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Pakistan Army Chief Gen. Kayani during a Pak-China military exercise
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As Siachen war
enters its 29th year, FORCE looks at what it means today
By Pravin
Sawhney and Ghazala Wahab
After the 1999
Kargil war and the 26/11 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, can Siachen spring the
next surprise for India? Sounds impossible, all regular analysts would say. The
arguments to back this assertion would be that the 28-year-old conflict has
stabilised operationally, with little hope of either side making tactical gains.
Both sides are keen on demilitarisation, which would be a powerful confidence
building measure towards the Kashmir resolution. Both sides continue to lose
troops to weather than combat which has ceased since 26 November 2003. The only
thing that is preventing the pullback of mutual troops is the trust deficit
between India and Pakistan. A move-back from this futile battlefield would
provide a gigantic fillip to the lack of mutual trust.
While
all these assertions are sensible, what if a new factor with power to change
the existing geo-political and military dynamics gets introduced into this
stabilised scenario? It is well known that the Pakistan Army (PA) is not
reconciled to having lost the Siachen race to the Indian Army (IA). General
Pervez Musharraf has confirmed that the 1999 Kargil war was a response to
India’s Siachen occupation. More recently, on April 7, Pakistan’s 124 soldiers
and 14 civilians were buried alive under an avalanche while sleeping in their
bunkers at Gayari, the battalion headquarters of 6 Northern Light Infantry.
Pakistani leaders of all hue were quick to say that Siachen be dimilitarised
and the conflict end. Former Premier Nawaz Sharif went furthest saying that
Pakistan should withdraw its troops even if India was not agreeable to a mutual
pullback. Sensing the sombre moment, Pakistan chief of army staff (COAS),
General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani muttered homilies, which Pakistan foreign office
was quick to say should not be taken seriously.
The
powerful factor to change the existing realities could be China. Numerous media
reports in 2011 have written about 10,000 Chinese in Northern Areas (NA), purportedly
for building of infrastructure there. It has also been reported that the 1978-built
Karakoram Highway which connects Chinese Xinjiang with NA over the 19,000 feet
Khunjerab pass well north of the Siachen glacier is to be developed into an
all-weather road with Chinese help. What should alarm India, however, is
something else. The Indian COAS, General V.K. Singh in 2011 spoke about the
presence of nearly 3,500 Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) personnel in
Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). As an aside, when FORCE recently asked a
senior general responsible for Kashmir theatre what could be the implication of
this development, he said that his dual responsibility was counter-insurgency
and anti-infiltration across the Line of Control. People in Delhi should worry
about Chinese troops in POK, he added. If anything, his remarks betrayed a lack
of understanding of the influence of geo-politics (geography’s influence on
relations between nations) on military dynamics, which has propelled power-play
in this region since centuries.
Now juxtapose
the presence of PLA in POK with two related issues. On the eve of Chinese Prime
Minister Wen Jiabao’s visit to India in December 2010, Chinese foreign office threw
a bombshell by referring to the disputed border (Line of Actual Control)
between the two countries as mere 2,000km long from the known 4,056km. The
Chinese new border with India includes 554km of the Middle Sector, 160km of
Sikkim (this is being dealt outside the preview of border talks), and 1,226km
(with 90,000sq km area) of Eastern Sector (Arunachal Pradesh). China no longer recognises
a border with India in Kashmir (called the Western Sector). The astonishing bit
is that India, given the history of the region, has not raised questions on how
China unilaterally slashed the disputed border by half. By implication, China
has become a stake-holder in Kashmir, and given its relations with Pakistan,
may have no hesitation in supporting it openly on its Kashmir policy.
The
other news is about Pakistan having leased portions of Northern Areas (NA) to
China. This was reported in the Pakistani media without official confirmation
or denial. As there is no smoke without fire, this could well be true. In March
1963, when Pakistan illegally ceded 5,100km of Shaksgam valley (abutting
Siachen in Ladakh) to China, it quickly became public knowledge as both
countries were still building mutual relations against a perceived common
adversary. Today, given the cemented partnership between the two, what is the
need for either to talk about NA’s status?
