">The
Karakoram Range has a geo-political dynamics of its own. More awesome than the
Great Himalayas, the Karakoram can be crossed over through two passes only. The
Karakoram pass in the east is the shortest route from Leh to Xinjiang, and
interestingly the Pakistani version of NJ 9842 running eastward (trigger for
Siachen war) terminates at this Karakoram pass. The other pass on Karakoram is
Khunjareb pass in the north across which the famed Karakoram highway runs. When
Pakistan ceded the Shaksgam valley to China in 1963, it aligned itself closer
to Chinese territory. The southern end of Shaksgam valley is close to the
northern tip of the Karakoram pass. It cannot be a coincidence that all these
years that China has been in border talks with India it has deliberately not
discussed the western portion of the Karakoram towards India. The plea has been
that it is a disputed area between India and Pakistan.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">Now,
with China declaring in 2010 that its border with India is a mere 2,000km dismissing
the earlier accepted disputed status of Ladakh, and with reports of Pakistan
leasing large portions of NA to China, technically the two allies have finally
linked up. What remains is a physical link-up, which requires the PA to capture
NJ 9842 and China to sever land and air links to SSN facing it. In military
terms, the physical link-up by the two adversaries will completely outflank
India’s Siachen defences and render them untenable. Sooner rather than later,
India will be forced to unilaterally pull-back its troops from Siachen, which
would be a national humiliation. With the Karakoram Range firmly with China and
Pakistan, Leh, the capital of Ladakh, would finally be threatened. To recall,
the district magistrate of Leh is on record in 2011 to have said that China is
intruding into its areas, a charge denied by New Delhi worried about souring
relations with China.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">It now becomes
clear that occupation of Siachen in 1984 was a monumental blunder. The need was
for permanent occupation west of the Saltoro Range. This would have facilitated
dominance of ingress routes to the Glacier passes and importantly, provide
access to the Shyok and Nubra river approaches. With the IA having placed
itself in an operationally difficult situation, the burden to prevent a
physical link-up of China and Pakistan falls once again largely on the IAF. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">Thwarting China-Pak Collusion<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">Should Chinese
decide to back Pakistan to push the NJ 9842-Karakoram line, India will need to
be prepared for a limited war in time and space. Combined, the two allies have
the capability to dare and accomplish this. As India will hesitate to broaden
the war to include Kashmir, where a ceasefire holds, let alone allow itself
into an all-out two-front war for which it lacks both political will and
military capabilities, at the forefront will be the IA’s 14 corps. The IAF will
need to play a supportive role to the land forces as otherwise the war would
not remain a limited one.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">The 14
corps which was raised on 1 September 1999 after the Kargil war has limited
assets and awesome responsibilities. Its 8 mountain division is responsible for
the Kargil sector which extends between Zoji la and sub-sector Hanif. Its other
3 infantry division looks after Siachen and the LAC with China. The corps has
two reserve brigades. With a frontage of 1,162km, the corps zone has a 238km LC
against Pakistan, a 110km AGPL on Siachen, and 814km LAC with China. With snow
blocking the Srinagar-Leh road which passes through Zoji la, the corps remains
cut-off from the rest of Jammu and Kashmir for six to seven months in a year. Another
peculiarity of 14 corps is that it is entirely in high altitude areas from
heights between 10,000 ft to 22,000 ft.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">Given
such unique characteristics, 14 corps requires a different command profile. GOC
14 corps should be an operational rather than a tactical level commander
dependent on the Northern Army Commander to help address crisis and war-time situations.
