Delusionary Generals

By Pravin Sawhney

When French Prime Minister George Clemenceau wrote that, ‘war is too important to be left to the generals,’ he had people like Lt Gen. Syed Ata Hasnain in mind who do not understand military coercion or coercive diplomacy as distinct from war-fighting, are mixed up between perception management and reality check, and fail to appreciate that land war is just one of the six domains of war. The war-fighting domains are land, sea and air, while military coercion (short of war also called non-contact war) is possible in space, electromagnetic space and cyber domains.

Military coercion is more demanding than actual war-fighting because in addition to the kinetic capability it needs credibility to deter and compel if deterrence fails. A failed military coercion demonstrates a blunted conventional war-fighting capability. This has adverse political, military, diplomatic and psychological implications as the enemy gets emboldened.

An example of failed military coercion is India’s Operation Parakram in 2001-2002 against Pakistan. The Indian Army lost 979 soldiers in what General V.K. Singh refers to as ‘mine panic’, which ‘exposed the hollowness of our operational preparedness’ (his book: Courage and Conviction); India, by official account, spent Rs 858 crore; and New Delhi eventually blinked after the 10-month military stand-off seeking refuge in a vague posture called ‘strategic re-deployment.’ Pakistan’s 26 November 2008 Mumbai attacks were a direct consequence of India’s failed military coercion.

On the other hand, an example of successful military coercion is the three-week intrusion in April-May 2003 by Chinese border forces in Depsang plains (Ladakh). At the political level, Union minister of state for home, Kiren Rijiju told the Rajya Sabha (13 August 2014) that ‘No intrusions have been reported or taken place on the Indo-China border during last five years (since 2009).’ At the military level, the Chairman of the National Security Advisory Board, Shyam Saran wrote to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on 10 August 2013 after a spot-inspection ordered by the Prime Minister Office that, ‘the PLA troops are not allowing their Indian counterparts to patrol the Indian perception of the LAC in eastern Ladakh.’ (Hindustan Times, 3 September 2013).

The inference is obvious: China’s successful military coercion compelled India to reduce its patrolling limits. Moreover, New Delhi (Modi, and not Manmohan Singh government), as evident from Rijiju’s statement, acquiesced to Beijing’s diktat as it does not want military escalation assessing that it has little hope of winning a war. Indian political leadership correctly concluded that it is easy to start a ‘localised showdown’, the difficult part is to control escalation which has its own dynamics. After all, there is the dictum that no war plans, however brilliantly conceived, usually survive first contact in war.

In the larger sense, when Chinese shot down one of its own satellite in the low earth orbit demonstrating its Anti-Satellite (ASAT) capability in February 2009, the Pentagon saw this as a coercive reminder to the United States that it could not count on uncontested control of space commons. Within months, the US’ Raytheon was given the contract to work on a defensive shield in space to ensure that Chinese ASAT capabilities do not interfere with US’ military use of space with debris from destroyed satellites hampering their optimal utilisation.

Against this background and without digressing any further by explaining the implications of the 20-day recent stand-off in Chumar-Demchok (Ladakh) which coincided with Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to India starting September 17, I would like to return to Gen. Hasnain’s comments on my writing (reproduced below for the readers).

To Gen Husnain’s suggestion of a ‘localised showdown’, I argued that China would prefer military coercion through three probable methods, namely, shooting our satellite, cyber-attacks, or by test-firing its ballistic missiles with conventional warheads. This will be done to remind us of our miniscule capabilities in these non-contact war areas, and also to rub in that the PLA is well past the 1986-87 Sumdorong Chu crisis when both sides had more or less matching military capabilities. To be sure, China has no reason for a border war with India when it could achieve its purpose through lesser methods like the 2013 Depsang crisis.

What is Gen Hasnain’s response? He writes that I (Sawhney) do not ‘understand perception management’, which according to him means a gradual build-up for war. ‘Conflicts do not reach levels of shooting satellites out of sky without a build-up,’ he adds. Now, why is a forces’ build-up required for shooting satellite? Gen. Hasnain read about military coercion! I recommend Joseph S Nye’s brilliant book ‘The Future of Power.’

Coming to ‘perception management’, this is meant for psychological operations (psy ops) as a part of counter-insurgency operations. An adversary, however, does not get swayed by ‘perception management’, but does a ‘reality-check’ of the opponent’s capabilities and capacity before deciding the form of military power to be used in pursuance of his political objectives.

For argument’s sake, why will China get into a ‘localised showdown’ with India when there are few political objectives to be won? In a worst case scenario (extremely unlikely) it will go for a full-scale war with a capability to pump in 38 to 40 divisions in addition to unleashing other domains of war against India. This is where military strategy and operational art, where the PLA has mind-boggling capabilities, comes into play.

While Gen. Hasnain boasts of teaching operational art, he, to be sure, has, while in uniform, been a tactical player. According to the Indian Army doctrine, a corps (the highest field formation that he has commanded) is the highest tactical level of war; operational art is practiced at the command level. This is not all. He seems to have an aversion for operational art as he commanded the elite 21 strike corps (any officer will feel blessed to command an offensive force) for an unprecedented low period of mere three to four months before getting himself posted to 15 corps in Srinagar. A strike corps by practising manoeuver contributes to operational art in a land war.

However, considering Gen Hasnain teaches higher levels of war, I recommend three basic books for his reading and reflection. These are: Colin S. Gray’s ‘Explorations in Strategy’, Gen E.B. Atkeson’s ‘The Final Argument of Kings: Reflections on The Art of War’, and Edward N. Luttwak’s ‘Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace.’