Given
these realities, what stops China from throwing its weight behind the Pakistan
Army (PA) to enforce the NJ9842-Karakoram line with national security
implications for India? In a military pincer, Indian positions on the Saltoro
Ridge and the Glacier could be outflanked. The PA could attempt to recapture
NJ9842 (surrounded by three distinct glaciers, Gyong, Urdelop and Korissa) in
sub-sector west (renamed Hanif sector in memory of Captain Hanifuddin who died
here during the 1999 Kargil war) presently held by India, and the PLA could
sever India’s operational logistics by land and air maintenance to Sub-Sector
North (SSN) facing the Chinese in Ladakh. In an area of little collateral
damage, and removed from the Kashmir Valley where a ceasefire since 26 November
2003 could continue to hold, the two allies have capability and reasons (both
are non-status quo and pro-active powers) to send a powerful message to India.
To be
sure, few nations would diplomatically come to India’s rescue. The Siachen
glacier will be interpreted to be on disputed land, and China with its
unchallenged (by India) policy shift towards Pakistan would say that India is
in illegal possession of both Siachen and Kashmir both of which belong to
Pakistan. Such a scenario is plausible. To put this into perspective, two
questions would need to be addressed. Why would Pakistan and China collude against
India over Siachen? And does India have the capability to prevent this? To
appreciate this, there is the need to step-back to 13 April 1984 when India
started the Siachen war with complete disregard to history, the powerful
geo-politics of the region, and military acumen.
Two Generals
The Siachen
war for India, called Operation Meghdoot, was started by two generals, the
Northern Army Commander, Lt General M.L. Chibber and his junior, the 15 crops
commander in Srinagar, Lt General P.N. Hoon without any cohesive and
comprehensive military planning. Operation Meghdoot was conceptualised as a minor
side-show by the Northern Army Command with little involvement of the army
headquarters. The COAS, General A.S. Vaidya was sidestepped by Hoon with tacit encouragement
from Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. In his book, Hoon has said more than we
would have ever known about the beginnings of this self-defeating war. He makes
an unabashed assertion of close ties between the Hoon clan and Nehru family,
finally taking the credit for briefing Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at his
headquarters in Srinagar on why it was necessary to launch Meghdoot. In later
years, while Chibber conceded that occupation of Siachen was a mistake, Hoon
makes a nonsensical case about the importance of Siachen (see following boxes ‘Meeting
Chibber’ and ‘Hoon Talk’).
Why did a discerning Indira Gandhi accept Hoon’s incredible
exposition on the strategic importance of Siachen? Because, the war was
politically necessary. Operation Meghdoot
was to be the first military operation since Independence when India conveyed a
clear political message to Pakistan and China: India retains the right and
might to pre-empt rather than react. Pakistan was stopped from having a
free-run in Kashmir especially in the NA. It is a geo-political truism that
unoccupied territory, however marginal, gets occupied over time by the side
which has the military means and muscle to do it. Once India and Pakistan
acquired sophisticated weapons and developed expertise in mountain and high
altitude warfare in the late Seventies, it was a matter of time who would
occupy Siachen first.
Unfortunately, Chibber and Hoon did not
understand the geo-political significance of Siachen and started the war with
incorrect military perceptions, resulting in faulty military aims and planning.
The Indian political leadership in 1984 understood the need for the Siachen
war, but did not give out political objectives of war to the military
leadership. It could be argued that it was the military leadership who
suggested the Siachen conflict to Indira Gandhi, and not the other way round.
The Prime Minister merely went along with the military decision hoping there
would be little need to baby-walk the generals. Her only term of reference was
that the conflict should not escalate; precisely what happened subsequently.
This was because the two generals based the
military planning on a wrong assumption that there was no requirement for a
permanent occupation of the Siachen Glacier, or better still to permanently occupy
low areas to the west (Dansum) of the Saltoro Range, the westernmost high ridge
boundary, ranging from 12,000 to 22,000 feet, of the Glacier. It was thought
enough to deter Pakistani troops from reaching the Saltoro Range. The military
leadership failed to appreciate the nature and quantum of Pakistani reaction to
an Indian occupation of Saltoro passes. On one hand, the nature and quantum of
the protracted conflict was assessed wrongly. On the other, two basic military
rules were simply overlooked. That logistics planning is always more important
than strategy in war especially in high altitude mountainous terrain; and
operations in high altitude areas are different from those in the mountains.