This will be contrary to the IA doctrine where a corps for a conventional war
is a tactical level formation. As an operational level commander, GOC 14 corps
would be able to interact directly with the army headquarters to ensure a balance
between Pakistan and China in threat assessments, procurements, and
infrastructure development. He could directly ask for army headquarters
reserves in a shortened chain of command; and interact with the western air
command especially in peacetime about his corps’ unique requirements without
having to go through the northern army command. All this would help 14 corps
appreciate a situation better and meet the challenge in time with adequate
response. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">Two
other operational gaps staring 14 corps in the face are lack of adequate round-
the-clock surveillance capabilities, and artillery firepower. Unlike China,
which has high resolution radars on satellites capable of surveillance through
bad weather (which is the norm in the region), 14 corps has frugal satellite
capabilities. 14 corps is highly dependent on airborne sensors for surveillance
(which it does not own) with limited capabilities and weather dependent
platforms. Regarding artillery, the situation is pathetic. Considering the need
for high angle firing guns with good ranges and projectile weights for the Siachen
theatre, both Pakistan and China score heavily over India. Thus, in all five
important operational areas of surveillance, firepower, adequate reserves for
tasks at hand, the needed formation level for better command and control and
necessary infrastructure, 14 corps appears grossly inadequate. It is doubtful
if the army headquarters has reckoned a situation where China would back the PA
to enforce NJ 9842-Karakoram line.</span></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiqWmIrO5_EePCLJW-2c-Ben7JpiCPrrG9Bc2t_dVXD2PqrooShdVfacWgbtZk5tt0gij1Zun_Yw21UhoWf04kyyo9eFxEfqDQN5RaqUaqVP1gI1DYoEk69QIGUkKKTSLRJ4myrEJlrqUk/s1600/Living+quarters+for+jawans+at+base+camp.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="177" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiqWmIrO5_EePCLJW-2c-Ben7JpiCPrrG9Bc2t_dVXD2PqrooShdVfacWgbtZk5tt0gij1Zun_Yw21UhoWf04kyyo9eFxEfqDQN5RaqUaqVP1gI1DYoEk69QIGUkKKTSLRJ4myrEJlrqUk/s320/Living+quarters+for+jawans+at+base+camp.JPG" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Living quarters for jawans at base camp</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">The IAF
is better prepared than the IA to face such a challenge. As part of its
peacetime air maintenance challenge which straddles Siachen and SSN against
China, it has garnered expertise to operate in these high altitude areas. The
IAF is also conscious that given the terrain, climatic conditions, defunct
infrastructure, and the importance of this area, its operational role will be
awesome. Moreover, since 2003, the IAF has been working silently to procure
capabilities and build assets in this area to meet the dual challenge. To be
sure, when the IAF speaks about assets for a strategic role, what it has in
mind is not out-of-area operations, but deterrence against China.</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">This
thinking is exemplified by the development of the THOISE (Transit Halt of
Indian Soldiers Enroute) air force station at an altitude of 10,066feet. THOISE
is located south of Shyok river, between the Saltoro Range and the Great Ladakh
Range (Khardung La). The Saltoro Range ends up in the Siachen glacier from
where the Nubra river flows to become a tributary of the Shyok river. As the
major river in the region, Shyok originates near Daulat Beg Oldie (where India
fought China in 1962 war) and joins the Indus in POK. Thus, THOISE is well
placed to supply along the river lines, Shyok and Nubra, both the Indian posts
in SSN against China and in Siachen. In addition, it also supplies to the
southern glacier where NJ 9842 is located. Given such air maintenance
responsibilities on two theatres which the IAF does with credit, it could not
be unaware of the operational importance of THOISE. It is another matter that
given the government sensitivity towards China, the IAF incessantly downplays its
operational role. However, its capability building and training betrays this. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">THOISE
development has happened in three interesting stages. Developed in 1960, THOISE
Advanced Landing Ground (ALG) was used during the 1962 war to drop men and
material by Dakota and Packet aircraft. With Operation Meghdoot, THOISE entered
the second phase when AN-32 aircraft started operations from here in October
1984. A 7,500 feet long black-top (concrete) runway was completed in January
1987; subsequently the runway length was increased to 10,000 feet to facilitate
air maintenance operations by IL-76 and AN-32. In third phase, in 2004, THOISE
was upgraded to an independent air force station with a forward base support
unit under it. It now has centrally heated hangers for Mi-17IV, and Mi-26s are
parked here. Night flying is a major accomplishment of this air base. The
length of the runway is being further increased to facilitate landings by all
fighter aircraft; Su-30MKI aircraft have already landed here. According to the
IAF, in case of hotting up of operations against China, THOISE will be used as
a staging airfield. However, given its altitude, weapons load carrying capacity
of combat aircraft taking off from THOISE will be severely curtailed. This is
where the air-to-air refuellers will come in handy. In short, Leh (10,680 ft)
and THOISE (10,066 ft) located on both sides of Khardung La are two major air
force bases available in this area.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">This is
not all. The IAF has plans to develop Nyoma and Kargil as air force bases with
facilities to operate all types of combat and transport aircraft. While Kargil
needs little explanation about its operational usefulness, Nyoma at 13,500 ft
is a mere 25km from the LAC, and importantly given its location, has the capability
to deny a major air ingress route to the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF).