To appreciate things closer home, I suggest that the he read my first book, ‘The Defence Makeover: 10 Myths that Shape India’s Image,’ written in year 2001, when he was probably a colonel posted somewhere. This book was reviewed among others by Maj. Gen. Ashok Mehta, Amitabh Mattoo and P.R. Chari. The reason why he should read my book is also to know that CI ops in J&K have floundered because its strategic underpinning was never spelt out. The political leadership should have given two directives to the army, namely, the end-state and the need for a mix of offensive and defensive methods. It is a truism that no insurgency can survive without a robust sanctuary outside (Pakistan Occupied Kashmir in our case).

During the initial years of the insurgency we were fortunate to have army chiefs like Generals Rodrigues and especially Bipin Joshi. I remember too well how Gen. Rodrigues urged me (I was in Times of India then) to visit the LC and see how our units were responding to Pakistan’s machinations by aggressive firepower and raids; the Pakistanis were on their toes. The next army chief, Gen. Joshi spent a lot of time with me (I was in Indian Express then) assuring that the army should not and will not do CI ops open-endedly. Gen. Joshi died early and his successors, unfortunately, realised that there were rewards and awards to be won in CI ops besides of course an elevation of status. Where else but in J&K can a corps commander challenge an elected chief minister publicly? The pits came in 2004. With Operation Fence, the Indian Army reduced itself to being a (glorified) paramilitary; the Pakistani troops could now sleep well at night. The fence has instilled a Maginot Line mentality in the army. Nowhere in the world there is a fence on a military-line.

Generals like Hasnain who pontificate on the virtues of the fence are unmindful of the three harms it has done to the army. One, the over 450 suicides in the army (in 2013-14 given by the defence minister Arun Jaitley in Parliament) are a consequence of the continuous war-like situation (with a defensive mind-set) in J&K since 1990. The army leadership does not agree with this and reels out a list of other reasons underplaying the primary one.

Two, the army has found itself less than prepared in all crises since 1990, namely, the Kargil conflict, Operation Parakram, and 26/11 attacks. It is rueful that with the largest annual capital acquisition budget amongst the three defence service, in 2013-2014, the air force spent 48 per cent of the total capital outlay followed by the navy. The army leadership is so obsessed with CI ops that war preparedness has taken a back-seat. In the latter, the focus is not on consolidation of assets, but on expansion of manpower. And three, as a consequence of the above, the air force, unlike in the previous wars, is no longer in a supporting role to the army. It is actually the other way round, something that the army leadership is yet to come to grips with.

All this pains me because I care for the Indian Army, an organisation that I am proud to have served. But, those days we did not have officers like Gen. Hasnain. We had professionals who understood war and operational art. They were not obsessed with CI ops and perception management. And self-projection.

Cruise Control

The recent BrahMos test-firing has brought into focus the importance of cruise missiles

By Pravin Sawhney

 

The successful maiden test-firing of BrahMos supersonic cruise missile from an underwater pontoon on March 20 was more important than has been understood in the popular perception. Media focus, unfortunately, has been on the negatives: there is no submarine platform (Project 75I) to use this version of BrahMos missile; the missile has been test-fired from a stationary underwater pontoon and not a submarine; as Project 75I acquisition is a good decade away (the RFP has still not been issued), the underwater cruise missile technology would become obsolete, are some of the comments which betray both a lack of understanding of the subject and its operational utility and context.

It seems to have been forgotten that Pakistan successfully test-fired its long range 1,000km sub-sonic Babur cruise missile, in August 2005, which since has joined its army’s inventory, upsetting the operational balance between the two militaries. While bean counting of assets between India and Pakistan is unnecessary, a new weapon system joining one’s inventory has serious operational implications for both sides, since neither is expected to use nukes early in a war. Probably a step by step approach is required to understand the latest progress in the BrahMos phenomenon: how cruise missiles relate to war? The quality of cruise missile with India and Pakistan, and the road ahead, are questions that need to be pondered over. The issue assumes importance since cruise missiles, unlike ballistic missiles, will be used freely in a conventional war.

A cruise missile is a dispensable, pilot-less, guided, continuously-powered, endo-atmospheric (stays within the atmosphere) vehicle that is supported by wings and is powered by the same kind of jet engine as an aircraft. Unlike a ballistic missile, that is powered and usually guided for only the brief initial part of its flight till it leaves the atmosphere, a cruise missile requires continuous power and guidance, since both the velocity and the direction of its flight can be unpredictably altered by local weather conditions or changes in the performance of its propulsion system. For instance, a ballistic missile is guided for the first five of the 20 minutes it takes to travel 5,000km; a cruise missile, which usually flies at subsonic speed, would require close to six hours of continuous guided flight to cover the same distance. Hence, guidance errors that accumulate with time would be almost a hundred times larger for a cruise missile than for a ballistic missile with a comparable range. Accurate arrival of a cruise missile at a target is achieved with continuous inertial guidance only by correcting it from time to time with fresh information about the missile’s position.

In terms of cost, cruise missiles are less costly to design, develop, procure, maintain and operate than ballistic missiles. In operational terms, cruise missiles are better suited than ballistic missiles for use with conventional warheads as their accuracy is far better. The aerodynamic stability of the cruise missile permits the use of less-sophisticated and therefore, less costly guidance and control methods than in the case of ballistic missiles, which undergo the stresses of re-entry into the atmosphere with high speed. For example, cruise missiles can receive satellite navigation corrections all the way to the target from the US Global Positioning System (GPS) or Russian Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) leading to 10 metres Circular Error Probability. CEP is a measure of accuracy, defined as the radius of a circle in which 50 per cent of missiles are successfully delivered.