So what did planners of Operation Meghdoot do?
Based on faulty military appreciation, a cardinal principle of war in the
mountains was transgressed. A need for secure and organic logistics and
administration of troops perched on the passes was given least attention. The
Indian Air Force was asked to provide logistics, because Chibber concluded that
the best and the most economical way to sustain this operation would be by the
use of helicopters. An important medical lesson established by the 1962 war
with China was that no acclimatisation for human beings is possible at heights
more than 18,000 feet. While it is good tactics to occupy heights in the
mountains for observation and operations, doing so is a hazardous proposition
in high altitude areas. If only these simple facts had struck Indian
commanders, the Saltoro passes would not have been occupied and a national
tragedy would have been averted. Indian soldiers have taken more casualties
fighting weather than Pakistani troops which occupy much lower heights.
What should have India done? Instead of occupying
the Saltoro passes, Indian troops should have occupied territory west of the
Saltoro Range, which then was lightly held by Pakistan. Dansum, which after the
launch of Operation Meghdoot became Pakistan’s 323 brigade headquarters, at an
average height of 10,000 feet, was an ideal location. This would have helped an
Indian occupation in six ways:
·
One, Dansum is
a relatively flat area at lower heights and is ideal for heliborne operations
and troops build-up.
·
Two, the three
major passes on the Saltoro Range — Sia La, Bilafond La and Gyong La — meet at
Dansum. This makes Dansum an excellent base to defend the Saltoro ridge and the
glacier itself.
·
Three, an
Indian occupation of Dansum would have threatened Khapalu, which is Pakistan’s
heavy brigade size garrison.
·
Four, Indian
casualties due to weather on the Saltoro ridge and the glacier would have been
minimal.
·
Five, the
benefit of occupying Dansum was to be in negotiations with Pakistan as India
would have been in a strong bargaining position to trade ‘land for peace’.
·
And six,
Dansum provides an easy link-up with Sub-Sector West, area west of map point NJ
9842 which is the most sensitive and fighting prone area in Siachen.
Both Chibber and Hoon do not agree. According to
them, occupation of Dansum ‘would have violated the Shimla agreement as Dansum
is north-west and not north of NJ 9842. Secondly, Dansum is situated in a
valley and we would have been dominated by Pakistan unless we captured the
heights west of Dansum. Occupation of Dansum would have meant territorial
aggression by India’. This argument is flawed. If a straight line due north is
drawn from NJ 9842, it joins Terram Shehr II glacier, implying that in its
present occupation of Sia La, Indian troops are already eight degrees west of
where they should be; and hence aggressors.
Moreover, as point NJ 9842 was not identified on
the ground in 1984 when Operation Meghdoot started, how was it known that ‘due
north’ was along the Saltoro ridge? It was only in 1985 that an Indian survey
team identified map point NJ 9842 with an approach from Urdolep glacier. NJ
9842 is surrounded by three distinct glaciers, Gyong, Urdelop and Korisa. Even
if an occupation of Dansum meant a localised war with Pakistan, how would it be
more than what it is now when artillery has been used freely, fiercely and
regularly?
The simple truth remains that Meghdoot was not a
well thought out military plan, but was a panic reaction, reminiscent of the
pre-1962 ‘forward policy’ against China, when posts were occupied without
ensuring their logistics lifeline. Panic was created by Pakistan’s action, as
its former COAS, General Mirza Aslam Beg later conceded: In 1983 Pakistani
Special Service Group chased Indian scouts from the glacier. The race for
militarisation of Siachen was started by Pakistan, and India thoughtlessly
occupied the Saltoro Range with an incorrect strategy of ‘holding the passes’.
India’s non-military approach seems strange for
two other reasons. One, the IA has always given importance to this area by
making military gains in this sector in the 1971 war with Pakistan. India’s
major gains in the Western Sector against Pakistan were about 22km in the
Turtok Sector, which it traded with Pakistan’s gains made in the Chhamb sector.
