By Pravin Sawhney
While confirming that the recent mutilation
of two Indian soldiers on the Line of Control was the handiwork of Pakistani
regulars, defence minister A.K. Antony said that India was watching the
situation, a euphemism for military inaction. Taking cue, the army, has
confirmed its resolve to continue with counter-terrorism operations adding that
2,500 infiltrators are waiting to cross the LC. Pakistan, on the other hand,
slipped into denial mode, with its foreign minister, Hina Rabbani offering
cooperation for a UN probe into the matter, which India rejected. This was
clear evidence, if one was needed, that the raid had sanction from the highest
level at General Headquarters, and the latter controls India policy. Meanwhile,
having got a good sensational story, the Indian media went into an overdrive
speculating motives behind the dastardly act and what India should do to teach
the Pakistan Army a lesson.
Writing in the Hindustan Times newspaper,
one defence analyst with army background has suggested that the Pakistani post
from where the raiders came should be decimated by massive artillery firepower.
This is what should not be done. The Pakistan Army will seize the opportunity
with ferocious firepower retaliation leading to the end of ceasefire on the LC.
The latter will both then facilitate infiltration under cover fire and India
will be seen as aggressors in Kashmiri perception. The Indian response should also
not be more CI ops, something that works to Pakistan Army’s satisfaction; the
India Army continues to bleed itself in an unending war with little threat to
Pakistan. The answer lies in giving the Pakistan Army a taste of its own
medicine. This should be done by regular raids by Indian Army Special Forces
across the LC at a time of its own choosing, while keeping a firm grip over the
war escalatory ladder. How?
Three simultaneous actions by Indian
defence ministry will get Pakistan army chief, General Ashfaq Kayani to the edge
of his chair wondering what to do next? In the next three months, the Indian
Army should move 40 to 50 per cent of its Rashtriya Rifles (RR) troops from its
CI role in the hinterland to the LC. Of the present five divisions (called RR
Force Headquarters), two divisions or about 25,000 troops can be pulled to the
LC for the conventional war role. This should not be difficult as forward
elements of these forces (reconnaissance and order groups) have been
familiarising themselves for the war contingency. In addition, two Special
Forces units doing CI ops in Kashmir should also be moved to the LC.
Meanwhile, the fence on the LC which
gets damaged by snow, especially in the higher reaches, each year, should not
be re-built this season. This will both facilitate Indian raids when they
happen, and will leave the Pakistan Army perplexed about Indian motives. And
lastly, in a war-like mode, defence ministry officials should procure
ammunition and missiles from abroad to make up war wastage rate deficiencies of
the Indian Army, something that was done during the 1999 Kargil conflict. Even
if India does not want war, the army should have adequate ammunition for a
credible holding (and probing, if needed) action on the
border.
Once these preparations are afoot,
the Pakistan Army, in all possibility, will get the message and be compelled to
even scale down infiltration across the LC, something that usually goes up each
year with the melting of snow. The Indian Army offensive strategy will become
clear to GHQ, Rawalpindi. It will be raids across the LC, and should Pakistan
escalate operations, there will be credible Indian forces (pivot corps) on the
border to checkmate the machinations without venturing into Pakistan territory.
The Pakistan Army leadership, committed on its western front against
Afghanistan, will find it difficult to keep supporting the Jehadis (Laskhar terrorists) across the LC. The Pakistan Army for
once in 22 years, when insurgency started in Kashmir in 1990, will be on the
back-foot.
(For more on the subject visit www.forceindia.net)
