Can Siachen Spring the Next Surprise?

Pakistan Army Chief Gen. Kayani during a Pak-China military exercise

As Siachen war enters its 29^th year, FORCE looks at what it means today

By Pravin Sawhney and Ghazala Wahab

After the 1999 Kargil war and the 26/11 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, can Siachen spring the next surprise for India? Sounds impossible, all regular analysts would say. The arguments to back this assertion would be that the 28-year-old conflict has stabilised operationally, with little hope of either side making tactical gains. Both sides are keen on demilitarisation, which would be a powerful confidence building measure towards the Kashmir resolution. Both sides continue to lose troops to weather than combat which has ceased since 26 November 2003. The only thing that is preventing the pullback of mutual troops is the trust deficit between India and Pakistan. A move-back from this futile battlefield would provide a gigantic fillip to the lack of mutual trust.

While all these assertions are sensible, what if a new factor with power to change the existing geo-political and military dynamics gets introduced into this stabilised scenario? It is well known that the Pakistan Army (PA) is not reconciled to having lost the Siachen race to the Indian Army (IA). General Pervez Musharraf has confirmed that the 1999 Kargil war was a response to India’s Siachen occupation. More recently, on April 7, Pakistan’s 124 soldiers and 14 civilians were buried alive under an avalanche while sleeping in their bunkers at Gayari, the battalion headquarters of 6 Northern Light Infantry. Pakistani leaders of all hue were quick to say that Siachen be dimilitarised and the conflict end. Former Premier Nawaz Sharif went furthest saying that Pakistan should withdraw its troops even if India was not agreeable to a mutual pullback. Sensing the sombre moment, Pakistan chief of army staff (COAS), General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani muttered homilies, which Pakistan foreign office was quick to say should not be taken seriously.

The powerful factor to change the existing realities could be China. Numerous media reports in 2011 have written about 10,000 Chinese in Northern Areas (NA), purportedly for building of infrastructure there. It has also been reported that the 1978-built Karakoram Highway which connects Chinese Xinjiang with NA over the 19,000 feet Khunjerab pass well north of the Siachen glacier is to be developed into an all-weather road with Chinese help. What should alarm India, however, is something else. The Indian COAS, General V.K. Singh in 2011 spoke about the presence of nearly 3,500 Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) personnel in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). As an aside, when FORCE recently asked a senior general responsible for Kashmir theatre what could be the implication of this development, he said that his dual responsibility was counter-insurgency and anti-infiltration across the Line of Control. People in Delhi should worry about Chinese troops in POK, he added. If anything, his remarks betrayed a lack of understanding of the influence of geo-politics (geography’s influence on relations between nations) on military dynamics, which has propelled power-play in this region since centuries.

Now juxtapose the presence of PLA in POK with two related issues. On the eve of Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s visit to India in December 2010, Chinese foreign office threw a bombshell by referring to the disputed border (Line of Actual Control) between the two countries as mere 2,000km long from the known 4,056km. The Chinese new border with India includes 554km of the Middle Sector, 160km of Sikkim (this is being dealt outside the preview of border talks), and 1,226km (with 90,000sq km area) of Eastern Sector (Arunachal Pradesh). China no longer recognises a border with India in Kashmir (called the Western Sector). The astonishing bit is that India, given the history of the region, has not raised questions on how China unilaterally slashed the disputed border by half. By implication, China has become a stake-holder in Kashmir, and given its relations with Pakistan, may have no hesitation in supporting it openly on its Kashmir policy.

The other news is about Pakistan having leased portions of Northern Areas (NA) to China. This was reported in the Pakistani media without official confirmation or denial. As there is no smoke without fire, this could well be true. In March 1963, when Pakistan illegally ceded 5,100km of Shaksgam valley (abutting Siachen in Ladakh) to China, it quickly became public knowledge as both countries were still building mutual relations against a perceived common adversary. Today, given the cemented partnership between the two, what is the need for either to talk about NA’s status?  