These two tactical changes resulted in the Cease Fire Line becoming the Line of
Control after the 1971 war. And two, since early Eighties, both sides had been
sending military patrols
The Siachen war for India, called Operation Meghdoot, was started by two generals, the Northern Army Commander, Lt General M.L. Chibber and his junior, the 15 crops commander in Srinagar, Lt General P.N. Hoon without any cohesive and comprehensive military planning. Operation Meghdoot was conceptualised as a minor side-show by the Northern Army Command with little involvement of the army headquarters. The COAS, General A.S. Vaidya was sidestepped by Hoon with tacit encouragement from Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. In his book, Hoon has said more than we would have ever known about the beginnings of this self-defeating war. He makes an unabashed assertion of close ties between the Hoon clan and Nehru family, finally taking the credit for briefing Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at his headquarters in Srinagar on why it was necessary to launch Meghdoot. In later years, while Chibber conceded that occupation of Siachen was a mistake, Hoon makes a nonsensical case about the importance of Siachen (see following boxes ‘Meeting Chibber’ and ‘Hoon Talk’).
Why did a discerning Indira Gandhi accept Hoon’s incredible exposition on the strategic importance of Siachen? Because, the war was politically necessary. Operation Meghdoot was to be the first military operation since Independence when India conveyed a clear political message to Pakistan and China: India retains the right and might to pre-empt rather than react. Pakistan was stopped from having a free-run in Kashmir especially in the NA. It is a geo-political truism that unoccupied territory, however marginal, gets occupied over time by the side which has the military means and muscle to do it. Once India and Pakistan acquired sophisticated weapons and developed expertise in mountain and high altitude warfare in the late Seventies, it was a matter of time who would occupy Siachen first.
Unfortunately, Chibber and Hoon did not understand the geo-political significance of Siachen and started the war with incorrect military perceptions, resulting in faulty military aims and planning. The Indian political leadership in 1984 understood the need for the Siachen war, but did not give out political objectives of war to the military leadership. It could be argued that it was the military leadership who suggested the Siachen conflict to Indira Gandhi, and not the other way round. The Prime Minister merely went along with the military decision hoping there would be little need to baby-walk the generals. Her only term of reference was that the conflict should not escalate; precisely what happened subsequently.
This was because the two generals based the military planning on a wrong assumption that there was no requirement for a permanent occupation of the Siachen Glacier, or better still to permanently occupy low areas to the west (Dansum) of the Saltoro Range, the westernmost high ridge boundary, ranging from 12,000 to 22,000 feet, of the Glacier. It was thought enough to deter Pakistani troops from reaching the Saltoro Range. The military leadership failed to appreciate the nature and quantum of Pakistani reaction to an Indian occupation of Saltoro passes. On one hand, the nature and quantum of the protracted conflict was assessed wrongly. On the other, two basic military rules were simply overlooked. That logistics planning is always more important than strategy in war especially in high altitude mountainous terrain; and operations in high altitude areas are different from those in the mountains.
So what did planners of Operation Meghdoot do? Based on faulty military appreciation, a cardinal principle of war in the mountains was transgressed. A need for secure and organic logistics and administration of troops perched on the passes was given least attention. The Indian Air Force was asked to provide logistics, because Chibber concluded that the best and the most economical way to sustain this operation would be by the use of helicopters. An important medical lesson established by the 1962 war with China was that no acclimatisation for human beings is possible at heights more than 18,000 feet. While it is good tactics to occupy heights in the mountains for observation and operations, doing so is a hazardous proposition in high altitude areas. If only these simple facts had struck Indian commanders, the Saltoro passes would not have been occupied and a national tragedy would have been averted. Indian soldiers have taken more casualties fighting weather than Pakistani troops which occupy much lower heights.
What should have India done? Instead of occupying the Saltoro passes, Indian troops should have occupied territory west of the Saltoro Range, which then was lightly held by Pakistan. Dansum, which after the launch of Operation Meghdoot became Pakistan’s 323 brigade headquarters, at an average height of 10,000 feet, was an ideal location. This would have helped an Indian occupation in six ways:
· One, Dansum is a relatively flat area at lower heights and is ideal for heliborne operations and troops build-up.