Another appealing operational feature of cruise missiles is that they can be placed in canisters, which makes them easy to maintain and operate in harsh environment. Their relative compact size offers more flexible launch options, more mobility for ground-launched versions, and a smaller logistics burden, which reduces their battlefield vulnerability to detection — and thus improves their pre-launch survivability. Moreover, cruise missiles dictate no special launch pad stability requirements and can be launched from ships, submarines, aircraft and ground launchers with ease.

Most importantly, cruise missiles can fly low and hence pose severe detection challenges even for airborne radars due to ground clutter. Moreover, cruise missiles’ exhaust plumes are not generally detected by launch warning systems, and unlike ballistic missiles, their flight paths are unpredictable. Given the fact that reductions in radar cross-section are easier to accomplish in cruise missile designs than in manned aircraft, cruise missile pose a formidable challenge to modern air defence systems. In comparison, at least to a limited extent, defences against ballistic missiles are available with the US, Russia, Israel and China.

In more specific terms, the operational importance of cruise missiles owes to the advances in propulsion (engine), guidance and navigation technologies. The air breathing engines for propulsion are of two types: turbojet and turbofan. Turbofan engines consume much less fuel than turbojets of equivalent size; hence are more complex system and extremely expensive. Accordingly, turbofan engines are considered suitable for long-range cruise missiles with ranges between 600km to 2,000km. At present, only a few advanced countries have mastered the turbofan propulsion technology. Interestingly, China is amongst them. In 1994, the Clinton administration in the US approved a half-billion-dollar sale of turbofan engines by AlliedSignal to China for use in business aircraft. These engines were reversed engineered by the Chinese to upgrade their Silkworms Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM) to 600km range. China publicly unveiled its WS500 turbofan engine (subsequently used in Babur Land Attack Cruise Missile) at the Zhuhai Air Show in late 2004. Developed by the Chinese Gas Turbine Establishment, the WS500 is claimed to produce around 1,125lbs of thrust. By comparison, the US Tomahawk engine produces 700lbs thrust.

The turbojet engine is more widely used in cruise missile with ranges up to 500km, referred to as tactical missile. The ramjet propulsion engine is a derivative of turbojet engine. Unlike in the case of turbojet propulsion that produces subsonic speeds, in ramjet, adequate pressure is built up within the engine to produce supersonic speeds of Mach 2 (Mach 1 is equivalent to the speed of sound which is 1,000km per hour) to Mach 4. The main disadvantage of the ramjet is that it requires to be boosted from static to a suitable high velocity, usually around Mach 2, to create a high enough pressure (called ram pressure) for the ramjet propulsion to work. However, a ramjet is much simpler than turbojet or turbofan propulsion.

Regarding the navigation and control of cruise missiles, it can be done by various methods that include simple mid-course correction by pre-programmed autopilot, and terminal guidance by passive radio frequency homing, radar, or passive Infra Red. The Inertial Navigation System (INS) that uses accelerometers and gyroscopes that detect motion and calculate changes in relative position are not very helpful with cruise missiles as given their slow motion and long range, adequate inaccuracies accumulate that make it unreliable for use in conventional missions. The answer is to integrate GPS with INS. The problem with the GPS is that the US defence department has intentionally added an inaccuracy in the system called Selective Availability (SA), so that only the US military gets the accurate signal codes for its use. Interestingly, US companies themselves have created a technique called the Digital Ground Precision System (DGPS) which has removed most of the inherent GPS’ SA inaccuracies. Commercial DGPS are available in the open market and India and Pakistan are amongst the many countries that have sought the DGPS.

Probably what makes cruise missiles an attractive weapon system for developing countries is the stronger consensus amongst the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) members that restricting ballistic missiles is more important than cruise missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) systems. This has motivated many countries to upgrade ASCM and UAV to Land Attack Cruise Missile (LACM). Moreover, the MTCR threshold of 500kg payload and 300km range is more suited for ballistic rather than cruise missiles. From an engineering standpoint, it is relatively easy to scale-up the range of an existing cruise missile system than a ballistic missile. The technology required to produce a 600km range cruise missile is not fundamentally different from that needed for very short-range cruise missiles. Hence, UAV technologies falling clearly below the MTCR threshold can be exported and applied to the development of long-range cruise missiles. Moreover, the structures, propulsion, autopilot, and navigation systems used in manned aircraft are essentially interchangeable with those of cruise missiles. Against this backdrop, Pakistan’s Babur and India’s BrahMos cruise missiles need to be assessed to determine their operational capabilities. 

 

Babur

Babur’s two technology advantages are its turbofan propulsion, and its navigation and guidance system comprising the radar altimeter and a digital imaging infrared seeker. Unlike India that started with the low-end of technology by making BrahMos into an ASCM to be upgraded to LACM, Babur’s evolution appears to be the other way round. It has been developed as a long-range LACM and its naval version will be made in limited numbers to be carried by F-22P guided missile frigates.

The radar altimeter enables the cruise missile to fly as low as 20m over water, 50m over moderately hilly terrain, and 100m over mountains. (This capability makes the missile difficult to detect with ground-based radar). Fitted with turbofan propulsion, a cruise missile is capable of ranges up to 2,000km at low altitude and perhaps 50 per cent more if the first 1,500km are flown at higher altitude and the rest at tree top level.

As a thumb rule, more fuel is consumed if a cruise missile travels low, and inversely, less fuel is expended if a cruise missile travels at higher altitudes within the atmosphere. Given these technical parameters, Pakistan media reports claiming that the 10 August 2005 test-firing of Babur achieved a range of 500km at a low cruising altitude of 100m at a speed of Mach 0.7 sound plausible. Moreover, Babur has tremendous inherent potential to be made into an accurate long range LACM.