Given these realities, what stops China from throwing its weight behind the Pakistan Army (PA) to enforce the NJ9842-Karakoram line with national security implications for India? In a military pincer, Indian positions on the Saltoro Ridge and the Glacier could be outflanked. The PA could attempt to recapture NJ9842 (surrounded by three distinct glaciers, Gyong, Urdelop and Korissa) in sub-sector west (renamed Hanif sector in memory of Captain Hanifuddin who died here during the 1999 Kargil war) presently held by India, and the PLA could sever India’s operational logistics by land and air maintenance to Sub-Sector North (SSN) facing the Chinese in Ladakh. In an area of little collateral damage, and removed from the Kashmir Valley where a ceasefire since 26 November 2003 could continue to hold, the two allies have capability and reasons (both are non-status quo and pro-active powers) to send a powerful message to India.

To be sure, few nations would diplomatically come to India’s rescue. The Siachen glacier will be interpreted to be on disputed land, and China with its unchallenged (by India) policy shift towards Pakistan would say that India is in illegal possession of both Siachen and Kashmir both of which belong to Pakistan. Such a scenario is plausible. To put this into perspective, two questions would need to be addressed. Why would Pakistan and China collude against India over Siachen? And does India have the capability to prevent this? To appreciate this, there is the need to step-back to 13 April 1984 when India started the Siachen war with complete disregard to history, the powerful geo-politics of the region, and military acumen.

Two Generals

The Siachen war for India, called Operation Meghdoot, was started by two generals, the Northern Army Commander, Lt General M.L. Chibber and his junior, the 15 crops commander in Srinagar, Lt General P.N. Hoon without any cohesive and comprehensive military planning. Operation Meghdoot was conceptualised as a minor side-show by the Northern Army Command with little involvement of the army headquarters. The COAS, General A.S. Vaidya was sidestepped by Hoon with tacit encouragement from Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. In his book, Hoon has said more than we would have ever known about the beginnings of this self-defeating war. He makes an unabashed assertion of close ties between the Hoon clan and Nehru family, finally taking the credit for briefing Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at his headquarters in Srinagar on why it was necessary to launch Meghdoot. In later years, while Chibber conceded that occupation of Siachen was a mistake, Hoon makes a nonsensical case about the importance of Siachen (see following boxes ‘Meeting Chibber’ and ‘Hoon Talk’).

Why did a discerning Indira Gandhi accept Hoon’s incredible exposition on the strategic importance of Siachen? Because, the war was politically necessary. Operation  Meghdoot was to be the first military operation since Independence when India conveyed a clear political message to Pakistan and China: India retains the right and might to pre-empt rather than react. Pakistan was stopped from having a free-run in Kashmir especially in the NA. It is a geo-political truism that unoccupied territory, however marginal, gets occupied over time by the side which has the military means and muscle to do it. Once India and Pakistan acquired sophisticated weapons and developed expertise in mountain and high altitude warfare in the late Seventies, it was a matter of time who would occupy Siachen first.

Unfortunately, Chibber and Hoon did not understand the geo-political significance of Siachen and started the war with incorrect military perceptions, resulting in faulty military aims and planning. The Indian political leadership in 1984 understood the need for the Siachen war, but did not give out political objectives of war to the military leadership. It could be argued that it was the military leadership who suggested the Siachen conflict to Indira Gandhi, and not the other way round. The Prime Minister merely went along with the military decision hoping there would be little need to baby-walk the generals. Her only term of reference was that the conflict should not escalate; precisely what happened subsequently.

This was because the two generals based the military planning on a wrong assumption that there was no requirement for a permanent occupation of the Siachen Glacier, or better still to permanently occupy low areas to the west (Dansum) of the Saltoro Range, the westernmost high ridge boundary, ranging from 12,000 to 22,000 feet, of the Glacier. It was thought enough to deter Pakistani troops from reaching the Saltoro Range. The military leadership failed to appreciate the nature and quantum of Pakistani reaction to an Indian occupation of Saltoro passes. On one hand, the nature and quantum of the protracted conflict was assessed wrongly. On the other, two basic military rules were simply overlooked. That logistics planning is always more important than strategy in war especially in high altitude mountainous terrain; and operations in high altitude areas are different from those in the mountains.