· Two, the three major passes on the Saltoro Range — Sia La, Bilafond to the region. For example, two major expeditions by
the Indian Army in 1982 and 1983, called Polar Bear I and II, were military
reconnaissance efforts and left tell-tale signs on the passes climbed by them.
These patrols brought back information about Pakistani mountaineers, Special
Forces and Northern Light Infantry, closing up from the Khapalu side towards
Siachen.
India today
takes pride in the fact that the entire 110km long Saltoro Range, called the
Actual Ground Position Line (the western edge of the glacier facing Pakistan)
is held by it, thereby denying the advantage of the Glacier to both Pakistan
and China. For this reason, India will continue to hold the Glacier until
Pakistan accepts a mutual withdrawal of troops on India’s terms, which means
that it should formally agree to authenticate in some form the present Indian
positions on the AGPL. In short, the planning and execution of Operation
Meghdoot (Pakistan calls it Operation Ababeel) has been a complete success.
Even as this perception has become widespread over the years, it is not the
truth. Even today, the main effort on the Glacier is to maintain and preserve
the personnel.
The
operational logistics wholly supported by the IAF drives the Siachen
war-fighting doctrine conceptualised by the IA, instead of the other way round.
In any case, the IA never dwelt on a Siachen doctrine keeping geo-politics and
military imperatives in mind; it concentrated on a presence on Siachen, a
mind-set borrowed from the Line of Control deployments against Pakistan. The
IA’s abysmally poor ability for war-gaming is all too evident: From a
company-group task force for Siachen on 13 April 1984, the troops’ requirement
has grown to nearly two brigade-groups plus holdings under 102 (Independent)
brigade headquarters at Partapur; at any time three battalions hold the three
passes on the Saltoro Range and another three battalions plus are on the
Glacier itself. This is not all. Equal numbers are being trained for troops’
rotation every six months and same numbers are kept earmarked for induction.
The entire operational logistics is being done by the IAF, with casualty
evacuation responsibility shared by the IAF and IA’s aviation corps. Unlike
Pakistan, where troops have the dual advantage of being at lower height and
easy access to their posts, the India side has a single supply route going
across the length of the Glacier. At the southernmost tip of the Glacier lies
the base camp, the hub of all preparatory activities for living on the Glacier
(see ‘NJ 9842 and broadening of the war’).
Colluding Allies
To go back to
why Siachen could be the next surprise by Pakistan, there is a need to revisit
the geo-politics of the region. Of the six mountain ranges in the region, Kun
Lun, Pamirs, Hindukush, Karakoram, Great Himalayan Range, and the Pir Panjal
range, India has traditionally given importance to the Great Himalayan Range,
which until the 1962 war was considered impregnable. Pakistan and China with a
keener sense of history have understood geo-politics better and hence the
importance of the Karakoram. Pakistan’s understanding was the takeaway from the
British who grasped the geo-politics around the old Silk route which passed
along the base of the Siachen glacier towards the Karakoram pass and onto
China. Determined to dominate Tibet, China first occupied Aksai Chin in 1948 and
secured its land corridor to connect Xinjiang (earlier East Turkestan). Then,
in the 1962 war, it pushed its claims to secure areas east of Karakoram. This
was meant to provide depth of the land route to Xinjiang. In later years until
the Eighties, the Chinese offer to trade off the Eastern Sector (Arunachal
Pradesh) and the Western Sector (Ladakh) with India were attempts to secure its
interests in the Karakoram. Except for Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh did not have
any importance for the then weak China.
The
Karakoram Range has a geo-political dynamics of its own. More awesome than the
Great Himalayas, the Karakoram can be crossed over through two passes only. The
Karakoram pass in the east is the shortest route from Leh to Xinjiang, and
interestingly the Pakistani version of NJ 9842 running eastward (trigger for
Siachen war) terminates at this Karakoram pass. The other pass on Karakoram is
Khunjareb pass in the north across which the famed Karakoram highway runs. When
Pakistan ceded the Shaksgam valley to China in 1963, it aligned itself closer
to Chinese territory. The southern end of Shaksgam valley is close to the
northern tip of the Karakoram pass. It cannot be a coincidence that all these
years that China has been in border talks with India it has deliberately not
discussed the western portion of the Karakoram towards India. The plea has been
that it is a disputed area between India and Pakistan.