Moreover, unlike DBO (the other ingress route) and Fukche, Nyoma has living
villages around it which would get a major boost by an air force station there.
Two other airstrips at DBO and Fukche will remain ALGs for use of transport
aircraft. The terrain at DBO precludes combat aircraft operations, and Fukche
at 13,700 ft altitude and just 10km from the LAC is too close to the Chinese
for IAF comfort. Unlike an air force station, ALGs are meant for peacetime
operations. Considering that the IAF has acquired C-130J and will soon have the
C-17 aircraft, the larger operational role for the service becomes clear. The
IAF does not need these aircraft for air maintenance; the C-130J is for Special
Operations and the C-17 will be the alternative to defunct infrastructure in a
war situation.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">The IAF
clearly has the PLAAF in mind, and is gearing up to take on the challenge. But
has the IAF been in talks with the IA’s 14 corps about a surprise at Siachen?<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=2043962667781155759" name="_GoBack"></a><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<br /></div>
</div>FORCEhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17033758774826339971noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2043962667781155759.post-6615279053326602162012-05-05T03:58:00.000-07:002012-05-05T03:58:23.362-07:00‘Siachen does not have any strategic significance’<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjAIfqf76OS0UlphkfQi541I-ZBec9eZtiNf5RvJeoIruoTCkSm4A8sr8KfYrrngeePhvLBxaFE-FvK4k5s5UJXexGqFCV9b9M3mB4115HMmYyF0Tq19or94P78b45xKpCv2psDASp5ve8/s1600/Lt+Gen.+M.L.Chibber.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="213" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjAIfqf76OS0UlphkfQi541I-ZBec9eZtiNf5RvJeoIruoTCkSm4A8sr8KfYrrngeePhvLBxaFE-FvK4k5s5UJXexGqFCV9b9M3mB4115HMmYyF0Tq19or94P78b45xKpCv2psDASp5ve8/s320/Lt+Gen.+M.L.Chibber.JPG" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Lt Gen. M.L.Chibber<br /><div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt; text-align: left;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt; text-align: left;">FORCE
interview with </span><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt; text-align: left;">Lt Gen. M.L. Chibber
(retd) r</span><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt; text-align: left;">eproduced
from December 2004</span></div>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Swiss921BT-RegularA;">“S</span><span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Utopia-Regular;">iachen does not have any strategic
significance. The strategic importance being talked about is all invention,”
says Lt Gen. M.L. Chibber (retd), the officer responsible for planning and
mounting the Siachen operation (called Meghdoot) for India on 13 April 1984. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Utopia-Regular;">Then why did the Indian Army launch
Operation Meghdoot? The former General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Northern
Army Command says that two issues precipitated the need for an occupation of
Siachen. First, Pakistan had, in March 1963, ceded 5,000 sqkm of territory in
Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (claimed by India), north east of the Siachen glacier
to China. These include the Hunza tract, Shaksam and Raksham valley. This
illegal territorial exchange rankled India. And second, Pakistan’s northern
sector commander sent a signal addressed to the Indian northern sector
commander on 21 August 1983, which read: “Request instruct your troops to
withdraw beyond Line of Control south of line joining point NJ 9842, Karakoram
pass NE 7410 immediately. I have instructed my troops to show maximum
restraint. But any delay in vacating our territory will create a serious
situation.” According to Chibber, Army Headquarters approached Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi for permission to deny the glacier (which they were claiming) to
Pakistan. While giving the green signal, Mrs Gandhi made it clear that the army
action should be done in a manner which will not escalate into an all-out war.