So what did planners of Operation Meghdoot do? Based on faulty military appreciation, a cardinal principle of war in the mountains was transgressed. A need for secure and organic logistics and administration of troops perched on the passes was given least attention. The Indian Air Force was asked to provide logistics, because Chibber concluded that the best and the most economical way to sustain this operation would be by the use of helicopters. An important medical lesson established by the 1962 war with China was that no acclimatisation for human beings is possible at heights more than 18,000 feet. While it is good tactics to occupy heights in the mountains for observation and operations, doing so is a hazardous proposition in high altitude areas. If only these simple facts had struck Indian commanders, the Saltoro passes would not have been occupied and a national tragedy would have been averted. Indian soldiers have taken more casualties fighting weather than Pakistani troops which occupy much lower heights.

What should have India done? Instead of occupying the Saltoro passes, Indian troops should have occupied territory west of the Saltoro Range, which then was lightly held by Pakistan. Dansum, which after the launch of Operation Meghdoot became Pakistan’s 323 brigade headquarters, at an average height of 10,000 feet, was an ideal location. This would have helped an Indian occupation in six ways:

·         One, Dansum is a relatively flat area at lower heights and is ideal for heliborne operations and troops build-up.

·         Two, the three major passes on the Saltoro Range — Sia La, Bilafond La and Gyong La — meet at Dansum. This makes Dansum an excellent base to defend the Saltoro ridge and the glacier itself.

·         Three, an Indian occupation of Dansum would have threatened Khapalu, which is Pakistan’s heavy brigade size garrison.

·         Four, Indian casualties due to weather on the Saltoro ridge and the glacier would have been minimal.

·         Five, the benefit of occupying Dansum was to be in negotiations with Pakistan as India would have been in a strong bargaining position to trade ‘land for peace’.

·         And six, Dansum provides an easy link-up with Sub-Sector West, area west of map point NJ 9842 which is the most sensitive and fighting prone area in Siachen.

Both Chibber and Hoon do not agree. According to them, occupation of Dansum ‘would have violated the Shimla agreement as Dansum is north-west and not north of NJ 9842. Secondly, Dansum is situated in a valley and we would have been dominated by Pakistan unless we captured the heights west of Dansum. Occupation of Dansum would have meant territorial aggression by India’. This argument is flawed. If a straight line due north is drawn from NJ 9842, it joins Terram Shehr II glacier, implying that in its present occupation of Sia La, Indian troops are already eight degrees west of where they should be; and hence aggressors.

Moreover, as point NJ 9842 was not identified on the ground in 1984 when Operation Meghdoot started, how was it known that ‘due north’ was along the Saltoro ridge? It was only in 1985 that an Indian survey team identified map point NJ 9842 with an approach from Urdolep glacier. NJ 9842 is surrounded by three distinct glaciers, Gyong, Urdelop and Korisa. Even if an occupation of Dansum meant a localised war with Pakistan, how would it be more than what it is now when artillery has been used freely, fiercely and regularly?

The simple truth remains that Meghdoot was not a well thought out military plan, but was a panic reaction, reminiscent of the pre-1962 ‘forward policy’ against China, when posts were occupied without ensuring their logistics lifeline. Panic was created by Pakistan’s action, as its former COAS, General Mirza Aslam Beg later conceded: In 1983 Pakistani Special Service Group chased Indian scouts from the glacier. The race for militarisation of Siachen was started by Pakistan, and India thoughtlessly occupied the Saltoro Range with an incorrect strategy of ‘holding the passes’.