The introduction of Babur missile by Pakistan coincides well with the Chinese focus on cruise missiles with longer ranges since the Nineties. For example, China reportedly has a number of cruise missile programmes underway. These include the YJ-62 long-range ASCM, as well as air and ground launched derivatives. For missile guidance, China has acquired active radar guidance for terminal guidance in addition to electro-optical seeker for LACM.

It will be appropriate to assume that China, which cares little about international non-proliferation treaties and obligations, would have shared advanced cruise missile technology with Pakistan. In summation, Babur, with state-of-the-art turbofan technology procured from China, is expected to be used as sub-sonic LACM and on surface ships.

 

BrahMos

What makes BrahMos cruise missile extraordinary is that it is the only significant weapon system produced by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) which has evolved in reasonable time and cost-lines and has been accepted by all the three defence services (navy, army and air force) readily without government pressure. The missile has two-stage propulsion — solid propellant rocket for initial acceleration and liquid fuelled ramjet for sustained supersonic cruise — achieving a speed of 2.8 Mach to deliver a 300kg payload. Russia has provided propulsion, while India is responsible for navigation based on inertial navigation system.

A brainchild of Dr APJ Abdul Kalam, BrahMos has matured through Dr Sivathanu Pillai’s efforts as a multi-role cruise missile. The inter-governmental joint venture agreement signed between India and Russia on 12 February 1998 formed the BrahMos Aerospace to build ASCM to be jointly designed, developed, produced and marketed. Fifteen years later, in February 2012 when BrahMos celebrated its landmark anniversary, it had achieved the unexpected. Starting with INS Rajput in 2005, BrahMos has been accepted by the navy to be its offensive weapon on all surface ships. The army has accepted three versions of BrahMos LACM. Three regiments of BrahMos Block I and II have been raised as part of artillery divisions. Block I is with radio frequency seekers, while Block II has indigenous software developed by BrahMos and DRDO for better accuracy against smaller targets.

In tandem with GPS, an accuracy of 10m has been achieved. Block III version is meant for mountains, where BrahMos’ steep-dive capability meant to cover targets behind mountain ridges (called dead ground in army parlance) was successfully demonstrated to the army on 5 September 2010.  Orders for a regiment of BrahMos LACM Block III version have since been placed. The BrahMos LACM version will be provided with an Infrared missile seeker with an inbuilt camera to provide simultaneous photographs of the target to minimise collateral damage.

Meanwhile, work has started on adopting BrahMos for the air and undersea versions. The air version will be lighter in weight and the government has cleared modifications on 42 numbers of Su-30MKI aircraft to have the supersonic missile. All checks and analysis by HAL and the Sukhoi design bureau have been completed and the field ‘drop test’ of BrahMos from the Su-30MKI is slated for the end of the year, with the production expected to commence in 2014.

Meanwhile, BrahMos created a record of sorts by its recent underwater launch from a pontoon platform. The navy is satisfied with the tests and preliminary acceptance to have eight vertically launched BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles on each P-75I submarine has been cleared. Consider a realistic naval firepower potential a decade from now: All Kilo-class submarines will be fitted with the Russian Klub 3E-14E LACM. With each submarine carrying 16 to 18 of these 300km range missiles, the navy will have devastating firepower to employ in various tactical scenarios. This is not all. With P-75I submarines getting inducted into service, they would be fitted with both Klub 3E-14E LACM and improved BrahMos missiles; then, even reduced submarine numbers will be made good by better capabilities.

Probably the biggest limitations of BrahMos are its 290km range and 300kg warhead, well under the MTCR range threshold of 300km and 500kg. Fitted with ramjet propulsion, BrahMos rises up to an altitude of nearly 10km to 12km, before the ramjet propulsion takes over to provide the missile with a speed of Mach 2.8 during the cruising phase. BrahMos’ advantage is that with its high speed, it is capable of travelling its maximum range in four minutes. Even as the missile during its initial phase will provide a sizeable signature for the enemy acquisition radar, there will be little time to take counter measures to stop the missile.

On balance, BrahMos has three distinctive features. One, except for the air version, it has a universal launcher for its naval and land versions. Two, the same missile, without any modification, can be employed against any ship or land targets. And three, no land forces in the world are equipped with supersonic cruise missiles. Specific to Pakistan, with kinetic energy nine times more than Babur, BrahMos is a formidable supersonic cruise missile.  

What India now urgently needs is a cruise missiles policy, whose long-term developmental focus should be three-pronged: to improve BrahMos to hypersonic speeds, to work on a long range subsonic cruise missile with indigenous turbofan propulsion, and Cruise Missile Defence (CMD). There will also be the need to decide various platforms for cruise missiles, as being the prime target of the enemy these will be vulnerable. For example, the LACM can be fired from mobile launchers, hardened silos and submarines; the ideal, of course, will be to have a mix of all three.

There is a need to exploit BrahMos, which is available in all three sea, land and air versions, optimally. At present, BrahMos uses the GPS. It is known that the Indian Space and Research Organisation (ISRO) is working on an indigenous GPS, which has been partially successful. Once accomplished, this will be a major breakthrough in providing secure and improved guidance to cruise missiles. Another cruise missile project should concentrate on scramjet propulsion, to take the missile to hypersonic speeds of Mach 10, something that BrahMos Aerospace has initiated. It may be recalled that conceptual work on hypersonic propulsion was started in 1993 by the then DRDO chief, Dr APJ Abdul Kalam. In addition to the engine itself, the need will be for composite materials that can withstand high temperatures for trans-atmospheric flight. Unfortunately, material management has never been India’s strength and outside help (Russia) would be needed.