With these political instructions, Chibber decided to occupy only three passes
(Sia La, Bilafond La, and Gyong La) on the Saltoro ridge. This was in
consonance with the 1949 Karachi agreement which delimited the Cease Fire Line
till map point NJ 9842, thence north to the glaciers. Chibber and his 15 corps
commander, Lt Gen. P.N. Hoon who took charge on 3 August 1983 started planning
Operation Meghdoot. In December 1983, Hoon was shopping for tents, ski boots
and other glacier-related equipment and clothing in Europe for the impending
operation.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Utopia-Regular;">Chibber says that the plan was to occupy
the three passes with platoon group strength (50 to 60 soldiers) each for
summer months only. During this period, the troops were to be maintained
totally by air. It was appreciated by the Indian military leadership that given
the adverse climatic conditions during winter months neither side would want to
occupy these passes. Asked why Pakistan would not occupy passes vacated by
Indian troops, Chibber said, “In my experience as the deputy director military
operations during the delimitation of the Line of Control (LoC) after the 1971
Indo-Pak war, Pakistanis were prone to transgressing the LoC. But once it was
occupied by Indian troops, they usually went back to the original line. The
basic issue was who reaches the passes first.” <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Utopia-Regular;">Chibber and the Army Headquarters believed
that Pakistan will cower to an Indian military presence and would abide by the
spirit of the Karachi agreement sooner rather than later. Thereafter, there may
be little need to even hold the passes in summer months. The Indian military leadership
was jolted from slumber by an intelligence briefing on Pakistan’s extensive
preparations for Siachen given to Chibber in May 1984, a month after the Indian
troops were perched on the three Saltoro passes. It was at this stage that
Chibber concluded that occupation of passes would need to be permanent.
Reminiscent of the 1962 ‘forward policy’ against China which led to India’s
humiliation in the Sino-India war, the Indian Army leadership had appreciated
that a sporadic military presence would be enough to deter Pakistan from
occupying the glacier. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Utopia-Regular;">Why did the Indian army’s appreciation go
so wrong? Chibber gives two reasons for this: One, as always, intelligence
agencies had failed the nation. “We did not have intelligence about what the
Pakistanis were up to regarding Siachen,” he says. And two, Mrs Gandhi’s
assassination in November 1984 precipitated matters and emboldened Pakistan
President Gen. Zia-ul-Haq to not accept the Indian <i>fait accompli</i>.</span><span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Swiss921BT-RegularA;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>FORCEhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17033758774826339971noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2043962667781155759.post-42657759191528912362012-05-05T03:51:00.000-07:002012-05-05T03:54:17.199-07:00Hoon Talk<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">How the Siachen war
was ill-conceived and ill-planned</span></b><br />
<br />
<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" style="color: #333333; font-family: Verdana; font-size: 11px; line-height: 18px; text-align: justify; width: 800px;"><tbody>
<tr><td align="left" class="Decmbertext" style="color: black; font-family: verdana; font-size: 9pt; line-height: 14pt;" valign="top" width="350"><b><br class="Apple-interchange-newline" />Extracts from Lt. Gen. P.N. Hoon’s Memoirs Unmasking Secrets </b><br />
<b>of Turbulence (Published in 2000)</b></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt; text-align: justify;">I took over as corps commander of 15 Corps on 3
August 1983. In September-October I briefed Prime Minister Indira Gandhi about
the strategic importance of Siachen and about Pakistan’s designs to capture
Kardung La, (</span><i style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt; text-align: justify;">sic</i><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt; text-align: justify;">) the highest
motorable road in the world, and thus dominate Leh by bringing artillery,
rockets etc, into the Nubra Valley — capture Leh and then link up with the
Chinese at Aksai Chin.</span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">The preparation for Operation Meghdoot started
long before the operation was actually launched. In November-December 1983, I
went on a shopping mission to Europe. The shopping did not include arms, but
skis, tents, boots and other equipment for soldiers to survive in high
altitude. The operation was finally launched on 13 April 1984. It was still
winter in Siachen. The plan was a vertical envelopment by surprise during
winter, when the passes were closed and this is what happened. By 18 April, we
had secured control over Siachen, including Indira Col…<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">As commander of the operation, I wish to state
that the operation was launched after a careful logistics planning. The initial
plan of putting 20 to 30 men over Sia La, Bilafond La and Gyong La was only an
interim action. This was to be followed by the raising of a brigade (three
battalions with 1,200 troops each) trained in ‘white shod operations’ ie, who
would be ski-trained and hence would operate throughout the year. The brigade
was raised when I was the corps commander of 15 corps. This was to be further
made into a division (three brigades or nine battalions) and then within one or
two years it was to be organised into a STRIKE FORCE CORPS FOR WHITE SHOD