India’s non-military approach seems strange for two other reasons. One, the IA has always given importance to this area by making military gains in this sector in the 1971 war with Pakistan. India’s major gains in the Western Sector against Pakistan were about 22km in the Turtok Sector, which it traded with Pakistan’s gains made in the Chhamb sector. These two tactical changes resulted in the Cease Fire Line becoming the Line of Control after the 1971 war. And two, since early Eighties, both sides had been sending military patrols

The Siachen war for India, called Operation Meghdoot, was started by two generals, the Northern Army Commander, Lt General M.L. Chibber and his junior, the 15 crops commander in Srinagar, Lt General P.N. Hoon without any cohesive and comprehensive military planning. Operation Meghdoot was conceptualised as a minor side-show by the Northern Army Command with little involvement of the army headquarters. The COAS, General A.S. Vaidya was sidestepped by Hoon with tacit encouragement from Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. In his book, Hoon has said more than we would have ever known about the beginnings of this self-defeating war. He makes an unabashed assertion of close ties between the Hoon clan and Nehru family, finally taking the credit for briefing Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at his headquarters in Srinagar on why it was necessary to launch Meghdoot. In later years, while Chibber conceded that occupation of Siachen was a mistake, Hoon makes a nonsensical case about the importance of Siachen (see following boxes ‘Meeting Chibber’ and ‘Hoon Talk’).

Why did a discerning Indira Gandhi accept Hoon’s incredible exposition on the strategic importance of Siachen? Because, the war was politically necessary. Operation Meghdoot was to be the first military operation since Independence when India conveyed a clear political message to Pakistan and China: India retains the right and might to pre-empt rather than react. Pakistan was stopped from having a free-run in Kashmir especially in the NA. It is a geo-political truism that unoccupied territory, however marginal, gets occupied over time by the side which has the military means and muscle to do it. Once India and Pakistan acquired sophisticated weapons and developed expertise in mountain and high altitude warfare in the late Seventies, it was a matter of time who would occupy Siachen first.

Unfortunately, Chibber and Hoon did not understand the geo-political significance of Siachen and started the war with incorrect military perceptions, resulting in faulty military aims and planning. The Indian political leadership in 1984 understood the need for the Siachen war, but did not give out political objectives of war to the military leadership. It could be argued that it was the military leadership who suggested the Siachen conflict to Indira Gandhi, and not the other way round. The Prime Minister merely went along with the military decision hoping there would be little need to baby-walk the generals. Her only term of reference was that the conflict should not escalate; precisely what happened subsequently.

This was because the two generals based the military planning on a wrong assumption that there was no requirement for a permanent occupation of the Siachen Glacier, or better still to permanently occupy low areas to the west (Dansum) of the Saltoro Range, the westernmost high ridge boundary, ranging from 12,000 to 22,000 feet, of the Glacier. It was thought enough to deter Pakistani troops from reaching the Saltoro Range. The military leadership failed to appreciate the nature and quantum of Pakistani reaction to an Indian occupation of Saltoro passes. On one hand, the nature and quantum of the protracted conflict was assessed wrongly. On the other, two basic military rules were simply overlooked. That logistics planning is always more important than strategy in war especially in high altitude mountainous terrain; and operations in high altitude areas are different from those in the mountains.

So what did planners of Operation Meghdoot do? Based on faulty military appreciation, a cardinal principle of war in the mountains was transgressed. A need for secure and organic logistics and administration of troops perched on the passes was given least attention. The Indian Air Force was asked to provide logistics, because Chibber concluded that the best and the most economical way to sustain this operation would be by the use of helicopters. An important medical lesson established by the 1962 war with China was that no acclimatisation for human beings is possible at heights more than 18,000 feet. While it is good tactics to occupy heights in the mountains for observation and operations, doing so is a hazardous proposition in high altitude areas. If only these simple facts had struck Indian commanders, the Saltoro passes would not have been occupied and a national tragedy would have been averted. Indian soldiers have taken more casualties fighting weather than Pakistani troops which occupy much lower heights.

What should have India done? Instead of occupying the Saltoro passes, Indian troops should have occupied territory west of the Saltoro Range, which then was lightly held by Pakistan. Dansum, which after the launch of Operation Meghdoot became Pakistan’s 323 brigade headquarters, at an average height of 10,000 feet, was an ideal location. This would have helped an Indian occupation in six ways:

· One, Dansum is a relatively flat area at lower heights and is ideal for heliborne operations and troops build-up.