Probably the most daunting challenge will be the Cruise Missile Defence (CMD), especially when futuristic missiles are expected to have hypersonic propulsion. The answer to this lies in directed energy weapons, which derive their destructive power from electromagnetic energy or subatomic particle beams aimed against an incoming warhead, and travel close to or at the speed of light. For example, laser light can be used as directed energy weapon. Laser guided weapons differ from the anti-missile weapon systems in three fundamental ways: One, in laser weapons destructive energy is transported to the target in the form of an intense beam of electromagnetic waves rather than in the form of an explosive charge carried inside a missile or shell. Two, this energy travels at the speed of light, that is, 3.10 (to power 8) metres per second, compared with 1,000 to 2,000m per second that a supersonic missile should be capable of. And three, the laser beam can damage a target only if it physically strikes it. It is axiomatic that laser weapons are best directed from space. While India is in no way near such advanced research and in principle opposes militarisation of space, it must start appreciating the non-military applications of space.

In a rare candid admission, a former DRDO chief, M. Natarajan has said: “The lack of success in developing indigenous propulsion systems for the country’s major programmes is a cause of concern. Affected are programmes such as the aero engines for fighter aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles, engines for tanks and naval propulsion and ramjet and hypersonic propulsion for missiles.” Taking cue, the DRDO should abandon its penchant for hype and boasting, and indeed concentrate on essentials with transparency. The growth trajectory of BrahMos Aerospace has set the roadmap for future developments.

Games DRDO Plays

By Pravin Sawhney

Tall claims and empty boasts seem to have become the hallmark of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). The proclivity of the Director General, DRDO, Dr V.K. Saraswat and his team to exaggerate its achievements would be amusing to discerning people. Unfortunately, this amusement has grave national security implications and Dr Saraswat, a ballistic missile expert with the indigenous Prithvi ballistic missile being his crowning glory, should know this better than most.

As the director general, DRDO, he is leading the nation’s home-grown Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) programme. The claims made by him about the recently tested-fired Dhanush and Prithvi II ballistic missiles on March 11 and the BMD Endo-atmospheric interceptor test on March 6 are exaggerated beyond imagination. These should have been put into perspective by the Indian defence correspondents and experts, not only for domestic but international consumption as well, because the Pakistani establishment, while ignoring DRDO’s claims on Prithvi, utilises the boasts about the BMD to its strategic advantage.

Making use of Saraswat’s chest-thumping, Pakistan is going ahead full throttle to more than match India’s humble BMD technological achievements; if at all, the programme is decades away from fruition. According to US intelligence, while ahead of India in ballistic missiles capabilities since 2001, General Headquarters, Rawalpindi continues to increase its inventory of nuclear weapons’ land vector by citing India’s BMD claims as a destabilising factor. This writer had first-hand experience of this a few months ago. During the alumni meet at the Cooperative Monitoring Centre (Sandia National Laboratory) at Albuquerque, US in October 2010, a former director of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division, Brigadier Feroz Khan argued that India’s growing BMD capability had forced Pakistan to build more ballistic missiles.

Given its unbridled inventory, it is a matter of time before the Pakistan Army will alter its war-fighting doctrine to align it with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army thinking. While supplementing air power, the difference between combat aircraft and ballistic missiles will narrow down to tighter control of the latter. This will upset the Indian Air Force combat numbers superiority over the Pakistan Air Force and force the Indian Army to review its operational level pro-active strategy, referred to as the Cold Start doctrine in the media, against the Pakistan Army. Given such implications, the defence minister needs to restrain Saraswat and the DRDO from making irresponsible statements. Apparently after the recent claims on the BMD project, defence minister A.K. Antony has expressed his displeasure to Saraswat.

Prithvi and Dhanush

A brief history and technological limitations of the indigenous Prithvi ballistic missile are in order. The development of surface-to-surface Prithvi ballistic missile was sanctioned by the government in 1983 under the Integrated Guided Missiles Development Programme. As Prithvi was an offshoot of ISRO’s civilian Space Launch Vehicle (SLV), its development commenced without the General Staff Qualitative Requirements (GSQR) — technical requirements given by the user, that is, defence services, to the research organisation — implying that the defence services were neither consulted nor were they interested (ballistic missiles were still unknown to them) in the programme. As happens with most indigenous programmes, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi personally goaded the army in 1988 to accept Prithvi in order to encourage the indigenous product. Considering the Prime Minister had intervened regarding a weapon system, it was easy for the DRDO to arm-twist the other two services, the navy and the air force to seek the missile with a few minor and not design changes to suit its medium of operations.

Thus, three versions of the same missile were created. The army’s Prithvi has a range of 150km with a 1,000kg payload. Working on the trade-off between weight of the warhead and the missile range, the IAF was offered the Prithvi (Prithvi II) with 250km range and 500kg payload. The IAF argued that it had little use for this missile, after all what was the point of a ballistic missile (with dubious accuracy) knocking off a few of enemy building (in a 500kg payload, 30 per cent space by volume would be occupied by the arming and fusing mechanisms, and onboard digital autopilot) and causing collateral damage.