OPERATIONS (<i>author’s emphasis</i>). This
was never carried out. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">The logistics costs which are being incurred
today would have been avoided, had the plan been fully implemented. The plan
was to station the strike force not at Siachen but between Kargil, Dras,
Sonamarg, Magam and Gandarbal. The advantage of this would be that the
logistics support for this large force would have been minimal, since it was
positioned on a highway and the valley. On the other hand it would have been a
deterrent to Pakistan. It would have the capability to strike at the underbelly
of the Saltoro Range, if Pakistan dared to attack and capture one of the passes
on the glacier. The number of soldiers actually stationed at Siachen was to
have been minimal. If Pakistan did manage to capture any post or pass, then the
Strike Force would react by going right up to Gilgit, Skardu, and threaten the
Karakoram Highway.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: right; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><i><br /></i></span></div>
</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">FORCE’s Comments<o:p></o:p></span></b><br />
<b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;"><br /></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">Hoon’s understanding of Siachen as told to Indira
Gandhi, over-rides common-sense. When Shyok and Indus river approaches are
available to Pakistan, it would have been simply foolish for them to cross the
Saltoro Range at average heights of 20,000 ft to reach Leh, the capital of
Ladakh. Even if the Pakistanis were stupid enough to do so how many of its
mountaineers (not soldiers) would have reached Leh through the treacherous
Siachen Glacier. And would it not have been easy for Indian troops and
firepower to decimate fatigued troops?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">Hoon’s assertion that, if allowed, Pakistan would
have brought artillery to Nubra Valley to dominate Leh is strange. With good
artillery deployment sites at lower altitudes available to Pakistan, why would
it have done what India was forced to do? Indian artillery guns were dropped on
the glacier by Mi-17 helicopters of the Indian Air Force as small loads of
dismantled pieces, where technicians assembled them at surveyed locations. If
ever there is a demilitarisation of the glacier, India would have to abandon
the guns deployed there as they cannot be retrieved.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">Hoon’s detailed operational plan for Siachen is
fictitious and has been written by him (his book came out in 2000) with the
benefit of the 1999 Kargil war. Chibber denied the existence of any such plan
to FORCE, and 15 corps headquarters has no records of Hoon’s strike force corps
plan. Moreover, no brigade — expert in white shod operations — as claimed by
Hoon, was ever raised or exists in 15 corps.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">Assuming that Hoon’s plan did exist, it is
interesting to understand its salient features. Twenty to 30 men were to occupy
the main passes on the Saltoro Range (obviously air maintained) as an interim
measure, while a brigade expert in skiing was to be raised. It is unclear if
these brigade experts were to ski through the innumerable crevices and serve as
porters to ferry logistics from the logistics maintenance areas on the glacier
to the posts on the Saltoro. Or, they were to wait until the Strike Corps
expert in skiing would become a reality.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">Hoon’s stupid plan suggests that if Pakistan
captured any posts on the Saltoro, the Indian Strike Corps would have the capability
to go and threaten the Karakoram Highway. Once India launched Operation Meghdoot,
Pakistan launched its own Operation Ababeel (eagle) for Siachen. In less than a
year, the PA established brigade strength garrisons each at Dansum, Khapalu,
Siari, Skardu, with an ad hoc corps headquarters (Force Command Northern Area)
at Gilgit under the overall command of 10 corps at Rawalpindi. India has indeed
been fortunate to have not raised the ski-trained strike corps.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">Actual
Execution<o:p></o:p></span></b><br />
<b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;"><br /></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">The truth about Operation Meghdoot is a tribute
to Indian troops who despite the stupidity of their generals are willing to
tread the extra mile. The actual Hoon plan had assessed that the overall
commitment of troops-to-task would not exceed a reinforced battalion (about
1,300 soldiers). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.2in;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">This included the task force and soldier-porters
to ferry logistics. The task force under Lt Col Pushkar Chand comprised one
company (about 120 men) of Ladakh scouts for Sia La, one company of 4 Kumaon to
Bilafond La, and one company of 19 Kumaon to Gyong La. Elements of Special
Forces and instructors from the army’s High Altitude Warfare School were also
included in the three parties. As far as logistics were concerned, a platoon
(about 35 soldiers) each for three groups was provided as porters to ferry
logistics on foot from the staging camp on the glacier to the two forward posts
on the Saltoro Range.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">Troops for Sia La and
Bilafond La were to be lifted by helicopters, while troops for Gyong La (adjacent
to NJ 9842) were told to walk on the glacier to their locations. Unfortunately,
an avalanche wiped out the entire walking column of 19 Kumaon to Gyong La, and
extreme bad weather disrupted helicopter lift of troops to the other two passes.