· Two, the three major passes on the Saltoro Range — Sia La, Bilafond  to the region. For example, two major expeditions by the Indian Army in 1982 and 1983, called Polar Bear I and II, were military reconnaissance efforts and left tell-tale signs on the passes climbed by them. These patrols brought back information about Pakistani mountaineers, Special Forces and Northern Light Infantry, closing up from the Khapalu side towards Siachen.

India today takes pride in the fact that the entire 110km long Saltoro Range, called the Actual Ground Position Line (the western edge of the glacier facing Pakistan) is held by it, thereby denying the advantage of the Glacier to both Pakistan and China. For this reason, India will continue to hold the Glacier until Pakistan accepts a mutual withdrawal of troops on India’s terms, which means that it should formally agree to authenticate in some form the present Indian positions on the AGPL. In short, the planning and execution of Operation Meghdoot (Pakistan calls it Operation Ababeel) has been a complete success. Even as this perception has become widespread over the years, it is not the truth. Even today, the main effort on the Glacier is to maintain and preserve the personnel.

The operational logistics wholly supported by the IAF drives the Siachen war-fighting doctrine conceptualised by the IA, instead of the other way round. In any case, the IA never dwelt on a Siachen doctrine keeping geo-politics and military imperatives in mind; it concentrated on a presence on Siachen, a mind-set borrowed from the Line of Control deployments against Pakistan. The IA’s abysmally poor ability for war-gaming is all too evident: From a company-group task force for Siachen on 13 April 1984, the troops’ requirement has grown to nearly two brigade-groups plus holdings under 102 (Independent) brigade headquarters at Partapur; at any time three battalions hold the three passes on the Saltoro Range and another three battalions plus are on the Glacier itself. This is not all. Equal numbers are being trained for troops’ rotation every six months and same numbers are kept earmarked for induction. The entire operational logistics is being done by the IAF, with casualty evacuation responsibility shared by the IAF and IA’s aviation corps. Unlike Pakistan, where troops have the dual advantage of being at lower height and easy access to their posts, the India side has a single supply route going across the length of the Glacier. At the southernmost tip of the Glacier lies the base camp, the hub of all preparatory activities for living on the Glacier (see ‘NJ 9842 and broadening of the war’).

Colluding Allies

To go back to why Siachen could be the next surprise by Pakistan, there is a need to revisit the geo-politics of the region. Of the six mountain ranges in the region, Kun Lun, Pamirs, Hindukush, Karakoram, Great Himalayan Range, and the Pir Panjal range, India has traditionally given importance to the Great Himalayan Range, which until the 1962 war was considered impregnable. Pakistan and China with a keener sense of history have understood geo-politics better and hence the importance of the Karakoram. Pakistan’s understanding was the takeaway from the British who grasped the geo-politics around the old Silk route which passed along the base of the Siachen glacier towards the Karakoram pass and onto China. Determined to dominate Tibet, China first occupied Aksai Chin in 1948 and secured its land corridor to connect Xinjiang (earlier East Turkestan). Then, in the 1962 war, it pushed its claims to secure areas east of Karakoram. This was meant to provide depth of the land route to Xinjiang. In later years until the Eighties, the Chinese offer to trade off the Eastern Sector (Arunachal Pradesh) and the Western Sector (Ladakh) with India were attempts to secure its interests in the Karakoram. Except for Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh did not have any importance for the then weak China.

The Karakoram Range has a geo-political dynamics of its own. More awesome than the Great Himalayas, the Karakoram can be crossed over through two passes only. The Karakoram pass in the east is the shortest route from Leh to Xinjiang, and interestingly the Pakistani version of NJ 9842 running eastward (trigger for Siachen war) terminates at this Karakoram pass. The other pass on Karakoram is Khunjareb pass in the north across which the famed Karakoram highway runs. When Pakistan ceded the Shaksgam valley to China in 1963, it aligned itself closer to Chinese territory. The southern end of Shaksgam valley is close to the northern tip of the Karakoram pass. It cannot be a coincidence that all these years that China has been in border talks with India it has deliberately not discussed the western portion of the Karakoram towards India. The plea has been that it is a disputed area between India and Pakistan.