The DRDO then took two steps. It announced to the media that Prithvi would be nuclear capable as well — this statement took care of the accuracy issue as with nuclear warheads accuracy becomes less important — and it decided to increase the warhead by making the payload weight 750kg instead of 500kg. This was sought to be achieved by using boosted liquid propellant to generate greater thrust-to-weight ratio. Technically, if there is a 20 per cent change in the warhead weight or range, a ballistic missile requires a series of fresh testing. Then Prithvi project director, Saraswat, the present DG, DRDO, ruled out extensive testing saying that the air force variant will not be a new design. What is more, he claimed a Circular Error Probability, a measure of accuracy and consistency, of 25metres at full range (‘Boosting the Arsenal’ India Today, 29 February 1996), which is untrue even today. This labelled Prithvi a dual-use missile, which could be used with both conventional and nuclear warheads.

Enormous pressure was put on successive air force chiefs to accept the Prithvi II, so much so that the air force chief in 2006, when asked in a press conference (by me), was prompted to say that the IAF would get a squadron of Prithvi II missiles. Contrary to popular understanding, the reality is that the IAF does not have Prithvi II missiles, and to fast-forward the story, will never get them as Prithvi’s production has stopped. The few Prithvi II made by the DRDO are held by DRDO on behalf of the Strategic Forces Command (SFC), which was created on 4 January, 2003. The much publicised Prithvi II test-firing by the SFC on 11 March, 2011 was from these holdings.

To digress a bit, there is ambiguity about the SFC as well. Being a strategic command, the SFC should have under its command only those ballistic missiles (Agni series) which will be used with nuclear warheads. For example, the status of Army’s Prithvi missiles is unclear: two Prithvi missile units are held by the two artillery divisions suggesting they will be used with conventional warheads. However, their annual firing practice is under the aegis of SFC, which should mean they will have nuclear warheads. A dangerous situation has thus been created where the adversary (Pakistan) is uncertain whether Prithvi is indeed a dual-use missile. Moreover, as India does not have an understanding or agreement with Pakistan on the usage of various ballistic missiles (it was bilaterally sought under the Memorandum of Understanding signed as part of the 1999 Lahore Declaration), a misreading or a miscalculation about the warhead would have grave consequences.

Meanwhile, learning from the IAF’s doggedness, the DRDO agreed to do a number of test-firings for the naval version, Dhanush, with a purported range of 300km carrying a 1,000kg payload. It is worth noting that the first test of Dhanush done atop a surface ship on 11 April 2000 was a failure. This validated the IAF’s point that a new design requires extensive test-firings. Given the operational limitations of the missile (discussed later), the navy, like the IAF, has never been enthusiastic about Dhanush. The 11 March 2011 Dhanush test done from INS Suvarna is part of the validation process. Commenting on the recent tests of Prithvi II and Dhanush, Saraswat reportedly claimed that the missile had a CEP of less than 10 metres, implying that if the missile is fired at its full range, 82 per cent of the hits will be within a radius of 10 metres drawn around the bulls-eye. Not to be left behind, DRDO chief controller for life sciences (who has little to do with ballistic missiles), W. Selvamurthy claimed that the SFC, according to its strategy, can now attack a target from land and sea simultaneously. Considering that the land-based Prithvi version, given Pakistan’s elongated geography, can hit almost all valuable targets, what is the need for the navy to fire Dhanush? If indeed Dhanush was a successful nuclear weapon vector, what was the need for India to spend billion of rupees on developing the sea-based deterrence INS Arihant and its follow-on vessels?

Coming back to the army’s Prithvi, it has, at least, four major technical and operational limitations. One, when all countries with ballistic missiles use solid propellants, Prithvi uses liquid propellant, which is difficult to handle in the field and during tactical movements. While pre-filled Prithvi has shelf-life limitation (once filled, the liquid propellant cannot be emptied out and the missile will need to be destroyed), topping the missile in the field requires large preparatory time and utmost care (as the liquid propellant is highly corrosive to human skin), a luxury unavailable in the din of war. Two, the terminal velocity of the Prithvi is low, and hence high explosive monolith conventional warhead will not be able to penetrate the hardened fortifications on the international border between India and Pakistan. The reason for Prithvi’s low terminal velocity is that unlike the Chinese M-11 (which Pakistan has), the body of the Prithvi does not separate from the warhead. The pre-fragmented warhead will be effective against ‘soft targets’, but compared with the multi-barrel rocket launchers like Smerch and Pinaka, which the artillery has, the Prithvi fire will not be cost-effective and flexible. For this reason, the DRDO never developed the other advertised conventional warheads like pre-fragmented monolith, bomblet sub-munitions, and blast cum earth-shock munitions for Prithvi. Three, as Prithvi lacks a proven terminal guidance system, its accuracy and consistency for use with conventional warheads is unacceptable. As a general guideline, Prithvi’s CEP is 100m for 150km. All Prithvi tests have been done from pre-surveyed sites and hence are stage-managed. It can be argued that even in war, Prithvi could be fired from pre-surveyed sites, but this will be at the cost of battlefield flexibility. Considering that the BrahMos Land Attack Cruise Missile (LACM) gives a less than 10m CEP at full advertised range of 290km (its range is much more, but has been kept suppressed to adhere to Missile Technology Control Regime limits) with supersonic speed, the army has found it a far better option that Prithvi for depth and strategic targeting. And lastly, the Prithvi missile signature is huge as it rises upon firing; the enemy will find its general location with ease for counter bombardment.

Once the army acquired the BrahMos LACM, Smerch and Pinaka MBRLs, the future of Prithvi in its present design, with all its shortcomings, was sealed and its production stopped. As an aside, the IAF, which did not accept the Prithvi II, has acquired a regiment of BrahMos LACM. The government has decreed that the existing two regiments of Prithvi with the Indian artillery will eventually be replaced by Agni missiles (Agni-V whenever it enters service) and will be given to the SFC. Prithvi in all its manifestations is a dead dog that continues to be flogged by the DRDO for meaningless glory.