Meanwhile, radio communications were disrupted as no one had thought of present
radio sets working in the extreme climate. Only on the fourth day (April 18),
half of troops (about 60 soldiers) were managed to be dropped at Sia La and
Bilafond La. In less than two weeks, 26 out of the 52 troops at Bilafond La
were evacuated on medical grounds. The foot columns carrying logistics took
enormous casualties mainly because of the unpredictable crevices. And with the
death of the entire 19 Kumaon column in an avalanche, Pakistani troops (Burzil
force) managed to occupy Gyong La, which subsequently led to the broadening of
the war. Such was the beginning of Operation Meghdoot, which would eventually
have a division (six battalions) worth of troops on the glacier and the Saltoro
Ridge, and two times more numbers for troops’ rotation.</span></div>
</div>FORCEhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17033758774826339971noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2043962667781155759.post-58749527082405878632012-04-16T03:12:00.000-07:002012-04-16T03:12:44.995-07:00DefExpo 2012<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div style="text-align: left;"></div><div style="text-align: right;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjIKna6BJBxPycCY2tljNcI55y97wcChtOlqtjuXl5JtfZpV84ZfbeY4qbEL8iUAvoravW0sLLF8trm5M5gGCETLUfrLu1QZEWDo8VK4WuNBPghHEHG9r3xfKjFJB-h2fQnL1AGrOhFOa4/s1600/Lamp+lighting+Inaugural+Ceremony+of+DefExpo+2012+by+Defence+Minister+A.K.Antony+%2528from+R-L%2529+Shri+Shekhar+Agarwal%252C+Dr.+MM+Pallam+Raju%252C+Dr.+Vijay+Kumar+Saraswat%252C+Shri+RV+Kanoria%252C+President%252C+FICCI.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjIKna6BJBxPycCY2tljNcI55y97wcChtOlqtjuXl5JtfZpV84ZfbeY4qbEL8iUAvoravW0sLLF8trm5M5gGCETLUfrLu1QZEWDo8VK4WuNBPghHEHG9r3xfKjFJB-h2fQnL1AGrOhFOa4/s320/Lamp+lighting+Inaugural+Ceremony+of+DefExpo+2012+by+Defence+Minister+A.K.Antony+%2528from+R-L%2529+Shri+Shekhar+Agarwal%252C+Dr.+MM+Pallam+Raju%252C+Dr.+Vijay+Kumar+Saraswat%252C+Shri+RV+Kanoria%252C+President%252C+FICCI.JPG" width="212" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Lamp lighting Inaugural Ceremony of DefExpo 2012 by Defence Minister A.K.Antony (from R-L) Shri Shekhar Agarwal, Dr. MM Pallam Raju, Dr. Vijay Kumar Saraswat, Shri RV Kanoria.</td></tr>
</tbody></table><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi2PUhR9PKFQZx0yzvnj9MaWWCMmXIkj5l0of7mRuiWUeGAlD3sJl66i8l95c92HZDfpPZrCdPrYQZXVSjVpFJk9yx7zK77srZ2HwNPbNXtQfsnMy7Xsxb8W9zBs4xA9eNXSeCBiJ930Z0/s1600/Day+2+of+DefExpo+was+literally+a+walk+in+the+park.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="213" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi2PUhR9PKFQZx0yzvnj9MaWWCMmXIkj5l0of7mRuiWUeGAlD3sJl66i8l95c92HZDfpPZrCdPrYQZXVSjVpFJk9yx7zK77srZ2HwNPbNXtQfsnMy7Xsxb8W9zBs4xA9eNXSeCBiJ930Z0/s320/Day+2+of+DefExpo+was+literally+a+walk+in+the+park.JPG" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Day 2 of DefExpo was literally a walk in the park.</td></tr>