Now, with China declaring in 2010 that its border with India is a mere 2,000km dismissing the earlier accepted disputed status of Ladakh, and with reports of Pakistan leasing large portions of NA to China, technically the two allies have finally linked up. What remains is a physical link-up, which requires the PA to capture NJ 9842 and China to sever land and air links to SSN facing it. In military terms, the physical link-up by the two adversaries will completely outflank India’s Siachen defences and render them untenable. Sooner rather than later, India will be forced to unilaterally pull-back its troops from Siachen, which would be a national humiliation. With the Karakoram Range firmly with China and Pakistan, Leh, the capital of Ladakh, would finally be threatened. To recall, the district magistrate of Leh is on record in 2011 to have said that China is intruding into its areas, a charge denied by New Delhi worried about souring relations with China.

It now becomes clear that occupation of Siachen in 1984 was a monumental blunder. The need was for permanent occupation west of the Saltoro Range. This would have facilitated dominance of ingress routes to the Glacier passes and importantly, provide access to the Shyok and Nubra river approaches. With the IA having placed itself in an operationally difficult situation, the burden to prevent a physical link-up of China and Pakistan falls once again largely on the IAF.

Thwarting China-Pak Collusion

Should Chinese decide to back Pakistan to push the NJ 9842-Karakoram line, India will need to be prepared for a limited war in time and space. Combined, the two allies have the capability to dare and accomplish this. As India will hesitate to broaden the war to include Kashmir, where a ceasefire holds, let alone allow itself into an all-out two-front war for which it lacks both political will and military capabilities, at the forefront will be the IA’s 14 corps. The IAF will need to play a supportive role to the land forces as otherwise the war would not remain a limited one.

The 14 corps which was raised on 1 September 1999 after the Kargil war has limited assets and awesome responsibilities. Its 8 mountain division is responsible for the Kargil sector which extends between Zoji la and sub-sector Hanif. Its other 3 infantry division looks after Siachen and the LAC with China. The corps has two reserve brigades. With a frontage of 1,162km, the corps zone has a 238km LC against Pakistan, a 110km AGPL on Siachen, and 814km LAC with China. With snow blocking the Srinagar-Leh road which passes through Zoji la, the corps remains cut-off from the rest of Jammu and Kashmir for six to seven months in a year. Another peculiarity of 14 corps is that it is entirely in high altitude areas from heights between 10,000 ft to 22,000 ft.

Given such unique characteristics, 14 corps requires a different command profile. GOC 14 corps should be an operational rather than a tactical level commander dependent on the Northern Army Commander to help address crisis and war-time situations. This will be contrary to the IA doctrine where a corps for a conventional war is a tactical level formation. As an operational level commander, GOC 14 corps would be able to interact directly with the army headquarters to ensure a balance between Pakistan and China in threat assessments, procurements, and infrastructure development. He could directly ask for army headquarters reserves in a shortened chain of command; and interact with the western air command especially in peacetime about his corps’ unique requirements without having to go through the northern army command. All this would help 14 corps appreciate a situation better and meet the challenge in time with adequate response.

Two other operational gaps staring 14 corps in the face are lack of adequate round- the-clock surveillance capabilities, and artillery firepower. Unlike China, which has high resolution radars on satellites capable of surveillance through bad weather (which is the norm in the region), 14 corps has frugal satellite capabilities. 14 corps is highly dependent on airborne sensors for surveillance (which it does not own) with limited capabilities and weather dependent platforms. Regarding artillery, the situation is pathetic. Considering the need for high angle firing guns with good ranges and projectile weights for the Siachen theatre, both Pakistan and China score heavily over India. Thus, in all five important operational areas of surveillance, firepower, adequate reserves for tasks at hand, the needed formation level for better command and control and necessary infrastructure, 14 corps appears grossly inadequate. It is doubtful if the army headquarters has reckoned a situation where China would back the PA to enforce NJ 9842-Karakoram line.