Ballistic Missile Defence

To place the 6 March 2011 Endo-atmospheric interception test at 15km altitude into perspective, a brief backgrounder on BMD is necessary. Any BMD has six essential elements. The first is the early warning system that is capable of signalling the launch of enemy’s ballistic missile as early as possible. Earliest detections are best done by satellite and by aircraft (AWACS and AEW&C), capabilities which India presently does not have. It is hoped that AEW&C networked capability should be available by 2015, which then will provide dual-advantage of providing early warning and early cue to the Long Range Tracking Radar (LRTR). The second element is the LRTR, with a range of mere 600km; called Swordfish, this is the DRDO’s name for acquired Israeli Green Pine radars. The third element is the Multi Functional Fire Control Radar (MFFCR), a short range, short wavelength radar which takes over from the LRTR, detects the small cross section of the hostile missile and passes the relevant information to the control centre, where necessary computations are done and hostile missile coordinates are relayed to the interceptor missiles. The DRDO has the Thales MFFCR will a range of 350km capable of detecting radar cross-section of 0.3sqm. The control centre called the battle management and command, control, communication and intelligence (BM/C3I) is the fourth element of the BMD system. The fifth and sixth elements are the two interceptors, one each in the Endo and Exo-atmosphere to simultaneously hit and kill the ballistic missile before its nuclear warhead gets activated.

As a general rule, the nuclear chain reaction, which then cannot be controlled, gets activated about 10km (airburst is achieved with proximity fuse for maximum casualties) above the earth. If the hostile payload that has the nuclear warhead gets a direct hit before the payload drops to this low height, the nuclear core will not get activated and it will not burst. It is evident that interceptor missiles with conventional warhead should be used only if it has 100 per cent accuracy to hit the bull’s eye. Otherwise, the preferred option for interceptor missile warhead is a nuclear warhead which while engaging the hostile missile ideally in Exo-atmosphere detonates its warhead by its blast (it need not be a direct hit), with the nuclear debris then suspended in space. In short, it should be nuclear warhead for nuclear warhead to destroy enemy’s long range missiles.

Moreover, 30km height is the dividing line between the atmosphere and space; below 30km is atmosphere and above 30km is space, two medium with different characteristics. It is evident that both the interceptors should be designed to hit the hostile missile as high as possible so that the destroyed missile’s debris falls as much away as possible from friendly territory. Thus, the Exo-interceptor should be able to engage at heights of 200km plus with hypersonic speeds to hit long range hostile missiles with ranges up to 5,000km coming at high speeds. If this hit is not achieved, the Endo-interceptor should then kill the missile the moment it is at 30km height and enters the atmosphere.

Given these facts, let’s examine what has been achieved by the DRDO. The indigenous BMD programme started in 1995, the trigger were reports that Pakistan had acquired M-11 ballistic missiles from China. The M-11 has 400km range, but the advertised range was kept at 280km to meet MTCR limits. In quick time, Pakistan also acquired the Chinese M-9 ballistic missiles with 600km range. Keeping sights low and not bothering for subsequent Pakistani missiles acquisitions with ranges of 2,000km plus (no one thought about Chinese ballistic missiles), the DRDO started its work on the BMD. The Israeli LRTR with 600km and the Thales 350km range radars met the immediate need. The Exo-interceptor is PAD, a derivative of the indigenous Prithvi ballistic missile, and the Endo-interceptor is AAD, inspired by the indigenous medium range surface-to-air Akash missile with a 25km maximum slant range. The PAD, later called PAD-I, is a two stage interceptor missile, a solid propellant second stage rocket is mounted on top of the liquid propellant Prithvi. To achieve high terminal speed, a liquid ‘divert-thruster’ is placed on top of the second stage solid propellant. The ‘divert-thruster’ and the payload are fired simultaneously towards the target once they are within the seeker range (Radio Frequency) of 30 to 40km.

Three technical infirmities in PAD-I are: it can achieve a maximum height of 80km only and hence it cannot intercept missiles with more than 1,000km ranges; it has RF seeker which is unlikely to ‘acquire for hit’ fast speed long range missiles; and it uses a conventional warhead armed with proximity fuse, which while exploding within 20metres of the hostile missile may not hit it. If the hostile missile with nuclear warhead does not get a direct hit, it will continue on its trajectory path and its nuclear warhead will detonate at designated height. The PAD-I has done two successful interceptions at 48km and 80km heights in space. Understanding the severe shortcoming of PAD-I, Saraswat told me a year ago (FORCE, March 2010) that PAD-I would be modified to PAD-II or PDV with two changes: the first stage of PAD-I (Prithvi) which is a liquid motor will be replaced by a solid motor stage with high energy levels. The second stage will also be modified for higher interception accuracy and the RF seeker will be replaced by an Imaging Infra Red (IIR) seeker. He had said that PDV would be test-fired by end of 2010; this crucial test has still not happened.

After the 6 March 2011 Endo-atmospheric test, Saraswat announced that, “one more interception will be done to intercept a 2,000km range incoming missile at an altitude of 150km. With this test, which will be done in 2011, the BMD Phase one will be over.” Saraswat added that, “India’s plans for putting in place the first phase of the two-layered ballistic missile defence shield by 2012 and the second phase by 2016 are on course.” Saraswat was referring to the long overdue PDV test.