</tbody></table><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh223SWCk1T3EuECrYP_MUssDfCkaAe9FrZ-vRJSXK5ZbFQdYfVE28gr5y4RbCIwyvsN9tM98bem2AVo8dan-Cf0pas37ikBmFjUD7-8y4eHdlggh1fNYr_64ePQvAaEon5p2y6F7b1N2M/s1600/Peoples+enjoying+a+ride+on+T-90+ar+DefExpo+2012.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="212" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh223SWCk1T3EuECrYP_MUssDfCkaAe9FrZ-vRJSXK5ZbFQdYfVE28gr5y4RbCIwyvsN9tM98bem2AVo8dan-Cf0pas37ikBmFjUD7-8y4eHdlggh1fNYr_64ePQvAaEon5p2y6F7b1N2M/s320/Peoples+enjoying+a+ride+on+T-90+ar+DefExpo+2012.JPG" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Peoples enjoying a ride on T-90 at DefExpo 2012.</td></tr>
</tbody></table><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgVICu_-aa1STAKbXnngGwFQZ4UL9dWBqQyRRM8RyqCZSxy8_Y3M5L5P59Q06lWX0Z7Yl4S5TcYRIp2UoC_8kt8FTcu93cSAbh_NRgL2eRfuTsCgmd2jabnevsnHUt90-tzC-c3MuCPF98/s1600/Plenty+of+youngsters+were+present+during+the+business+days.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="213" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgVICu_-aa1STAKbXnngGwFQZ4UL9dWBqQyRRM8RyqCZSxy8_Y3M5L5P59Q06lWX0Z7Yl4S5TcYRIp2UoC_8kt8FTcu93cSAbh_NRgL2eRfuTsCgmd2jabnevsnHUt90-tzC-c3MuCPF98/s320/Plenty+of+youngsters+were+present+during+the+business+days.JPG" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Plenty of youngsters were present during the business days.</td></tr>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhitxKvLs0cXZmfcyAxiiL2hQkNx7KcPd-3ROz8enabg2tGm_abt6BvIf_6FHp0XCx1mtgLMSii2bTQ2efHLdqF_SimjrcaArdK9QGOlReH6eXuTyInaEUoVvK2BgHPwBcP1A248kZwaJ0/s1600/Black+Shark+%2526+Flash+Black+torpedoes+at+display+on+FINMECCANICA+stall+during+DefExpo+2012.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="212" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhitxKvLs0cXZmfcyAxiiL2hQkNx7KcPd-3ROz8enabg2tGm_abt6BvIf_6FHp0XCx1mtgLMSii2bTQ2efHLdqF_SimjrcaArdK9QGOlReH6eXuTyInaEUoVvK2BgHPwBcP1A248kZwaJ0/s320/Black+Shark+%2526+Flash+Black+torpedoes+at+display+on+FINMECCANICA+stall+during+DefExpo+2012.JPG" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Black Shark & Flash Black torpedoes at display on FINMECCANICA stall during DefExpo 2012.</td></tr>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjasMpM_wU5TE2_uou1Qu2oTnCDa1BB9xo-4ojNoUvAQlILeffQk0j_R8rlDpQ8FMDnpJ1Ocl9NelKNt8auCCQ8d2jTQf7EgBv9RteihK6YnTrU3aesniKkbfWMOU5ASi0txKTrdxjm1zE/s1600/BrahMos+is+an+exceptional+cruise+missile+and+demonstrate+the+best+in+partnership+between+India+%2526+Russia.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="212" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjasMpM_wU5TE2_uou1Qu2oTnCDa1BB9xo-4ojNoUvAQlILeffQk0j_R8rlDpQ8FMDnpJ1Ocl9NelKNt8auCCQ8d2jTQf7EgBv9RteihK6YnTrU3aesniKkbfWMOU5ASi0txKTrdxjm1zE/s320/BrahMos+is+an+exceptional+cruise+missile+and+demonstrate+the+best+in+partnership+between+India+%2526+Russia.JPG" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">BrahMos is an exceptional cruise missile and demonstrate the best in partnership between India & Russia.