Now,
with China declaring in 2010 that its border with India is a mere 2,000km dismissing
the earlier accepted disputed status of Ladakh, and with reports of Pakistan
leasing large portions of NA to China, technically the two allies have finally
linked up. What remains is a physical link-up, which requires the PA to capture
NJ 9842 and China to sever land and air links to SSN facing it. In military
terms, the physical link-up by the two adversaries will completely outflank
India’s Siachen defences and render them untenable. Sooner rather than later,
India will be forced to unilaterally pull-back its troops from Siachen, which
would be a national humiliation. With the Karakoram Range firmly with China and
Pakistan, Leh, the capital of Ladakh, would finally be threatened. To recall,
the district magistrate of Leh is on record in 2011 to have said that China is
intruding into its areas, a charge denied by New Delhi worried about souring
relations with China.
It now becomes
clear that occupation of Siachen in 1984 was a monumental blunder. The need was
for permanent occupation west of the Saltoro Range. This would have facilitated
dominance of ingress routes to the Glacier passes and importantly, provide
access to the Shyok and Nubra river approaches. With the IA having placed
itself in an operationally difficult situation, the burden to prevent a
physical link-up of China and Pakistan falls once again largely on the IAF.
Thwarting China-Pak Collusion
Should Chinese
decide to back Pakistan to push the NJ 9842-Karakoram line, India will need to
be prepared for a limited war in time and space. Combined, the two allies have
the capability to dare and accomplish this. As India will hesitate to broaden
the war to include Kashmir, where a ceasefire holds, let alone allow itself
into an all-out two-front war for which it lacks both political will and
military capabilities, at the forefront will be the IA’s 14 corps. The IAF will
need to play a supportive role to the land forces as otherwise the war would
not remain a limited one.
The 14
corps which was raised on 1 September 1999 after the Kargil war has limited
assets and awesome responsibilities. Its 8 mountain division is responsible for
the Kargil sector which extends between Zoji la and sub-sector Hanif. Its other
3 infantry division looks after Siachen and the LAC with China. The corps has
two reserve brigades. With a frontage of 1,162km, the corps zone has a 238km LC
against Pakistan, a 110km AGPL on Siachen, and 814km LAC with China. With snow
blocking the Srinagar-Leh road which passes through Zoji la, the corps remains
cut-off from the rest of Jammu and Kashmir for six to seven months in a year. Another
peculiarity of 14 corps is that it is entirely in high altitude areas from
heights between 10,000 ft to 22,000 ft.
Given
such unique characteristics, 14 corps requires a different command profile. GOC
14 corps should be an operational rather than a tactical level commander
dependent on the Northern Army Commander to help address crisis and war-time situations.
This will be contrary to the IA doctrine where a corps for a conventional war
is a tactical level formation. As an operational level commander, GOC 14 corps
would be able to interact directly with the army headquarters to ensure a balance
between Pakistan and China in threat assessments, procurements, and
infrastructure development. He could directly ask for army headquarters
reserves in a shortened chain of command; and interact with the western air
command especially in peacetime about his corps’ unique requirements without
having to go through the northern army command. All this would help 14 corps
appreciate a situation better and meet the challenge in time with adequate
response.
Two
other operational gaps staring 14 corps in the face are lack of adequate round-
the-clock surveillance capabilities, and artillery firepower. Unlike China,
which has high resolution radars on satellites capable of surveillance through
bad weather (which is the norm in the region), 14 corps has frugal satellite
capabilities. 14 corps is highly dependent on airborne sensors for surveillance
(which it does not own) with limited capabilities and weather dependent
platforms. Regarding artillery, the situation is pathetic. Considering the need
for high angle firing guns with good ranges and projectile weights for the Siachen
theatre, both Pakistan and China score heavily over India. Thus, in all five
important operational areas of surveillance, firepower, adequate reserves for
tasks at hand, the needed formation level for better command and control and
necessary infrastructure, 14 corps appears grossly inadequate. It is doubtful
if the army headquarters has reckoned a situation where China would back the PA
to enforce NJ 9842-Karakoram line.