The two-phased BMD programme that he talks about is: in Phase I, with one more test of PDV, the two interceptors (Exo and Endo) will be ready for production by 2012. Between 2012 and 2013, the DRDO will put together the required number of interceptors as well as other elements like radars and control centres. Thus, by 2013, Indian BMD will be ready to successfully intercept hostile ballistic missiles armed (with nuclear warheads) with 2,000km ranges. In Phase II, which Saraswat says will be ready by 2016, whose interceptors are to be validated by 2015, the BMD would take on ballistic missiles with 5,000km ranges. Dr Saraswat is kite-flying. His targets are unreal and his BMD achievements are gross exaggerations.

Talking about Phase I meant to hit 2,000km range ballistic missiles, there are five major unresolved issues. First, the choice of Prithvi missile as the target (in all the interceptions done so far) is wrong as the missile (discussed above) has slow speed. It ought to be remembered that Pakistan does not have Prithvi missiles; all its missiles with 2,000km ranges (like the Chinese CSS-5, renamed Ghauri, as even M-11 and M-9) have faster speeds. Saraswat would do well to designate indigenous Agni-I with 700km and Agni-II with 2,000km range as the hostile missiles and then demonstrate successful interceptions. Second, the PAD-I, validated thus far, can attain a maximum height of 80km, which is insufficient to intercept 2,000km range missiles in Exo-atmosphere. Moreover, there is a need to demonstrate high speed interceptor than the present PAD-I intercepting Prithvi missile. The answer is the PDV interceptor demonstration which has been delayed, obviously because it is not ready yet. Therefore, would it not be better for DRDO to hold the claims till PDV is successfully test-fired against Agni-II missile? Let the tests do the talking.

Third, given the fact that the interceptors are armed with conventional warheads, there is the need to demonstrate simultaneous Exo and Endo-atmospheric tests; if one misses the target, the other should be able to kill it. This has not been done. Fourth, the DRDO has not said whether the latest March 6 test and the earlier tests were indeed direct hits. Considering that the interceptors have RF seekers and the IIR seekers have still not been demonstrated, and the proximity fuse on the warhead will explode within 20m of the target, even with a slow target like Prithvi, the interceptions may not have achieved a ‘kill’. And fifth, all interceptor tests have been conducted from known designed sites, and have thus been stage managed. All Prithvi missiles depicting hostile missiles have been fired from the Integrated Test Range (ITR) at Chandipur, Orissa, and the interceptors from the Wheeler’s Island 70km apart. In actual war, such ideal situations will be unavailable. There is thus a need to do further tests in the above suggested configurations for successful interceptions of missiles with 2,000km ranges.

The BMD phase II will obviously be more challenging and it is unreal to now announce its accomplishment date of 2016. To thwart 5,000km range missiles (meant against China), the DRDO will need the following: the present Swordfish LRTR will need to be replaced with minimum 1,500km range radar. This will require foreign collaboration; it is doubtful if Israel will be able to help in this. Ideally, India will need satellite capability for early warning, which it does not have. The interceptors, Exo and Endo, will require higher speed, better seekers, and importantly should be able to attain up to 200km heights, which at present is a tall order. Probably, the biggest challenge will be to consider a nuclear warhead on the Exo-atmospheric interceptor to kill a 5,000km range nuclear missile. Considering the 1998 series of nuclear tests done by India, the question is, can India produce compact nuclear warheads with high yields and assurance for the low-diameter interceptors? It needs to be remembered that even with the best BMD programmes, the assurance level of ‘killing’ all hostile ballistic missiles is never more than 80 per cent.

What has been accomplished so far is nothing more than small baby steps in BMD development. But, Saraswat does not think so. After the March 6 test, he told the media that “Only the US, Russia, France, Israel and India have the capability to put in place a ballistic missile defence shield. China is still developing it.” Alluding to the successful Chinese anti-satellite test done in 2007, he said that, “India now has all the technologies and building blocks which can be used for anti-satellite missions in the low earth and polar orbits.”

He earlier gave me (FORCE, March 2010) a lengthy explanation on the subject. According to him, “Demonstrating satellite interception is not something that is necessary to acquiring this capability. Satellite, as you know, has a predictable path, whether it is in the polar, low earth or any other orbit. To check my interception capability, I can always simulate the satellite path electronically. I will generate an electronic scenario at the launch pad as if I am getting the data from another satellite or ground-based radar and take that as the inputs to my mission-control centre and then launch an interceptor. Since the path is known, I can know if I have accurately hit the target or not, unlike the ballistic missiles, where the path can be unpredictable because of aero-dynamic and many other reasons. So technically, we have concluded that we do not need to check our building blocks to ascertain whether we have satellite interception capability.”

When I asked him, why the Chinese had thought it necessary to demonstrate anti-satellite capability, he replied, “I do not know. Only they can answer this question.” Probably the answer lies in the cold statistics. Satellites in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) are at heights of 300km above the earth, as they will not be stable otherwise. The Polar orbit is at height of 843km. The demonstrated capability of DRDO’s Exo-interceptor is only 80km above the earth. How does this claim square up? Even if the DRDO were able to make an interceptor which could reach the height of 300km, it needs to be remembered that satellites in LEO move at speeds of 28,000km per hour. Thus, to demonstrate assurance, there is a need to do a successful anti-satellite test, which the Chinese did, and got the US anxious about their increasing space capabilities. The US, which has demonstrated capability to kill a satellite in LEO and Polar orbits with laser on aircraft, is already thinking about the inevitability of space militarisation. Both the early warning and interception of satellites and long range missiles (5,000km onwards) by laser beams is best done through space capabilities. China is planning the catch-up with the US. Where does this leave India where the DRDO has happily declared that intercepting satellites and ballistic missiles are the same thing? Worse, no one has questioned the wisdom of the Indian BMD, its implications and future.