</td></tr>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEji0W1ir3bN8rgNMM4E1w4To3WC4Iemlm7TdeblzTlNpKoeYdBaoMHohk1QTUPHPSqzDBOLePIZlY_M7RdtRSSyTuMlccmgi-fgpHoCDM5tZUQnT22-Sg7cTG844wQ996AZEg6jMboD3_o/s1600/NEXTER+system+CAESAR+highly+mobile+155mm+self+propelled+gun.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="213" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEji0W1ir3bN8rgNMM4E1w4To3WC4Iemlm7TdeblzTlNpKoeYdBaoMHohk1QTUPHPSqzDBOLePIZlY_M7RdtRSSyTuMlccmgi-fgpHoCDM5tZUQnT22-Sg7cTG844wQ996AZEg6jMboD3_o/s320/NEXTER+system+CAESAR+highly+mobile+155mm+self+propelled+gun.JPG" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">NEXTER system CAESAR highly mobile 155mm self propelled gun.</td></tr>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgLEm5R8oo6gbvcr_3yCOXBVhyC0o_jNiunmTypzeKM6OGWPd0davZ0pP9tyoxvwKy5NAdRElW9ogDPXkTFcy7sxtnlIsmAPmziUP-L0EQaWTyW79oe3NH5486H8yqWtF4GODc5a567-5Y/s1600/T-90+Tank+on+display+during+DefExpo+2012.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="212" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgLEm5R8oo6gbvcr_3yCOXBVhyC0o_jNiunmTypzeKM6OGWPd0davZ0pP9tyoxvwKy5NAdRElW9ogDPXkTFcy7sxtnlIsmAPmziUP-L0EQaWTyW79oe3NH5486H8yqWtF4GODc5a567-5Y/s320/T-90+Tank+on+display+during+DefExpo+2012.JPG" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">T-90 Tank on display during DefExpo 2012.</td></tr>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhzOWTyOdRNRmdMWhxhkfiouGjXPyuLQfL944vX38uCaPjTq0m2vdAwOc1blGkuYWQyO8q04wwoqwJAr1w69yqNTLn-rcS1x5BPFz6d8ku0ifAByn9SXphcxDMKtXxjk3DxxlDNQ5jsLFc/s1600/Arjun+was+planned+to+be+the+MBT.+It+lost+it+to+the+Russian+T-90S+tank.+Arjun+is+still+around+hoping+to+get+more+regiments+in+the+Indian+army.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="212" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhzOWTyOdRNRmdMWhxhkfiouGjXPyuLQfL944vX38uCaPjTq0m2vdAwOc1blGkuYWQyO8q04wwoqwJAr1w69yqNTLn-rcS1x5BPFz6d8ku0ifAByn9SXphcxDMKtXxjk3DxxlDNQ5jsLFc/s320/Arjun+was+planned+to+be+the+MBT.+It+lost+it+to+the+Russian+T-90S+tank.+Arjun+is+still+around+hoping+to+get+more+regiments+in+the+Indian+army.JPG" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Arjun was planned to be the MBT. It lost it to the Russian T-90S tank. Arjun is still around hoping to get more regiments in the Indian army.</td></tr>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhZ6WECGPM36Tw3RUe-fBsV48H9Nu9ZgN0PfOk0pGl0o0CNZmGSeaOUitOyuBWofUN5iv9Oa5daqUcnkY8ekshbr_UTXgTCynudqiIRRH2QM_2n7IcZIF7g1YCkVIJUg33n6h0Y8_PxypA/s1600/Upgraded+Multi+Barrel+Rocket+Launcher+for+PINAKA+Rockets++.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="213" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhZ6WECGPM36Tw3RUe-fBsV48H9Nu9ZgN0PfOk0pGl0o0CNZmGSeaOUitOyuBWofUN5iv9Oa5daqUcnkY8ekshbr_UTXgTCynudqiIRRH2QM_2n7IcZIF7g1YCkVIJUg33n6h0Y8_PxypA/s320/Upgraded+Multi+Barrel+Rocket+Launcher+for+PINAKA+Rockets++.JPG" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Upgraded Multi Barrel Rocket Launcher for PINAKA Rockets .</td></tr>
</tbody></table><br />
</div>FORCEhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17033758774826339971noreply@blogger.com0