Living quarters for jawans at base camp

The IAF is better prepared than the IA to face such a challenge. As part of its peacetime air maintenance challenge which straddles Siachen and SSN against China, it has garnered expertise to operate in these high altitude areas. The IAF is also conscious that given the terrain, climatic conditions, defunct infrastructure, and the importance of this area, its operational role will be awesome. Moreover, since 2003, the IAF has been working silently to procure capabilities and build assets in this area to meet the dual challenge. To be sure, when the IAF speaks about assets for a strategic role, what it has in mind is not out-of-area operations, but deterrence against China.

This thinking is exemplified by the development of the THOISE (Transit Halt of Indian Soldiers Enroute) air force station at an altitude of 10,066feet. THOISE is located south of Shyok river, between the Saltoro Range and the Great Ladakh Range (Khardung La). The Saltoro Range ends up in the Siachen glacier from where the Nubra river flows to become a tributary of the Shyok river. As the major river in the region, Shyok originates near Daulat Beg Oldie (where India fought China in 1962 war) and joins the Indus in POK. Thus, THOISE is well placed to supply along the river lines, Shyok and Nubra, both the Indian posts in SSN against China and in Siachen. In addition, it also supplies to the southern glacier where NJ 9842 is located. Given such air maintenance responsibilities on two theatres which the IAF does with credit, it could not be unaware of the operational importance of THOISE. It is another matter that given the government sensitivity towards China, the IAF incessantly downplays its operational role. However, its capability building and training betrays this.

THOISE development has happened in three interesting stages. Developed in 1960, THOISE Advanced Landing Ground (ALG) was used during the 1962 war to drop men and material by Dakota and Packet aircraft. With Operation Meghdoot, THOISE entered the second phase when AN-32 aircraft started operations from here in October 1984. A 7,500 feet long black-top (concrete) runway was completed in January 1987; subsequently the runway length was increased to 10,000 feet to facilitate air maintenance operations by IL-76 and AN-32. In third phase, in 2004, THOISE was upgraded to an independent air force station with a forward base support unit under it. It now has centrally heated hangers for Mi-17IV, and Mi-26s are parked here. Night flying is a major accomplishment of this air base. The length of the runway is being further increased to facilitate landings by all fighter aircraft; Su-30MKI aircraft have already landed here. According to the IAF, in case of hotting up of operations against China, THOISE will be used as a staging airfield. However, given its altitude, weapons load carrying capacity of combat aircraft taking off from THOISE will be severely curtailed. This is where the air-to-air refuellers will come in handy. In short, Leh (10,680 ft) and THOISE (10,066 ft) located on both sides of Khardung La are two major air force bases available in this area.

This is not all. The IAF has plans to develop Nyoma and Kargil as air force bases with facilities to operate all types of combat and transport aircraft. While Kargil needs little explanation about its operational usefulness, Nyoma at 13,500 ft is a mere 25km from the LAC, and importantly given its location, has the capability to deny a major air ingress route to the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). Moreover, unlike DBO (the other ingress route) and Fukche, Nyoma has living villages around it which would get a major boost by an air force station there. Two other airstrips at DBO and Fukche will remain ALGs for use of transport aircraft. The terrain at DBO precludes combat aircraft operations, and Fukche at 13,700 ft altitude and just 10km from the LAC is too close to the Chinese for IAF comfort. Unlike an air force station, ALGs are meant for peacetime operations. Considering that the IAF has acquired C-130J and will soon have the C-17 aircraft, the larger operational role for the service becomes clear. The IAF does not need these aircraft for air maintenance; the C-130J is for Special Operations and the C-17 will be the alternative to defunct infrastructure in a war situation.

The IAF clearly has the PLAAF in mind, and is gearing up to take on the challenge. But has the IAF been in talks with the IA’s 14 corps about a surprise at Siachen?