 |
| Living quarters for jawans at base camp |
The IAF
is better prepared than the IA to face such a challenge. As part of its
peacetime air maintenance challenge which straddles Siachen and SSN against
China, it has garnered expertise to operate in these high altitude areas. The
IAF is also conscious that given the terrain, climatic conditions, defunct
infrastructure, and the importance of this area, its operational role will be
awesome. Moreover, since 2003, the IAF has been working silently to procure
capabilities and build assets in this area to meet the dual challenge. To be
sure, when the IAF speaks about assets for a strategic role, what it has in
mind is not out-of-area operations, but deterrence against China.
This
thinking is exemplified by the development of the THOISE (Transit Halt of
Indian Soldiers Enroute) air force station at an altitude of 10,066feet. THOISE
is located south of Shyok river, between the Saltoro Range and the Great Ladakh
Range (Khardung La). The Saltoro Range ends up in the Siachen glacier from
where the Nubra river flows to become a tributary of the Shyok river. As the
major river in the region, Shyok originates near Daulat Beg Oldie (where India
fought China in 1962 war) and joins the Indus in POK. Thus, THOISE is well
placed to supply along the river lines, Shyok and Nubra, both the Indian posts
in SSN against China and in Siachen. In addition, it also supplies to the
southern glacier where NJ 9842 is located. Given such air maintenance
responsibilities on two theatres which the IAF does with credit, it could not
be unaware of the operational importance of THOISE. It is another matter that
given the government sensitivity towards China, the IAF incessantly downplays its
operational role. However, its capability building and training betrays this.
THOISE
development has happened in three interesting stages. Developed in 1960, THOISE
Advanced Landing Ground (ALG) was used during the 1962 war to drop men and
material by Dakota and Packet aircraft. With Operation Meghdoot, THOISE entered
the second phase when AN-32 aircraft started operations from here in October
1984. A 7,500 feet long black-top (concrete) runway was completed in January
1987; subsequently the runway length was increased to 10,000 feet to facilitate
air maintenance operations by IL-76 and AN-32. In third phase, in 2004, THOISE
was upgraded to an independent air force station with a forward base support
unit under it. It now has centrally heated hangers for Mi-17IV, and Mi-26s are
parked here. Night flying is a major accomplishment of this air base. The
length of the runway is being further increased to facilitate landings by all
fighter aircraft; Su-30MKI aircraft have already landed here. According to the
IAF, in case of hotting up of operations against China, THOISE will be used as
a staging airfield. However, given its altitude, weapons load carrying capacity
of combat aircraft taking off from THOISE will be severely curtailed. This is
where the air-to-air refuellers will come in handy. In short, Leh (10,680 ft)
and THOISE (10,066 ft) located on both sides of Khardung La are two major air
force bases available in this area.
This is
not all. The IAF has plans to develop Nyoma and Kargil as air force bases with
facilities to operate all types of combat and transport aircraft. While Kargil
needs little explanation about its operational usefulness, Nyoma at 13,500 ft
is a mere 25km from the LAC, and importantly given its location, has the capability
to deny a major air ingress route to the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF).
Moreover, unlike DBO (the other ingress route) and Fukche, Nyoma has living
villages around it which would get a major boost by an air force station there.
Two other airstrips at DBO and Fukche will remain ALGs for use of transport
aircraft. The terrain at DBO precludes combat aircraft operations, and Fukche
at 13,700 ft altitude and just 10km from the LAC is too close to the Chinese
for IAF comfort. Unlike an air force station, ALGs are meant for peacetime
operations. Considering that the IAF has acquired C-130J and will soon have the
C-17 aircraft, the larger operational role for the service becomes clear. The
IAF does not need these aircraft for air maintenance; the C-130J is for Special
Operations and the C-17 will be the alternative to defunct infrastructure in a
war situation.
The IAF
clearly has the PLAAF in mind, and is gearing up to take on the challenge. But
has the IAF been in talks with the IA’s 14 corps about a surprise at Siachen?
